THE  REACTION  OF  ENGLISH  MEN  OF  LETTERS  OF  THE  NINETEENTH 
CENTURY  TO  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  AUGUSTE  COMTE 


BY 

GARRETA  HELEN  BUSEY 

B.  A.  Wellesley  College,  1915 


THESIS 

SUBMITTED  IN  PARTIAL  FULFILLMENT  OF  THE  REQUIREMENTS 
FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF  MASTER  OF  ARTS  IN  ENGLISH 
IN  THE  GRADUATE  SCHOOL  OF  THE 
UIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS 
1922 


URBANA,  ILLINOIS 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2016 


https://archive.org/details/reactionofenglisOObuse 


\ u.  u- 


UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS 

THE  GRADUATE  SCHOOL 


3 / 


192 


I HEREBY  RECOMMEND  THAT  THE  THESIS  PREPARED  UNDER  MY 
SUPERVISION  BY 
ENTITLED 

/Vt\ 

BE  ACCEPTED  AS  FULFILLING  THIS  PART  OF  THE  REQUIREMENTS  FOR 


it  !jd  4 *£  tiCt 


Head  of  Department 


Recommendation  concurred  in* 


Committee 


on 


Final  Examination* 


Required  for  doctor’s  degree  but  not  for  master’s 


t 

f • 


, 


. 


CONTENTS 


Page 

Introduction  1 

Chapter 


I. 

Early  Interpreters 

18 

II. 

The  Universities 

47 

III. 

The  Priory 

75 

Conclu 

sions 

112 

Partial  List  of  Books  Used 


115 


INTRODUCTION 


"Selon  une  excellent©  remargue  de  M.  Brunet iere,"  says 
Lanson,^  "pour  etablir  la  valeur  d'unpoete,  il  suffit  presque 
de  l'interroger  sur  trois  points:  comment  a-t-il  parle  de  la 
nature,  de  1* amour,  de  la  mort?"  The  value  of  a writer  to 
others  is  indicated  hy  his  attitude  toward  the  material  world 
around  him,  toward  other  human  beings,  and  toward  those  mys- 
terious forces  that  are  outside  the  realm  of  human  knowledge* 

Every  mature  thinking  man  must,  consciously  or  unconsciously, 
have  taken  some  definite  attitude  towards  these  fundamental 
problems  of  existence,  and  upon  the  stand  which  he  has  taken  will 
depend  his  self-expression,  either  in  deed  or  word*  Accordingly, 
philosophy  and  literature  are  inextricably  bound  up  together. 

Into  the  great  tapestry  of  the  latter  are  woven  all  the  various 
threads  of  thought  and  emotion  which  man  produces,  forming  a 
subtly  - varied , yet  rhythmically  recurrent  pattern, 

n,But  there  is  no  Religion?'  says  Professor  Teufels- 
drockh  in  Sartor  Resartus , 'Pool.'  I tell  thee,  there  is. 

Hast  thou  well  considered  all  that  lies  in  this  immeasurable 

2 

froth-ocean  we  name  LITERATURE. T" 


Lanson,  Hist  or ie  d e la  Litt eratur e Eran^ais  e . p.  239, 

2 

Carlyle,  Sartor  Resartus . p.  190. 


f 


f 


-2- 


In  their  attempts  to  solve  the  fundamental 
problems  of  life,  men  have  arrived  at  such  widely  varying  con- 
clusions that  a list  of  the  schools  of  philosophy  sounds  almost 
as  ridiculous  as  Folonius*  classification  of  the  diframa.  Among 
the  tangled  threads  of  speculation,  however,  two  tendencies  are 
discernable,  i.  e.  faith  in  a supernatural  religion,  and  denial. 

"As  in  the  long-drawn  Systole  and  long-drawn  Diastole,  must  the 
period  of  Faith  alternate  with  the  period  of  Denial;  must  the  ver- 
nal growth,  the  summer  luxuriance  of  all  Opinions,  Spiritual 
Representations  and  Creations,  be  followed  by,  and  again  follow, 
the  autumnal  decay,  the  winter  dissolution."1  Man,  with  his 
instinct  to  worship,  builds  churches,  and,  with  his  reason,  tears 
them  down  again. 

Positivism  is  in  line  with  the  rationalistic  tradition 
and  can  trace  its  ancestry  back  to  antiquity,  when,  even  before 

Aristotle,  the  polytheism  of  ancient  Greece  found  critics  who 

' ' 2 

substituted  for  it  either  a single  deity  or  a sort  of  materialism. 

3 

It  was  in  the  Renaissance,  however,  that  the  forces  of  rationalism, 
the  elements  which  were  to  produce  posit iviem,  became  more  evident, 
receiving  new  life  with  the  general  blossoming  forth  of  that  time. 
Science,  in  the  form  of  astronomy,  upset  the  ancient  Christian 
cosmography  by  insisting  that,  not  the  earth,  but  the  sun  was  the 
center  of  the  universe.  Bacon,  in  his  Novum  Organurc,  reintro- 

1 

Carlyle,  Sartor  Resartus.  p.  86. 

2 

Benn,  Snglish Rational ism  in  the  19th  Century.  I,  59. 

3 

Ibid.  I,  86-87. 


T 


r r 


-3- 

duced  inductive  reasoning  to  prominence,  Descartes,  doubting 

everything,  Hobbes,  who  inaugurated  modern  materialism,  and 
1 

Spinoza,  in  his  reaction  against  the  anthropomorhpism  of  the 

traditional  theology,  in  his  denial  of  emotion  and  free  will  to 

God,  and  his  modern  Biblical  criticism,  all  were  products  of  the 

new  freedom  of  thought  of  the  Renaissance, 

In  England,  the  lineal  descendants  of  Eobbes  and  Bacon 

were  Locke,  Hume,  Bentham,  and  the  Utilitarians;  in  Erance,  the 

tradition  was  represented  by  Auguste  Comte  (1798-1857). 

2 

There  are  four  circumstances  in  the  life  of  Comte 
which  are  of  interest  as  possibly  bearing  upon  the  formation  of 
his  theories  and  upon  the  task  of  tracing  their  influence  in 
England.  (1)  During  his  poverty-stricken  youth  in  Paris,  he  be- 
came a disciple  of  St.  Simon,  and,  although  he  gradually  grew 
away  from  the  teachings  of  this  master,  and  finally  broke  with  him 
altogether,  he  took  from  him  the  two  starting  points  of  his 
philosophy:  "that  political  phenomena  are  as  capable  of  being 
grouped  under  laws  as  other  phenomena,"  and  "that  the  true  desti- 
nation of  philosophy  must  be  social,  and  the  true  object  of  the 
thinker  must  be  the  reorganization  of  the  moral,  religious  and 
political  systems." 

(2)  Comte  worked  out  what  he  called  Hygiene  Cerebral, 
"After  he  had  acauired  what  he  considered  to  be  a sufficient 

1 

Calkins,  The  Per si st ent  Problems  of  Philosophy,  p.  298. 

2 

Morley,  Article  on  Comte,  Encycloped ia  Britanni ca.  VI, 


p.  815  ff 


f 


T 


T 


* 


r 


r 


t 


f 


-4— 

stock  of  material,  and  this  happened  before  he  had  completed  the 
"Positive  Philosophy , "he  abstained  from  reading  newspapers,  reviews, 
scientific  transactions,  and  everything  else,  except  two  or  three 
poets  (notably  Dante)  and  the  Imitatio  Christi."  His  only  infor- 
mation as  to  what  was  going  on  in  science  (on  which  he  based  his 
philosophy)  was  that  which  he  gained  by  conversation  with  his 

friends,  Dante  and  the  Imitatio  may  have  had  some  influence  upon 

0 ‘ " 

0 

the  mystic  tendency  of  his  later  theories, 

(3)  One  of  the  great  influences  upon  the  life  of  Comte 
was  his  devotion  to  Mme.  Clotilde  de  Vaux,  whose  husband  had  been 
sent  to  the  galleys  for  life.  After  her  death  in  1846,  her 
memory  seemed  to  have  complete  ascendancy  over  his  mind.  Every 

* 

week  he  made  a pilgrimage  to  her  tomb,  and  three  times  a day,  he 
invoked  her  memory  in  a sort  of  prayer.  This  was  a part  of  the 
ritual  which  he  established  for  the  Positivist  religion. 

(4)  Owing  to  the  fact  that  he  devoted  his  time  ex- 
clusively to  speculative  thought,  he  was  constantly  in  financial 
difficulties,  so  that  Emile  Littr^,  one  of  his  disciples,  pub- 
lished an  appeal  for  subscriptions,  which  was  answered  by  a number 
of  writers  in  England,  John  Stuart  Mill  among  them.  This  circum- 
stance is  of  assistance  in  tracing  the  extent  of  his  influence  in 
England • 

In  1842  Comte's  first  work,  the  "Cours  de  Philosophic 
Positive,"  was  published,  and  from  that  date  until  his  death  in 
1857  he  was  constantly  elaborating  his  philosophy.  In  1848  the 
Positivist  Society  was  founded,  with  the  purpose  of  influencing 
politics.  Later  it  became  a kind  of  church. 


♦ 


I 


* 


Positiviem,  declares  Comte,  was  founded  "by  Bacon, 
Descartes,  and  Galileo,  Descartes,  "as  great  a geometer  as 
philosopher,  derived  Positivism  from  its  true  source,  thus  being 
able  to  lay  down  its  essential  conditions  with  firmness  and 
precision.  The  discourse  in  which  he  simply  narrates  his  own 
evolution  is  an  unconscious  description  of  the  human  mind  in 
general."  Galileo  devoted  his  energies  to  the  extension  of 
science,  and  Bacon  dealt  with  the  regeneration  of  the  moral  and 
social  field  along  positive  lines.1 2 3 

The  fundamental  doctrine  of  Positivism  is  that  "we  have 
no  knowledge  of  anything  but  Phaenomena;  and  our  knowledge  of 

phaenomena  is  relative,  not  absolute The  constant 

resemblances  which  link  phaenomena  together,  and  the  constant 
sequences  which  unite  them  as  antecedent  and  consequent,  are 
termed  their  laws.  The  laws  of  phaenomena  are  all  we  know  re- 
specting them.  Their  essential  nature,  and  their  ultimate 

causes,  either  efficient  or  final,  are  unknown  and  inscrutable  to 
2 

us."  Positivism  directs  its  labors  to  a study  of  the  laws  of 

3 

phenomena,  its  object  being  to  "pursue  an  active  discovery" 
of  them  and  to  reduce  them  to  the  smallest  possible  number.  There 
is  no  hope  of  reducing  them  to  one  single  law,  however.  "While 
pursuing  the  philosophical  aim  of  all  science,  the  lessening  of 
the  number  of  general  laws  requisite  for  the  explanation  of  nat- 

1 

Comte,  Positive  Philosophy,  II.  352-353. 

2 

Mill.  Comte  and  Positivism,  p.  6. 

3 

Comte,  Op.  cit . I,  5. 


t 


T 


* 


-6- 


ural  phenomena,  we  shall  regard  &s  presumptuous  every  attempt, 

1 

in  all  future  time,  to  reduce  them  rigorously  to  one." 

This,  it  will  he  readily  seen,  is  a philosophy  which, 

rejecting  metaphysics,  bases  itself  entirely  upon  science  and 

is  inseparable  from  it.  It  makes  use  of  both  deductive  and 

inductive  reasoning,  preferring  the  former  for  special  researches, 

2 

the  latter  for  the  discovery  of  fundamental  laws. 

The  "0 ours  de  Philos ophie  Posi t ive"  begins  with  an 
exposition  of  the  law  of  three  states . which  is,  briefly,  as 

follows:  "each  of  our  leading  conceptions  each  branch  of 

our  knowledge  — - passes  successively  through  three  different 
theoretical  conditions:  the  Theological,  or  fictitious;  the 
Metaphysical,  or  abstract;  and  the  Scientific,  or  positive."  The 
Theological  state  is  that  in  which  the  mind  supposes  the  cause  of 
phenomena  to  be  the  action  of  supernatural  forces.  Its  highest 
phase  is  monotheism.  The  Metaphysical  state  supposes  phenomena 
to  be  produced  by  abstract  forces,  and  its  highest  point  is  that 
at  which  Nature  is  considered  the  cause  of  all  phenomena.  In 
the  third  etage,  man  has  given  up  the  pursuit  of  absolute  know- 
ledge and  is  content  to  study  the  laws  of  phenomena.  Its 
highest  point  would  be  the  discovery  of  a single  governing  law, 
such  as  that  of  gravitation,  if  such  a thing  were  possible. 

This  state  is  reached  when  men  have  learned  by  experience  the 
limits  of  their  own  powers. 

1 

Comte,  Op.  cit . , I,  14. 

2 

Ibid,  II,  428. 

3 

Ibid , I,  2-4. 


T 


< 


-7- 


On  this  basis  Comte  proceedes  to  classify  the  sciences 
in  the  order  in  which  they  pass  from  the  theological  to  the  meta- 
physical, and  on  to  the  positive  stage.  The  sciences  become 
positive  in  the  order  of  their  complexity,  the  simpler  ones,  such 
as  mathematics,  reaching  the  positive  stage  first.  Thus  "each 
science  depends  on  the  truths  of  all  those  which  precede  it,  with 
the  addition  of  peculiar  truths  of  its  own."* 1 2 3 

The  law  of  three  states  leads  Comte  to  a theory  of  his- 

g 

torical  evolution,  by  which  he  is  enabled  to  see  past,  present, 
and  future  events  in  their  relation  to  each  other  and  to  the 
general  law.  In  his  opinion,  the  race  was,  at  that  time,  on  the 
threshold  of  a positive  age. 

It  also  leads  to  his  sociological  and  political  doctrines, 
which  are,  in  accordance  with  the  second  of  the  principles  which 
he  derived  from  St.  Simon,  the  aim  of  his  philosophy.  Sociology 
he  regarded  as  the  last  of  the  sciences  to  enter  into  the  positive 
state,  and  he  attributed  the  social  chaos  of  the  time  to  the  mix- 
ture of  theological,  metaphysical,  and  positive  elements  in  its 

ideas.  The  remedy  would  consist  in  bringing  sociology  entirely 

3 

into  the  positive  state. 

The  social  and  political  system,  which  Comte  worked  out, 
is  a very  elaborate  one  and  is  presented  in  his  "Positive 
Polity."  It  provided  fora  spiritual  power,  consisting  of  a 

body  of  philosophers,  which  should  act  as  an  advisory  council 

1 

Mill,  Ojd.  cit.,  p.  33-37. 

2 

Comte,  Op.  cit.,  387,  Vol.  II. 

3 

Ibid.,  I,  12-13. 


r 


t 


— 8- 

for  the  temporal  power.  The  latter  was  not  to  he  representative 

but  was  to  consist  of  capitalists  whose  authority  was  to  be  rated 

according  to  the  "degree  of  generality  of  their  conceptions  and 

operations.”  It  was  to  be  checked  by  the  spiritual  power  and  by 

free  discussion  on  the  part  of  inferiors.^ 

The  position  of  women  was  to  be  raised  — theoretically. 

They  were  to  be  lifted  above  material  cares,  thoroughly  educated, 

and  excluded  from  public  action,  in  order  that  their  influence 

over  men  might  be  carried  to  the  highest  point.  They  were  to 

play  their  part  in  religion—  for  Comte  believed  that  religion 

was  necessary.  The  progress  of  mankind  is  dependent  upon  the 

victory  of  social  feeling  over  self-love,  he  maintained,  which 

victory  is  only  possible  by  the  subordination  of  the  intellect  to 

the  emotion.  It  is  the  part  of  religion  to  assure  this  victory. 

Religion  implies  a being  to  worship,  and  Positivism,  completely 

agnostic  with  regard  to  everything  not  based  on  observed  facts, 

lacks  a God.  Comte,  looking  about  for  some  other  being  to  fill 

the  place,  lights  upon  humanity,  spells  it  with  a capital  letter, 

and  worships,  with  a set  of  rites  and  ceremonies  modeled  after  the 

Catholic  church  to  insure  the  proper  cult  of  the  emotions.  To 

woman,  according  to  the  doctrines  of  Positivism,  is  given  the 

moral  providence  of  the  Great  Being,  and  her  guardianship  over 

man's  moral  nature  is  of  three  types,  as  seen  in  the  mother, 

representing  protection;  the  wife,  union;  and  the  daughter, 

2 

obedience . 

1 

Mill,  Ojd.  cit . . p.  122. 

2 

Morley,  Article  on  Comte . Encyc loped ia  Britannica . 

Vol.  VI,  pp.  821-822. 


I 


t 


t 


1 

A Positivist  Calendar  was  made  out,  containing  the 
names  of  those  who  had  best  served  Humanity,  and  the  memory  of 
these  saints  was  to  be  invoked  at  certain  times.  This  was  to 
take  the  place  of  prayer,  although  the  soul  was  not  conceded  to 
be  immortal.  Among  the  names  on  the  Positivist  Calendar,  were 
those  of  Gutenberg,  Shakespeare,  and  Czar  Nicholas  of  Russia, 
who  was  still  living  at  the  time. 

Morality,  under  this  system,  had  its  basis  in  a sense 

of  duty,  produced  by  the  ascendency  of  the  spirit  of  generality 

due  to  the  fulfilment  of  the  intellectual  evolution,  which  would 

2 

come  about  with  the  prevalence  of  Positivism.  It  was  to  be 
furthered  by  the  various  rites  designed  to  cultivate  the  emotions 
The  inconsistency  of  making  morality  depend  on  intellect  and 
furthering  it  by  the  cultivation  of  emotion  for  the  purpose  of 
subordinating  the  intellect,  is  obvious. 

The  prieethood,  or  spiritual  authority  mentioned  above, 
was  to  be  sanctioned  by  the  voluntary  adhesion  of  the  people, 
and  was  to  be  chosen  for  the  intellectual  eminence  of  its  members 
rather  than  for  their  greatness  of  character.  It  was  to  possess 
no  wealth;  would  counsel,  not  command;  and  its  duties  were  to  be 
those  of  directing  education,  influencing  public  and  private  life 
arbitrating  in  cases  of  conflict,  preaching  sermons,  ordering  the 
classification  of  society  (for  there  were  to  be  distinct,  but  not 
iron-bound  classes)  and  performing  the  rites  and  ceremonies  of 

1 

Morley,  Article  on  Comt e , Encyclopedia  Britannica. 

Vol.  VI,  pp.  817-818. 

2 

Comte,  Op.  cit.,  II,  388. 


} 


< 


-10- 


1 

the  Positivist  religion. 

The  Comtian  theories  were  launched  at  a time  when  the 

spiritualistic  philosophy  of  Germany  was  in  possession  of  the 

field  in  Prance.  There  had  been  a reaction  against  the  scepticism 

of  the  Revolution  at  the  beginning  of  the  century,  marked  by 

Chateaubriand’s  "Genie  de  Chri st ianisme"  in  1802,  and  German 

ideas  had  come  in  with  what  Georges  Brandes  characterized  as 

2 

"la  litterature  d es  emigres."  This  idealism,  having  been  es- 
tablished and  officially  taught  for  30  years,  had  become  in- 
ferior to  the  newer  and  freer  thought  which  was  fermenting  in  the 
3 

Latin  Quarter  and  other  places  of  discussion,  through  having 

constantly  to  compromise  and  accomodate  itself  to  the  political 

4 

exigencies  and  the  needs  of  a whole  people. 

Positivism,  which  began  to  appear  in  the  5th  decade, 

spread  very  slowly.  Comte  did  not  have  the  art  of  making  his 

works  readable,  and  the  mystic  doctrines  of  his  later  years 

3 z' 

destroyed  his  prestige.  Even  Littre,  the  French  lexicographer 

and  philosopher,  vho  was  the  most  eminent  of  his  disciples,  did 
not  believe  in  the  Religion  of  Humanity.  Mill  states0  the 
situation  in  Prance  as  follows:  "The  great  treatise  of  M.  Comte 

1 

Morley,  Ojd.  cit . . p.  821. 

2 

Barzellotti.  La  Philosophic  de  H.  Taine,  p.  65-66. 

3 

Barzellotti,  _0jd  • cit . . pp.  74-76. 

4 

Ibid . . pp.  68-69. 

5 

Morley.  Article  on  Comte.  Enclycloped ia  Britannica. 

6 

Mill,  _0p.  cit . . p.  2 — 3 


t 


T 


r 


r 


T 


r 


11- 


was  scarcely  mentioned  in  French  literature  or  criticism,  when  it 
was  already  working  powerfully  on  the  minds  of  many  British  students 
and  thinkers.  But  agreeably  to  the  usual  course  of  things  in 
France,  the  new  tendency,  when  it  set  in,  set  in  more  strongly. 

Those  who  call  themselves  Positivists  are  indeed  not  numerous; 
but  all  French  writers  who  adhere  to  the  common  philosophy,  now 
feel  it  necessary  to  begin  by  fortifying  their  position  against 
'the  Positivist  school.'  And  the  mode  of  thinking  thus  desig- 
nated is  already  manifesting  its  importance  by  one  of  the  un- 
equivocal signs,  the  appearance  of  thinkers  who  attempt  a com- 
promise or  juste  milieu  between  it  and  its  opposite.  The  acute 
critic  and  metaphysician  M.  Taine,  and  the  distinguished  chemist 
M.  Berthelot,  are  the  authors  of  the  two  most  conspicuous  of 
these  attempts." 

In  a study  of  Positivism  and  Engli  eh  lit erature , the 

name  of  Taine,  mentioned  in  this  connection,  is  of  great  interest. 

Naturally  attracted  to  the  study  of  England  by  a peculiar 

affinity  with  what  he  regarded  as  the  genius  of  the  Anglo-Saxon 

race,  he  set  about  to  study  its  culture  and  became  more  familiar 

1 

with  it  than  with  that  of  any  other  country  outside  of  France. 

This  contact  between  the  literatures  of  the  two  nations  is 
represented  by  his  masterly  treatment  of  the  history  of  English 
literature,  which  could  not  help  but  exert  an  influence  on 
English  thought. 

That  Hippolyte  Taine  was  a disciple  of  Comte  cannot  be 
truthfully  said,  for  he  was  too  broad  a spirit  to  confine  his 

1 

Barzellotti,  Op.  cit . . p.  87. 


- . 


- ' 


- ' - 


f 


"-12- 


ideas  within  the  limits  of  that  system,  although  he  represented 

it,  in  a large  sense.  The  Hon,  Maurice  Baring,  in  an  article 

1 

in  the  Encyclopedia  Britannica  says:  "Taine Ts  doctrine  consisted 

in  an  inexorable  determinism,  a negation  of  metaphysics;  as  a 
philosopher  he  was  a positivist.  Enamoured  as  he  was  of  the 
precise  and  the  definite,  the  spiritualist  philosophy  in  vogue 
in  1845  poeitiviely  maddened  him.  He  returned  to  the  philosophy 
of  the  18th  century,  especially  to  Condillac  and  to  the  theory  of 
transformed  sensation.  Taine  presented  this  philosophy  in  a 
vivid,  vigorous  and  polemical  form,  and  in  concrete  and  coloured 
language  which  made  his  works  more  accessible,  and  consequently 
more  influential  than  those  of  Auguste  Comte,  Hence  to  the  men 
of  1860  Taine  was  the  true  representative  of  positivism."  This 
in  spite  of  the  fact  that  he  never  mentions  Comte  except  in  his 
work  on  Mill  (where,  however,  he  shows  himself  familiar  with  the 
Comtian  theories),  which  circumstance  makes  it  difficult  to 
determine  how  much  of  his  positivism  is  derived  from  Comte  and 
how  much  is  due  to  his  own  genius  plus  the  general  spirit  of  the 
age. 

In  1852  he  was  reading  Kant,  Hegel,  Spinoza,  and  Geothe. 

About  this  time  he  gave  up  teaching  and  went  to  Paris,  determined 

3 

to  live  entirely  by  his  pen.  Here  he  was  constantly  in  contact 


1 

Baring,  Article  on  H.  Taine.  Encyclopedia  Britannica. 
Vol.  XXVI,  p.  360  ff. 

2 

Barzellotti.  Op.  cit..  p.  69. 

3 

Ibid.,  pp.  34-43. 


T 


t 


13' 


with  a group  of  thinkers  in  which  the  new  philosophic  ideas 

were  being  earnestly  discussed,,  among  them  Renan  and  Sainte- 
1 2 

Beuve.  A*  Sorel  describes  the  Paris  of  1853,  "qui,  dans  une 

sorte  d ’effervescence  sourde  de  mine  et  de  laboratoire,  couvait 

une  revolution  dans  la  science  et  dans  les  lettres  frangaises. 

On  y travaillait,  on  y pensait , sans  autre  objet  oue  la 

verite,  sane  souci  des  consequences  pratiques;  que  dis-je?  avec 

le  mepris  de  ces  consequences."  And  it  was  here  that  Taine’s 

ideas  became  more  and  more  positive  and  hie  method  of  reasoning 

3 

shifted  from  deduction  to  induction.  It  is  significant  that 
this  was  just  the  period  in  which  Comte  was  publishing  his  works 
(1842-1857) . 

In  reality  Taine  occupies  a middle  position  between 

Comte  and  the  spiritualistic  doctrines  of  the  Germans,  then  in 

power  in  Prance.  He  exposed  the  latter  as  impotent  before  the 

new  science,  agreeing  with  Comte  (1)  in  condemning  the  traditional 

metaphysical  theories  (although  Taine  admitted  the  possibility 

of  metaphysics),  (2)  in  maintaining  that  philosophy  should  not 

concern  itself  with  the  cause  and  essence  of  things,  regarded 

as  the  basis  of  facts,  and  (3)  in  emphasizing  the  idea  that 

science  should  be  regarded  solely  as  the  study  of  facts,  their 

4 

laws,  and  their  system. 


1 

Baring,  Article  in  Encycloped ia  Britannica . Vol.  XXVI, 

p.  360  ff. 

2 

Barzellotti,  Ojd.  cit . . p.  43. 

3 

Ibid.,  p.  50  and  Baring,  Op.  cit.,  p.  361. 

4 

Barzellotti,  0£.  cit..,  p.  69. 


-14- 

On  the  other  hand,  hie  departure  from  Positivism  is 
indicated  in  hie  study  of  John  Stuart  Mill,  published  in  his 
"History  of  English  Literature. It  is  written  in  the  form  of 
a dialogue  between  an  English  student  and  himself,  during  which 
he  (Taine)  says:  "It  seems  to  me  that  these  two  dispositions  are 

most  frequently  met  with  in  an  English  mind.  rj?he  religious  and 
the  positive  spirit  dwell  there  side  by  side,  but  separate.  This 
produces  an  odd  medley,  and  I confess  that  I prefer  the  way  in 
which  the  Germans  have  reconciled  science  with  faith.  — - But," 
replies  his  interlocutor,  "their  philosophy  is  but  badly-written 
poetry.  — - Perhaps  so.  — But  what  they  call  reason,  or  intuition 
of  principles,  is  only  the  faculty  of  building  up  hypotheses. 

— - Perhaps  so. But  the  systems  which  they  have  constructed 

have  not  held  their  ground  before  experience.  - — I do  not  defend 
what  they  have  done.™  But  their  absolute,  their  subject,  their 
object,  and  the  rest,  are  but  big  words.  — I do  not  defend  their 
style.  — What,  then,  do  you  defend?  — - Their  idea  of  Causation. 

You  think  there  is  an  intermediate  course  between 

intuition  and  observation,  capable  of  arriving  at  principles, 
as  it  is  affirmed  that  the  first  is,  capable  of  arriving  at  truths, 
as  we  find  that  the  second  is?  — — Yes.  What  is  it?  Abstraction." 

It  is  not  possible,  in  the  limits  of  this  paper,  to 
make  a study  of  Renan  and  Saint e-Beuve,  who  were  associated  with 
Taine  and  who  also  exerted  some  influence  upon  English  men  of 

1 

Taine,  Hist ory  o f English  Literature . p.  694. 


-15- 

letters,  Renan  seemed  to  be  imbued  with  the  positivist  spirit 
in  some  respects,  but  he  denies  that  it  came  from  Oomte.  "La 

1 

science  positive,"  says  he  in  "Souvenirs  d 'Enfance  et  de  Jeunesse , " 

"resta  pour  moi  la  seulo  source  de  verite.  Hue  tard  , j'eprouvai 

une  sorte  d'agacement  a voir  la  reputation  exageree  d'Auguste 

Comte,  erige  en  grand  homme  de  premier  ordre  pour  avoir  dit,  en 

mauvais  frangais,  ce  que  tous  les  esprit s scient if iaues , depuis 

deux  cents  ane,  ont  vu  aussi  clairement  que  lui," 

In  England,  racial  characteristics  and  the  conditions 

of  the  times  seemed  to  have  been  such  as  to  warrant  a welcome  for 

Positivism,  The  tradition  of  Hume  was  being  carried  on  in  the 

Utilitarian  school,  which,  according  to  Taine,  represented  the 

English  genius,  in  spite  of  the  fact  complained  of  by  Mill  that 

there  were  "twenty  a priori  and  spiritualist  philosophers  for  every 

2 

partizan  of  the  doctrine  of  experience."  The  study  of  science 

was  becoming  wide-spread  throughout  the  entire  population.  "The 

growth  of  a scientific  taste  among  the  working  classes  of  this 

3 

country, "says  Harriet  Martineau,  "is  one  of  the  most  striking 
of  the  signs  of  the  times.  I beli evo  no  one  can  inquire  into 
the  mode  of  life  of  young  men  of  the  middle  and  operative  classes 
without  being  struck  with  the  desire  that  is  shown,  and  the  sacri- 
fices that  are  made,  to  obtain  the  means  of  scientific  study." 
Moreover,  this  wide-spread  study  of  science  was  making  extensive 

1 

Renan,  Souvenirs  d.'  Enfance  et  de  Jeunesse . p.  182. 

2 

Taine,  Op.  cit . , p.  675,  note. 

3 

Comte,  Ojd . cit  . . Introduction  by  H.  Martineau,  p.  v. 


c 


r 


r 


T 


-16 


inroads  on  the  faith  of  the  people  in  the  traditional  theology 
of  the  church.  "The  supreme  dread , " Miss  Martinoau  continues, 

"of  every  one  who  cares  for  the  good  of  nation  or  race  is  that 
men  should  he  adrift  for  want  of  an  anchorage  for  their  convic- 
tions. I believe  that  no  one  questions  that  a very  large  propor- 
tion of  our  people  are  now  so  adrift.  With  pain  and  fear,  we  see 
that  a multitude,  who  might  and  should  be  among  the  wisestand  best 
of  our  citizens,  are  alienated  for  ever  from  the  kind  of  faith 
which  sufficed  for  all  in  an  organic  period  which  has  passed  away, 
while  no  one  had  presented  to  them,  and  they  cannot  obtain  for 
themselves,  any  ground  of  conviction  as  firm  and  clear  as  that 
which  sufficed  for  our  fathers  in  their  day."  Many  felt  the 
same  sense  of  religious  loss  and  uncertainty  expressed  by 
Matthew  Arnold  in  many  of  his  poems. 

"Oh,  hide  me  in  your  gloom  profound. 

Ye  solemn  seats  of  holy  pain.1 

Take  me,  cowl'd  forms,  and  fence  me  round. 

Till  I possess  my  soul  again! 

Till  free  my  thoughts  before  me  roll. 

Not  chafed  by  hourly  false  control. 

For  the  world  cries  your  faith  is  now 
But  a dead  time*s  exploded  dream; 

My  melancholy,  sciolists  say. 

Is  a pass*d  mode,  an  outworn  theme  — 

As  if  the  world  had  ever  had  i 
A faith,  or  sciolists  been  sad." 

Social  conditions  in  England  at  this  period  were  ad- 
mittedly bad,  and  the  middle  of  the  century  was  marked  by 
demonstrations  of  social  unrest,  such  as  the  Chartist  movement. 


1 

Arnold,  ioercs,  p.  272. 


90-102. 


The  Grand  e Chartreuse.  LI 


f 


t 


T 


T 


T 


t 


-17 


Everything  seemed  favorable  for  the  advent  of  a doctrine 
founded  on  the  type  of  philosophy  congenial  to  the  English 
genius;  based  on  science;  whose  chief  aim  was  frankly  social; 
and  which  offered,  as  a religion  on  which  to  base  one*s  actions, 
something  more  consistent  with  the  tendencies  of  thought  of  the 
age  than  was  supplied  by  the  old  revealed  faith. 


r 


■ 

: : 

, ' 


-le- 

i 

EARLY  INTERPRETERS 

It  must  not  be  supposed,  however,  that  the  doctrines 
of  Comte,  because  they  were  in  accord  with  the  rationalism  of 
the  age,  made  a triumphal  entry  into  England,  sweeping  all  before 
them*  On  the  contrary,  the  system  in  its  entirety  was  never 
widely  accepted,  nor  even  widely  known  in  England, 

"At  no  time,"  says  Benn,^  "has  Positivism  acted  on  public 
opinion  in  the  way  its  founder  anticipated,  as  a complete  body 
of  doctrine.  What  fell  in  with  the  tendencies  of  the  age  was 

picked  out;  what  opposed  them  fell  away Positivism,  in 

fact,  told  on  English  thought  not  so  much  by  awakening  interest 
in  new  ideas  as  by  resuscitating  old  ideas  originally  peculiar 
to  this  island  and  afterwards  discredited  by  the  religious 
revival."  It  turned  the  attention  of  Englishmen  again  to  the 
ideas  of  Hume,  Thomas  Brown,  and  James  Mill* 

The  works  of  Comte  could  never  be  popular  — they  were 
too  unreadable.  The  ideas  put  forth  in  them  had  to  pass  through 
the  medium  of  philosophic  interpreters  before  they  could  be  un- 
derstood by  the  mass,  and  thus  they  were  liable  to  become  tinged 
with  the  convictions  of  those  thinkers.  Frederic  Harrison 

describes  the  situation  in  1869  in  an  article  in  the  Fortnightly 
2 

Review.  "Those  who  have  honestly  studied  or  even  actually 
1 

Bann,  History  of  Rationalism.  I,  417-418. 

2 

Fortnightly  Review.  Nov.  1,  1869,  Vol.  12,  pp.  469-470. 


t 


-19' 


read  these  difficult  works,"  he  says,  "may  he  counted  on  the 
hand;  and  no  methodical  exposition  of  them  exists  in  this  country* 
The  full  adherents  of  this  system  in  England  are  known  to  he  few; 
and  they  hut  rarely  address  the  public*  Amongst  the  regular 
students  of  Comte  two  or  three  alone  find  means  occasionally  to 
exprese  their  views,  and  that  for  the  most  part  on  special  subjects. 
Such  is  the  only  medium  through  which  the  ideas  of  Comte  are  form- 
ulated --  a mass  of  writings  practically  unread;  a handful  of 
disciples  for  the  most  part  silent. 

"On  the  other  hand,  the  press  and  society,  platform  and 
pulpit,  are  continually  resounding  with  criticism,  invective, 

and  moral  reflection  arrayed  against  this  system The 

critics  cut  and  thrust  at  will  well  knowing  there  is  no  one  to 

retaliate;  Religious  journalism,  too,  delights  to  use  the 

name  of  Comte  as  a sort  of  dark  relief  to  the  glowing  colors  of 
the  Scarlet  Woman.  Semi-religious  journals  detect  his  subtle 
influence  in  everything  from  the  last  poem  to  the  coming  revo- 
lution. Drowsy  congregations  are  warned  against  doctrines  from 
which  they  run  as  little  risk  as  they  do  from  that  of  Partheno- 
genesis, and  which  they  are  yet  less  likely  to  understand. 

Society  even  knows  all  about  it,  and  chirrups  the  last  gossip  or 
jest  at  afternoon  tea-tables.  Yet  even  under  this  the  philosophy 
of  Comte  survives;  for  criticism  of  this  kind,  it  need  hardly  be 
said,  is  not  for  the  most  part  according  to  knowledge." 

Among  the  first  exponents  of  the  Positivist  doctrines 
in  England  were  John  Stuart  Mill,  Richard  Congreve,  influential 
at  Oxford,  George  Henry  Lewes,  whom  I shall  take  up  in  a later 


! .. 


V 


- 


— 


' 


— 





-20- 


chapter,  and  Harriet  Martineau,  who  was  first  to  translate  the 

"Philosophic  Positive."  For  several  years  before  the  latter 

came  in  contact  with  Positivism,  she  had  been  interested  in 

rationalism  and  the  philosophy  of  Bacon,  influenced  by  a Mr. 

Atkinson,  a mesmerist,  to  whom  she  ascribes  her  cure  from  a long 

illness.^  Through  him  she  came  to  regard  science  as  the  "sole 

and  eternal  basis  of  wisdom — and  therefore  of  morality  and  peace," 

to  believe  that  "to  form  any  true  notion  whatever  of  any  of  the 

affairs  of  the  universe,  we  must  take  our  stand  in  the  external 

world ,— regard  ing  man  as  one  of  the  products  and  subjects  of  the 

everlasting  laws  of  the  universe,  and  not  as  the  favourite  of  its 

Maker;  a favourite  to  whom  it  is  rendered  subservient  by  divine 

partiality."  She  saw  philosophy  founded  upon  science  as  the 

one  thing  needful  to  the  promotion  of  intellectuality,  morality, 

3 


and  peace  among  men, 


With  Mr.  Atkinson,  she  published  a 


series  of  "Letters  on  Man's  Nature  and  Development,"  setting  forth 
4 

these  views.  They  appeared  in  1851.  Meanwhile,  in  1850, 

she  was  becoming  interested  in  the  philosophy  of  Auguste  Comte. 

She  tells,  in  her  autobiography,  how  she  came  to  translate  the 

5 

"Philosophy  Positive: " 

"It  appears,  from  two  or  three  notices  above,  that 
Comte’s  philosophy  was  at  this  time  a matter  of  interest  to  me. 


H.  Martineau,  Autobiography,  I,  489-90 

* 

Ibid..  II,  28. 

5 

Ibid.,  II,  29-30. 

I 

Ibid. , II,  31. 

Ibid.,  II,  57. 


? 


< 


f 


t 


I 


21- 


After  hearing  Comte’s  name  for  many  years,  and  having  a 

vague  notion  of  the  relation  of  hie  philosophy  to  the  intellectual 
and  social  needs  of  the  time,  I obtained  something  like  a clear 
preparatory  view,  at  second-hand,  from  a friend,  at  whose  house 
in  Yorkshire  I was  staying,  before  going  to  Bolton,  in  1850* 

What  I learned  then  and  there  impelled  me  to  study  the  great  book 

for  myself;  and  in  the  spring  of  1850 I got  the  book,  and 

set  to  work.  I bad  meantime  looked  at  Lewes's  chapter  on  Comte 
in  Mr.  Knight's  Weekly  Volume,  and  at  Littre's  epitome;  and  I 
could  thus,  in  a manner,  see  the  end  from  the  beginning  of  the 
complete  and  extended  work.  This  must  be  my  excuse  for  the  early 
date  at  which  I conceived  the  scheme  of  translating  the  Bhilosophie 
Positive. 

But  the  translation  of  six  volumes  of  Comte's  very 
difficult  writing  was  an  enormous  task. 

"M.  Comte's  style  is  singular,”  she  says  in  her  preface 
to  the  work.^  "It  is  at  the  same  time  rich  and  diffuse. 

Every  sentence  is  full  fraught  with  meaning;  yet  it  is  overloaded 
with  words.  His  scrupulous  honesty  leads,  him  to  guard  his 
enunciations  with  epithets  so  constantly  repeated,  that  though, 
to  his  own  mind,  they  are  necessary  in  each  individual  instance, 
they  become  wearisome,  especially  towards  the  end  of  his  work, 
and  lose  their  effect  by  constant  repetition.” 

Accordingly,  she  condensed  the  six  volumes  into  two, 
with  the  result  that  Comte  himself  placed  hor  work,  to  the 

1 

Comte,  Posit ive  Bhilosophie . Preface  by  H.  Martineau, 

Vol.  I,  p.  iv. 


r 


T 


t 


T 


T 


t 


-22- 


exclue  ion  of  his  own  "Philosophic  Positive , " among  the  hooks  which 
a positivist  library  should  contain,  end  long  after  his  death, 

N.  Av e sac-Lav i gne , one  of  his  friends,  wrote  to  her  asking  per- 
mission to  translate  her  translation  into  French.1 

That  Harriet  MartineauTs  rationalism  created  quite  a 

furor  among  her  friends  shows  that  England  was  by  no  means  in 

a condition  to  be  converted  to  Positivism  at  once.  Her  brother 

James,  the  Unitarian  minister,  was  entirely  out  of  sympathy  with 

her,  and  many  of  her  nearest  friends  were  scandalized.  A great 

deal  of  the  criticism  came  from  ignorance.  She  tells  of  one 

incident  which  will  illustrate  the  attitude  of  many  people  towards 

2 

Comte  and  Positivism.  In  October,  1851,  while  she  was  at  work 
on  her  translation,  an  eminent  philosopher  from  Scotland  was 
her  guest  at  dinner.  During  the  course  of  the  evening  he  asked 
her  about  her  work,  and  made  continued  aspersions  upon  Comte,  and 
insulting  remarks  to  her  as  his  translator. 

"I  saw,”  she  says,  "that  he  knew  nothing  of  what  he 
was  talking  about;  and  I then  merely  asked  him  i f he  had  read 
the  portion  of  the  work  he  was  abusing.  Being  pressed,  he 

reluctantly  answered No;  but  he  knew  all  about  it.  When  the 

dessert  was  on  the  table,  end  the  servants  were  gone,  he  still 
continuing  his  criticisms,  I looked  him  full  in  the  face,  and 
again  inquired  if  he  had  read  that  portion  of  the  Philosophy 

1 

H.  Martineau,  Autobiography,  II,  p.  422. 

2 

Ibid.,  II,  p.  74. 


T 


t 


r 


-23- 

Posi tive: — *N-n~o*:  but  he  knew  all  about  it.  'Come,'  said 

I:  Ttell  me,  — have  you  ever  seen  the  book?*  ’Ho;  I can't 

say  I have;*  he  replied  'but  I know  all  about  it . f 'Now,*  said 
I,  'look  at  the  bookshelves  behind  you.  You  see  those  six 
volumes  in  green  paper?  Now  you  can  say  that  you  have  seen  the 
book. *" 

During  her  last  illness,  which  began  the  year  after  the 
publication  of  the  Post  t ive  Philosophy.  Harriet  Martineau 
was  vastly  amused  at  the  concern  expressed  by  many  as  to  the 
wellfare  of  her  soul.  They  could  not  understand  how,  with  her 
opinions  about  dying,,  she  was  not  miserable  in  the  knowledge 
that  her  death  was  approaching.  They  sent  her  all  sorts  of 
religious  tracts  and  pamphlets,  and  one  person  sent  her  a New 
Testament,  "as  if  I had  never  seen  one  before,"  she  remarks  with 
amusement.  In  one  case,  a person  who  signed  herself  "Charlotte” 
wrote  demanding  that  she  destroy  all  of  her  writings  "because 
they  give  pain  to  the  pious."  She  says,  "It  would  have  been 
amusing  to  see  what  she  would'  think  of  a proposal  that 'the 
pious’  should  withdraw  all  their  writings,  because  they  give 
pain  to  the  philosophical.  It  might  have  been  of  service  to 
suggest  the  simple  expedient,  in  relief  of  the  pious,  that  they 
should  not  read  books  which  offend  them."^ 

There  were  others  of  her  friends,  however,  who  commended 
her  for  her  courage,  even  if  they  did  not  feel  attracted  to  her 
doctrines.  Among  these  was  Matthew  Arnold.  Miss  Martineau 

1 

H.  Martineau,  Ojd.  cit . . II,  109-111. 


T 


T 


f 


T 


T 


ft 

a 


t 


-24- 


was  a neighbor  of  the  Arnolds  at  their  home  at  Fox  Hour  in 


Westmoreland.  In  1855,  the  year  of  her  death,  Arnold  writes 
1 

to  his  mother: 


2 

"As  to  the  poem  in  Fraser.  I hope  K.  sent  you  a letter 
I wrote  to  her  on  the  subject,  in  which  I told  her  that  I knew 
absolutely  nothing  of  Harriet  Martineau’s  works  or  debated 
matters — had  not  even  seen  them,  that  I know  of  nor  do  I ever 
mention  her  creed  with  the  slightest  applause,  but  only  her 

boldness  in  avowing  it.  The  want  of  independence  of  mind  

is  so  eminently  a vice  of  the  English  I think,  of  the  last  hun- 
dred years that  I cannot  but  praise  a person  whose  one 

effort  seems  to  have  been  to  deal  perfectly  honestly  and  sincerely 
with  herself,  although  for  the  speculations  into  which  this 
effort  has  led  her  I have  not  the  slightest  sympathy.  I shall 
never  be  found  to  identify  myself  with  her  or  her  people,  but 
neither  shall  I join,  nor  have  the  least  community  of  feeling 
with  her  attackers." 

Harriet  Martineau*s  influence  in  the  spread  of  Positivism 
seems  to  have  been  for  the  most  part  through  her  translation  of 
the  Philosophie  Positive,  rather  than  through  personal  contact 
with  literary  people.  She  was  not  the  center  of  a brilliant 
group  of  writers,  as  were  George  Henry  Lewes  and  George  Eliot, 


1 

Arnold,  Letters „ collected  and  arranged  by  Geo.  W.  S. 
Russell,  Vol.  I,  p p.  58-59. 

2 

Haworth  Churchyard : 

"The  other,  maturer  in  fame. 

Earning,  she  too,  her  praise 
First  in  Fiction,  had  since 
Widened  her  sweep,  and  surveyed 
History,  Politics,  Mind."  etc. 


t 


t 


25— 


although  she  had  a wide  acquaintance  among  the  writers  of  the 
time*  Her  deafness  and  her  long  illness  made  much  social  con- 
tact difficult  in  the  years  after  she  took  up  the  study  of  Comte* 
Nor,  on  the  other  hand,  was  she  the  head  of  a philosophical  and 
political  "school,”  as  was  John  Stuart  Mill.  But  her  Posit ive 
Philosophy  made  the  study  of  Comte  much  easier,  and  enabled  his 
doctrines  to  reach  many  people  who  might  not  otherwise  have  read 
them. 

As  early  as  fourteen  years  before  Harriet  Martineau 
became  interested  in  Positivism,  it  had  attracted  the  alert  mind 
of  John  Stuart  Mill.  It  was  about  1837,  while  he  was  at  work 
upon  his  Logic . that  it  first  came  to  his  attention.  At  that 
time  only  the  first  two  volumes  of  the  Philosophie  Posit ive  had 
been  published,  but  he  read  them  eagerly,  and  acknowledges  that 
Comte’s  theories  influenced,  in  some  measure,  his  own  views  as 
expressed  in  the  Logic 

"My  theory  of  Induction  was  substantially  completed 
before  I knew  of  Comte’s  book,"  he  says,  explaining  that  he  came 
to  it  by  a different  road,  and  that  he  emphasizes  "reduction  of 
the  inductive  process  to  strict  rules  and  to  a scientific  test, 
such  as  the  syllogism  is  for  ratiocination,"  whilo  Comte  "does 
not  even  attempt  any  exact  definitions  of  the  conditions  of 
proof,"  which  was  the  specific  problem  Mill  had  proposed  to 
himself* 

"In  a merely  logical  point  of  view,"  he  goes  on,  "the 

1 

Mill,  J.  S..  Autobiography,  p.  209-211* 


f 


r 


T 


t 


f 


■26~ 


only  leading  concept  ion  for  which  I am  indebted  to  him  is  that 
of  the  Inverse  Deductive  Method,  as  the  one  chiefly  applicable  to 
the  complicated  subjects  of  History  and  Statistics:  a process 
differing  from  the  more  common  form  of  the  deductive  method  in 
this — - that  instead  of  arriving  at  its  conclusions  by  general 
reasoning,  and  verifying  them  by  specific  experience  fas  is  the 
natural  order  of  the  deductive  branches  of  physical  science), 
it  obtains  its  generalities  by  a collation  of  specific  experience, 
and  verifies  them  by  ascertaining  whether  they  are  such  as  would 
follow  from  known  general  principles.  This  was  an  idea  entirely 
new  to  me  when  I found  it  in  Comte:  and  but  for  him  I might  not 
soon  (if  ever)  have  arrived  at  it.” 

Mill  never  actually  met  Comte,  although  he  carried  on 
a rather  lively  correspondence  with  him  for  a number  of  years, 
until  the  diversity  of  their  opinions  became  so  great  that  they 
ceased  writing.  The  letters  began  in  1841  and  at  first  they 
were  extremely  open,  frank,  and  cordial.  Mill  revealing  more  of 

his  personal  thoughts  and  feelings  than  he  usually  told  to  any- 

2 

body.  In  1843  the  cordiality  diminished.  Mill  says: 

"I  was  the  first  to  slacken  correspondence;  he  was  the 
first  to  drop  it.  I found,  and  he  probably  found  likewise,  that 
I could  do  no  good  to  his  mind,  and  that  all  the  good  he  could 
do  to  mine,  he  did  by  his  books.  This  would  never  have  led  to 
discontinuance  of  intercourse,  if  the  differences  between  us  had 
been  matters  of  simple  doctrine.  But  they  were  chiefly  on  those 

1 

Mill,  Autobiography,  pp.  209-211. 

2 

Ibid . , 211. 


t 


i 


f 


-27' 


points  of  opinion  which  blended  in  both  of  us  with  our  strongest 
feelings  and  determined  the  entire  direction  of  our  aspirations.” 
A clue  to  the  nature  of  one  of  these  points  is  given 
by  Alexander  Bain,  who  says  in  his  Autobiography  that  in  1843 
Mill’s  correspondence  with  Oomte  was"very  warm  on  the  women  ques- 
tion; but  here  the  diversity  between  the  two  was  incurable."^ 

This  was  a matter  which  went  very  deep  with  Mill.  Bain  says 
that  some  years  later  Mill  showed  these  letters  to  a friend  of 
the  former,  but  that  when  he  had  re-read  them  himself,  he  was  so 

dissatisfied  with  the  concessions  he  had  made  to  Comto  that  ho 

2 

never  would  show  them  to  anyone  again. 

Mill’s  objection  to  Comte’s  theories  on  the  subject 

of  women  were  concerned  with  the  low  place  given  them  in  the 

social  and  political  scheme  of  Positivism  "the  irrevocability 

of  the  (marriage)  engagement,  the  complete  subordination  of  the 

wife  to  the  husband,  and  of  women  generally  to  men,"  which  he 

characterized  as  "precisely  the  great  vulnerable  points  of  the 

3 

existing  constitution  of  society  on  this  important  subject." 

There  was  another  side,  however,  to  Comte’s  view  of  the  position 
of  women,  which  was  not  so  far  distant  from  Mill’s  own  as  may  be 
suppos  ed . 

The  attachment  which  the  French  philosopher  conceived 
for  Mine.  Clotilde  de  Vaux  has  been  mentioned  elsewhere  in  this 
paper.  It  partook  of  the  nature  of  a religious  devotion,  and 

1 

Bain,  Alexander,  Autobiography,  p.  159. 

2 

Bain,  Alexander,  J.  S.  Mill,  p.  74. 

3 

Mill,  Comte  end  Positivism,  pp.  91-92. 


f 


T 


t 


T 


T 


4>\ 


T 


T 


-28 


from  it  sprang  much  of  the  sentiment  which  characterized  the 

Religion  of  Humanity.  Mill  refers  to  this  connection  of  Gomte 

1 

in  the  following  manner: 

"The  other  circumstance  of  a personal  nature  which  it 
Is  impossible  not  to  notice,  because  M.  Gomte  is  perpetually 
referring  to  it  as  the  origin  of  the  great  superiority  which  he 
ascribes  to  hie  later  as  compared  with  his  earlier  speculations, 
is  the  ’moral  regeneration*  which  he  underwent  from  'une  angelique 
influence*  and  'une  incomparable  passion  privee.'  He  formed  a 
passionate  attachment  to  a lady  whom  he  describes  as  uniting 
everything  which  is  morally  with  much  that  is  intellectually 
admirable,  and  his  relation  to  whom,  besides  the  direct  influence 
of  her  character  upon  his  own,  gave  him  an  insight  into  the  true 
sources  of  human  happiness,  which  changed  his  whole  conception 
of  life.  This  attachment,  which  always  remained  pure,  gave  him 
but  one  year  of  passionate  enjoyment,  the  lady  having  been  cut 
off  by  death  at  the  end  of  that  short  period;  but  the  adoration 
of  her  memory  survived,  and  became,  as  we  shall  see,  the  type  of 
his  conception  of  the  sympathetic  culture  proper  for  all  human 
beings.  The  change  thus  effected  in  his  personal  character  and 
sentiments,  manifested  itself  at  once  in  his  speculations;  which, 
from  having  been  only  a philosophy,  now  aspired  to  become  a 
religion;  and  from  having  been  as  purely,  and  almost  rudely, 
scientific  and  intellectual,  as  was  compatible  with  a character 
always  enthusiastic  in  its  admirations  and  in  its  ardour  for 
human  improvement,  became  from  this  time  what,  for  want  of  a better 

1 

Mill,  C omt e and  Positivism,  pp.  130-133. 


f 


♦ 


T T 


t 


-29- 

name,  may  be  called  sentimental;  but  sentimental  in  a way  of  its 
own,  very  curious  to  contemplate.  In  considering  the  system  of 
religion,  politics,  and  morals,  which  in  his  later  writings  M. 
Comte  constructed,  it  is  not  unimportant  to  bear  in  mind  the 
nature  of  the  personal  experience  and  inspiration  to  which  he 
himself  constantly  attributed  this  phasis  of  his  philosophy.” 

Mill  then  goes  on  to  speak  of  the  ennobling  influence  Mine.  de 
Vaux  exerted  over  the  character  of  Comte,  and  of  improvement  in 
his  feelings  due  to  this  attachment.  "Even  the  speculations 
are,  in  some  secondary  aspects,  improved  through  the  beneficial 
effect  of  the  improved  feelings;  and  might  have  been  more  so,  if, 
by  a rare  good  fortune,  the  object  of  his  attachment  had  been 
aualified  to  exercise  as  improving  an  influence  over  him  in- 
tellectually as  morally,  and  if  he  could  have  been  contented  with 
something  less  ambitious  than  being  the  supreme  moral  legislator 
and  religious  pontiff  of  the  human  race.” 

There  is  a strong  resemblance  here  to  Mill*s  own  rela- 
tions with  Mrs.  Taylor,  who  later  became  his  wife.  Both  of 
these  affairs  were  on  a high  spiritual  plane,  with  qualities 
somewhat  Platonic,  and  in  both  men  the  attitude  was,  in  many 

1 

respects .essentially  a religious  one.  Mill  says  of  Mrs.  Taylor: 
"Even  the  merely  intellectual  needs  of  my  nature 
suffice  to  make  me  hope  that  I may  never  out -live  the  companion 
who  is  the  profoundest  and  most  far-sighted  and  clear-sighted 
thinker  I have  ever  known,  as  well  as  the  most  consummate  in 

1 

For  these  quotations  concerning  Mrs.  Taylor  I am 
indebted  to  Miss  Leah  Fullenwi der 1 s paper  on  Mill  and  Mrs. 

Taylor. 


t 


X X 


X 


T 


X 


X 


I 


-30 


practical  wisdom.  I do  not  wish  that  I were  so  much  her  equal 

as  not  to  he  her  pupil,  hut  I would  gladly  he  more  capable  than 

I am  of  thoroughly  appreciating  and  worthily  reproducing  her 

admirable  thoughts”^  and:  "Were  I hut  capable  of  interpreting  to 

the  world  one  half  of  the  great  thoughts  and  noble  feelings 

which  are  buried  in  her  grave,  I should  be  the  medium  of  a greater 

benefit  to  it  than  is  ever  likely  to  arise  from  anything  that  I 

can  write,  unprompted  and  unassisted  by  her  all  but  unrivalled 

wisdom;”  and  again:  ”If  mankind  continue  to  improve,  their 

spiritual  history  for  ages  to  come  will  be  the  progressive  work- 

2 

ing  out  of  her  thoughts  and  realization  of  her  conceptions.” 

This  is  the  attitude  of  a religieux  toward  the  prophet 
3 

of  his  faith,  and  is  in  accord  with  the  theories  of  Comte,  when 

he  gives  women  the  guardianship  of  man's  moral  nature — when  he 

declares  that  to  her  is  entrusted  the  moral  providence  of  the 
4 

Grand  Etre.  Mill,  then,  like  Comte  himself,  exemplifies  in 
his  personal  life  this  one  of  the  Positivist  doctrines,  and, 
although  it  would  be  hard  to  prove  that  he  was  influenced  therein 
by  his  contact  with  Positivism,  nevertheless,  this  resemblance 
between  the  two  philosophers  is  striking. 

Mill  also  sounds  a Positivist  note  in  his  reference 


1 

Mill.  J.  S.,  Letters.  II.  p.  369. 

2 

Dedication  to  On  Liberty. 

3 

This  idea  of  Mrs.  Taylor's  place  in  Mill's  religion 
was  brought  out  by  Prof.  S.  P.  Sherman  in  a lecture,  October  6, 
1921. 

4 

See  Introduction. 


31- 


to  the  death  of  his  wife.  He  says  in  his  Autobiography: 1 
"But  because  I know  that  she  would  have  wished  it,  I endeavour 
to  make  the  best  of  what  life  I have  left,  and  to  work  on  for 
her  purposes  with  such  diminished  strength  as  can  be  derived 
from  thoughts  of  her,  and  communion  with  her  memory."  The  last 
phrase  is  redolent  of  the  Positivist  religion. 

Inasmuch  as  Mill*s  influence  upon  the  thought  of  the 

time  was  very  great,  the  estimate  which  he  made  of  Positivism 

was  one  which  was  adopted  by  a considerable  group  of  radical 

thinkers.  In  reply  to  a letter  from  Barbot  de  Ch^ment,  a 

French  captain  of  artillery,  who  writes  to  him  for  names  of  Comte 

English  disciples  and  to  learn  his  own  judgment  of  the  matter, 

2 

he  makes  the  following  statement: 

"II  y a en  effet  en  Angleterre  un  certain  nombre 
d'individus  qui  ont  connaissance  des  ecrits  de  M.  Comte  et  qui  en 
font,  a plusiers  £gards,  un  grand  cas.  Mais  je  ne  connais  ici 
personne  qui  accepte  l’ensemble  de  ses  doctrines  ni  que  l'on 
puisse  regard er  comme  son  disciple;  a commencer  par  moi,  qui 
a suivi  sa  carriers  des  ses  premieres  publications , ot  qui  ai 
plus  fait  peut-etre  que  tous  les  autres  pour  regard  re  son  nom  et 
sa  reputation." 

It  is,  accordingly,  worth  while  to  give  some  attention 
to  the  opinion  which  he  expresses  of  the  value  of  Comte’s  system. 

1 

Mill,  Autobiography,  p.  240. 

2 

Mill,  Letters . I,  p.  182. 


T 


i 


32' 


Mill  admired  Comte  for  the  originality  of  his  mind. 
nIt  is  long,"  he  writes  in  his  diary  under  date  of  January  21, 
1854,^  "since  there  has  been  an  age  of  which  it  could  he  said, 
as  truly  as  of  this,  that  nearly  all  the  writers,  even  the  good 
ones,  were  hut  ap pliers  of  ideas  borrowed  from  others.  Among 
those  of  the  present  time  I can  think  only  of  two  (now  that 
Carlyle  has  written  himself  out,  and  become  a mere  commentator 
on  himself)  who  seem  to  draw  what  they  say  from  a source  within 
themselves:  and  to  the  practical  doctrines  and  tendencies  of 
both  these  there  are  the  gravest  objections.  Comte,  on  the 
Continent;  in  England  (ourselves  excepted)  I can  only  think  of 
Rusk in." 

In  general,  however,  he  accepts  the  philosophy  but  re- 
jects the  social  and  religious  superstructure.  He  himself  ex- 
presses his  position  concisely  in  the  above-mentioned  letter  to 
Barbot  de  Ch^ment : 

nJ*admets  en  general  la  partie  logique  de  ses  doctrines, 
ou  en  d’autres  mots,  tout  ce  qui  a rapporte  a la  methode  et  a 

la  philosophie  des  sciences J'admets  en  grande  partie  la 

/ / / 

critique  de  ses  devanciers,  et  les  bases  generales  de  la  theorie 
historique  du  developpement  humain,  sauf  les  divergences  de  detail. 
Quant  a la  religion,  qui,  comme  vous  le  savez  sans  doute,  pour 
lui  comme  pour  tout  libre  penseur  est  un  grand  obstacle  aupres 
ducommun  de  mes  compatriot es , c’est  la  sans  contredit  que  mes 
opinions  sont  le  plus  pr^s  de  celles  de  M.  Comte.  Je  suis 
parfaitement  d 'accord  avec  lui  sur  la  partie  negative  de  la 

1 

Mill,  Letters  f II,  p.  361. 


» 


T 


-33- 


question,  et  dans  la  partie  affirmative,  je  soutiens  comme  lui 
que  l'idee  de  lf ensemble  de  humanity  represent ee  surtout  par 
lea  esprits  et  les  caracteres  d'elite,  passes,  presents,  et  a 
venir,  peut  devenir,  non  seulement  pour  les  personnes  except ionnelles 
mais  pour  tout  le  monde,  l'objet  d'un  sentiment  capable  do  rem- 
plaoer  avec  avantage  toutes  les  religions  actuelle^  soit  pour  les 
besoins  de  coeur,  soit  pour  ceux  de  la  vie  sociale,  cette  verite, 
d'autres  l'ont  sentie  avant  M.  Comte,  mais  personne  que  je  sache 
no  l*a  si  nettement  posee  ni  se  puissament  soutenue. 

"Restent  sa  morale  et  sa  politique,  et  la  dessus  Je 
dois  avouer  mon  dissentiment  presque  total." 

It  is  in  his  work  "Comte  and  Positivism"  that  Mill 
explains  clearly  and  in  detail  his  position  with  regard  to  the 
philosophy,  polit ioue . and  religion*  The  Fhilosophy  Positive 
in  the  main  he  finds  good.  That  part  of  it  dealing  with  the 
law  of  three  states,  he  regards  as  the  contribution  distinctly 
Comtian,  and  also  the  point  of  most  value  in  the  philosophy. 

Comte  claimed  to  bring  the  science  of  sociology  to  the  positive 
state,  but  Mill  believes  that  that  had  already  been  partly 
accomplished,  and  that  Comte *s  work  was  in  "discovering  or  proving, 
and  pursuing  to  their  consequences,  those  of  its  truths  which  are 
fit  to  form  the  connecting  links  among  the  rest."'*’  Up  to  this 
point.  Mill  is  in  accord  with  the  French  philosopher,  but  the 
diversity  of  their  opinions  begins  to  show  when  Comte  advocates 

1 

Mill,  Comte  and  Positivism,  p.  52. 


T 


•34- 


as  a principle  that  the  liberty  of  the  mind  should  he  limited 

by  the  "end  and  purpose  of  positive  science"1 2 3 4 5  which  ie  "as  much 

satisfaction  to  the  essential  inclinations  of  our  intelligence, 

as  ie  consistent  with  the  degree  of  exactitude  commanded  by  the 

2 

aggregate  of  our  practical  wants."  In  other  words,  the  search 

after  truth  is  to  be  subordinated  to  "the  essential  inclinations 

3 

of  our  intelligence."  This,  according  to  Mill,  is  the  principle 
which  is  responsible  for  the  perversions  of  Comte's  later  works. 
Among  the  "essential  inclinations  of  our  intelligence,"  Comte 
includes  the  predilection  for  unity  and  harmony,  and  our  feelings 

4 

of  taste,  and  here  he  departs  from  strict  rationalism  to 

aestheticism,  whither  Mill  cannot  follow  him. 

Mill's  objections  to  the  sociology  of  Comte  are  founded, 

for  the  most  part,  on  their  violation  of  the  principles  of 

liberty  and  equality.  To  Comte,  the  doctrine  of  unlimited 

liberty  of  the  conscience  has  its  place  only  as  an  instrument 

of  attack  upon  the  old  social  system.  In  the  Positive  state, 

it  would  cease  to  exist— just  as  there  is  no  liberty  of  con- 

5 

science  in  physics,  chemistry,  and  astronomy.  The  spiritual 
power,  to  which  Comte  granted  so  much  authority,  being  composed 


1 

Mill,  Comte  and  Positivism,  p.  59. 

2 

Ibid.,  p.  61. 

3 

Ibid.,  p.  62. 

4 

Ibid.,  p.  61 

5 

Ibid.,  p.  74. 


-35- 

of  philosophers,  which  wore  to  he  experts  on  moral  questions, 
would  become  a despotism,  and  to  this  Mill  could  not  consent. 

He  refers  to  it  in  his  book  on  Liberty:^ 

"Some  of  those  modern  reformers  who  have  placed  themselves 
in  strongest  opposition  to  the  religions  of  the  past,  have  been 
noway  behind  either  churches  or  sects  in  their  assertion  of  the 
right  of  spiritual  domination:  M.  Comte,  in  particular,  whose 
social  system,  as  unfolded  in  his  Systems  de  Politique  Pos it ive a 
aims  at  establishing  (though  by  moral  more  than  by  legal  appliances) 
a despotism  of  society  over  the  individual  surpassing  anything 
contemplated  in  the  political  ideal  of  the  most  rigid  discipli- 
narian among  the  ancient  philosophers," 

£ 

Again,  in  Comt e and  Pos it ivism,  he  says  of  Comte: 

"He  demands  a moral  and  intellectual  authority  charged  with  the 
duty  of  guiding  men's  opinions  and  enlightening  their  consciences; 
a Spiritual  Power  whose  judgements  on  all  matters  should  deserve, 
and  receive,  the  same  universal  respect,  and  deference  which  is 
paid  to  the  united  judgement  of  astronomers  in  matters  of 

astronomy.  The  undisputed  authority  — will  be  possessed 

on  the  great  social  questions  by  positive  Philosophers." 

Mill  believes  that  some  unorganized  authority  by 
philosophers  is  natural  and  good,  but  that  a spiritual  despotism 
by  either  clergy  or  philosophers  is  undesirable.  An  organized 
spiritual  authority  is  not  consistent  with  the  nature  of 
spiritual  power.  If  all  are  not  in  accord  with  it,  it  is  hurt- 

1 

Mill.  Liberty,  p.  76. 

£ 

Mill,  Comte  and  Positivism,  p.  96. 


1 


-36- 


ful,  and  if  all  are  in  accord,  it  is  unnecessary.  He  believes 
that  philosophers  can  exert  great  authority  as  educators  without 
being  organized  , and  tint  philosophers  should  not  govern  except 
in  a purely  advisory  capacity,'!' 

Mill  also  objected  to  Comte’s  rejection  of  the  doctrine 

of  equality,  and  his  organization  of  society  into  definite 

classes,  as  well  as  designation  of  political  economy  as  unscien- 

2 

tific,  unpositive,  and  a branch  of  metaphysics. 

He  pointed  out  that  the  fons  errorum  of  Comte’s  later 
works  is  "his  inordinate  demand  for  'unity’  and  ’systematization.*" 
To  it  is  traceable  the  mistakes  of  his  ethical  system,  which 
required  that  the  test  of  all  conduct  should  be  the  motive  which 
prompted  it,  and  which  made  all  conduct  either  moral  or  wrong, 
leaving  no  room  for  a neutral  region  of  unmorality.  He  demanded 
but  one  object  in  conduct— to  make  altruism  predominate  over 
egoism  by  using  every  means  to  "deaden  the  personal  passions 

desuotude."  This  led  to  asceticism  and  mortification  of  the 
3 

body.  Mill  asks: 

"Why  is  it  necessary  that  all  human  life  should  point 
to  but  one  object,  and  be  cultivated  into  a system  of  means  to 
a single  end?  May  it  not  be  the  fact  that  mankind,  who  after 
all  are  made  up  of  single  human  beings,  obtain  a greater  sum  of 
happiness  when  each  pursues  his  own,  under  the  rules  and  conditions 
required  by  the  good  of  the  rest,  than  when  each  makes  the  good 


1 

Mill,  Letters . 

2 

Mill.  Comte  and  Positivism,  pp,  78-60. 
3 

Ibid. . pp.  137-149. 


f 


t 


, , 


T 


f 


t 


r 


T 


T 


T 


r 


t 


t 


. 


-37— 

of  the  reet  his  only  object,  and  allows  himself  no  personal 

pleasures  not  indispensable  to  the  preservation  of  his  faculties? 

The  regimen  of  a blockaded  town  should  be  cheerfully  submitted 

to  when  high  purposee  require  it,  but  is  it  the  ideal  perfection 

of  human  existence?  M.  Comte  sees  none  of  these  difficulties."1 2 

We  have  seen  above  that  Mill  approves  of  the  Religion 

of  Humanity  in  general,  and  upholds  the  idea  of  a religion  without 

a God.  In  doing  this  he  defines  the  conditions  necessary  to 

2 

constitute  a religion,  as  follows: 

1.  "A  creed,  or  conviction  claiming  authority  over  the 
whole  of  human  life." 

2.  "A  belief  or  set  of  beliefs,  deliberately  adopted, 
respecting  human  destiny  and  duty,  to  which  the  believer  inwardly 
acknowled ges  that  all  his  actions  ought  to  be  subordinate." 

3.  "A  sentiment  connected  with  this  creed,  to  give  it 
this  authority.  It  is  a great  advantage  (though  not  absolutely 

indispensable)  that  this  sentiment  should  crystalize  around 

a concrete  object;  if  possible  a really  existing  one,  though,  in 
all  the  more  important  cases  only  ideally  present." 

These  conditions  are  fulfilled  in  the  Religion  of 
Humanity,  but  there  are  points  in  it  to  which  Mill  objects.  The 
most  important  of  them  is  the  cultus  which  was  attached  to  it. 

He  admits  that  there  can  be  no  religion  without  a cultus  or  "set 
of  systematic  observances,  intended  to  cultivate  and  maintain  the 
religious  sentiment,"  but  those  prescribed  by  Comte  are  so 

1 

Mill,  Comte  and  Positivism,  pp.  141-142. 

2 

Ibid.,  p.  133. 


t 


r 


t 


* 


t 


-38- 

minutely  regulated  that  they  become  ridiculous. 

"There  is  nothing  really  ridiculous  in  the  devotional 
practises  which  M.  Qomte  recommends  towards  a cherished  memory 
or  an  ennobling  ideal,  when  they  come  unprompted  from  the  depths 
of  the  individual  feeling,"  he  maintains;  "but  there  is  something 
ineffably  ludicrous  in  enjoining  that  everybody  shall  practise  them 
three  times  daily  for  a period  of  two  hours , not  because  his 
feelings  require  them,  but  for  the  premeditated  purpose  of  getting 
his  feelings  up."'1' 

As  has  been  stated  above,  many  of  the  absurdities  of 
Comte’s  later  writings,  all  of  which  Mill  rejects,  come,  he  believes, 
from  the  inordinate  desire  for  unity  and  regulation.  This  leads 
him  back  to  the  state  Fetishism,  which  is  one  of  the  states  which 

he  supposes  humanity  to  have  passed  through  long  ago. 

2 

"It  is  important,"  says  Comte,  "that  the  domain  of 
fiction  should  become  as  systematic  as  that  of  demonstration, 
in  order  that  their  mutual  harmony  may  be  conformable  to  their 
respective  destinations,  both  equally  directed  tov ards  the  con- 
tinual increase  of  unity,  personal  and  social."  Accordingly, 
he  creates  the  Grand  Fetiche,  which  is  the  earth,  and  makes 
Space  an  object  of  adoration,  representing  Fatality.  "The  final 
unity  disposes  us  to  cultivate  sympathy  by  developing  our 
gratitude  to  whatever  serves  the  Grand  Etre.  It  must  dispose 
us  to  venerate  the  Fatality  on  which  reposes  the  whole  aggregate 

1 

Mill.  Comte  and  Positivism,  pp.  151-153. 

2 

Quoted  in  Mill’s  Comte  and  Posi t ivism.  pp.  193-194. 


t 


r 


T 


t 


-39- 


of  our  existence,” 

This  passion  for  unity  was  carried  even  to  the  point  of 
the  cultivation  of  a superstitious  reverence  for  sacred  numbers, 
such  as  the  number  7,  because  "it  determines  the  largest  group 
which  we  can  distinctly  imagine,"  and  this  number  was  to  be  made 
the  basis  for  numeration  wherever  possible,  in  spite  of  its 
inconvenience.  It  also  led  him  to  the  formation  of  an  idiotic 
system  for  the  correction  of  his  own  literary  style.  Mill 
quotes1  the  following  "plan  for  all  compositions  of  importance" 
from  the  Synthase  Subject ive: 

"'Every  volume  really  capable  of  forming  a distinct 
treatise*  should  consist  of  'seven  chapters,  besides  the  intro- 
duction and  the  conclusion;  and  each  of  these  should  be  composed 
of  three  parts.*  Each  third  part  of  a chapter  should  be 
divided  into  'seven  sections,  each  composed  of  seven  groups  of 
sentences,  separated  by  the  usual  break  of  line.  Normally  formed, 
the  section  offers  a central  group  of  seven  sentences,  preceded 
and  followed  by  three  groups  of  five:  the  first  section  of  each 
part  reduces  to  three  sentences  three  of  its  groups,  symmetrically 
placed;  the  last  section  gives  seven  sentences  to  each  of  its 
extreme  groups.  These  rules  of  composition  make  prose  approach 
to  the  regularity  of  poetry,  when  combined  with  my  previous  re- 
duction of  the  maximum  length  of  a sentence  to  two  manuscript  or 
five  printed  lines,  that  is,  250  letters.'" 


1 

Mill,  Op.  cit. , p.  198. 


r 


t 


-40- 

Such  nonsense  did  not  diminish  the  respect  which  Mill 
retained  for  the  really  valuable  contributions  to  thought  made 
by  Comte  in  his  earlier  works.  He  regarded  them  as  the  signs 
of  the  "melancholy  decadence  of  a great  intellect,"  and  did  all 
in  hie  power  to  spread  the  more  important  of  his  doctrines, 
and  to  aid  him  personally. 

This  last  he  had  an  opportunity  to  do  in  1843,  when 
Comte’s  position  with  the  Polytechnic  School,  where  he  was  em- 
ployed as  examiner,  was  endangered.  Mill  offered  financial 
assistance,  in  case  it  should  be  needed,  but  Comte  declined, 
saying  that  he  would  accept  assistance  from  the  wealthy  men  of 
his  followers  because  he  regarded  it  the  duty  of  such  men  to 
minister  to  the  wants  of  philosophers,  but  that  he  did  net  bolieve 
that  philosophers  with  small  means  should  have  to  help  each  other 
in  this  way.  In  July  of  1844,  Comte  was  dismissed  from  the 
Polytechnic  and  was  in  great  distress.  He  appealed  to  Mill,  with 
the  same  reservation  as  before,  and  Mill  interested  George  Grote, 
the  historian,  and  Sir  William  Molesworth,  who  had  been  until 
1837  the  editor  of  the  London  and  Westminster  Review,  of  which 
Mill  was  the  real,  if  not  the  ostensible,  editor.  These  two, 

with  Raikes  Currie,  made  up  Comte’s  deficiency  for  the  first  two 

1 

years,  but  refused  to  continue  the  assistance,  because  they  did 
not  believe  that  the  philosopher  was  making  sufficient  effort  to 
help  himself.  Comte,  thereupon,  wrote  to  Mill  a statement  of 

1 

Bain,  J.  Mill . pp.  73-75. 


-41— 

his  theory  that,  "in  default  of  the  government,  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  rich  individuals  to  subscribe  their  money  to  enable  philoso- 
phers to  live  and  carry  on  their  speculations."1  Mill  did  not 
agree  with  this  theory,  but  showed  the  letter  to  Grote  and  Moles- 

worth. 

Grote,  however,  was  not  as  great  an  admirer  of  Comte  as 

was  Mill.  He  saw  even  less  of  value  in  the  sociological  volumes 

than  did  the  latter,  who  admired  Comte's  distinction  between  social 

Statics  and  Dynamics,  and  his  Historical  method.  Grote  especially 

disliked  the  repression  of  liberty  in  the  social  doctrines  of  the 

Frenchman.  Accordingly,  when  Comte  began  to  claim  financial  aid 

as  a right,  he  did  not  wish  to  continue  it,  although  Mill  renewed 

the  appeal  in  1848.  Mill  himself,  at  this  time,  in  reply  to  a 

circular  letter  from  Emile  Lit tr£, requesting  financial  assistance 

for  Comte,  sent  him  250  francs.  In  the  accompanying  letter,  he 

explained  that  he  agreed  on  the  theory  of  the  positive  method, 

but  differed  on  the  manner  of  applying  it  to  social  questions. 

"La  plupart  de  ses  opinions,"  he  explains,  "sont  d iametralement 

£ 

opposees  aux  miennes." 

George  Grote,  the  author  of  the  History  of  Groece . and 
a number  of  works  on  philosophy  and  politics,  had  been  associated 
with  Mill  from  about  1820.  As  one  of  the  promoters,  with  Mill, 
of  the  London  University,  he  made  a consistent  stand  against  the 
chair  of  philosophy  of  that  institution  being  occupied  by  a minister 

1 

Mill.  Letters.  I.  p.  132. 

2 

Ibid . , I,  p.  139. 


T 


T 


t 


f 


42 


of  religion,  opposing  the  appointment  of  James  Martineau  to  that 

1 

position.  His  personal  acquaintance  with  Comte  began  in 
January  1840,  at  the  time  of  a visit  to  Paris.  He  met  him 
again  in  Paris  in  1844,  where  Comte  was,  at  that  time,  little 
known.  The  Philosophie  Po s i t i ve  had  been  recently  published  and 
had  made  a great  impression  upon  Grote,  whose  wife  writes  of 
this  visit: 

"Mr.  Grote  found  M.  Comte’s  conversation  original  and 

instructive,  and  on  returning  to  London,  he  became  active  in 

promoting  the  circulation  of  M.  Comte’s  works,  as  being  calculated 

to  expand  the  circle  of  speculative  investigation  among  English 
2 

students." 

As  to  the  doctrines,  Grote  respects  the  method  but  dis- 
agrees on  the  speculations  on  sociology  and  the  progress  of 
society.  He  thinks  that  Comte  over-emphasi zes  fetishism  and 
polytheism,  but  agrees  on  the  law  of  three  states.  "As  to  moral 
and  social  phenomena,"  Grote  believes,  "he  recognises  no  standard 
except  his  own  taste  and  feeling,  which  has  been  derived  from 

Catholicism."  As  a historian,  Grote  does  not  trust  Comte’s 

3 

knowledge  of  facts  in  history. 

Mill  recommended  the  study  of  Comte’s  works  to  those 

with  whom  he  was  personally  in  contact,  and  to  those  with  whom  he 

4 

was  in  correspondence.  In  1843  he  wrote  to  Bulwer  Lytton: 


1 

Dictionary  of  National  Biography.  Article  on  Grote. 
2 — 

Mrs.  Grote.  Life  of  George  Grote,  pp.  157-158. 

3 

Ibid.,  pp.  203-205. 

4 

Mill,  Letters,  I,  p.  124. 


T 


T 


T 


-43- 

"You  would  find  Comte  well  worth  your  better  knowledge.  I do 
not  almys  agree  in  his  opinions,  but  as  far  as  I know  he  seems 
to  me  by  far  the  first  speculative  thinker  of  the  age.”  I have 
been  able  to  find  nothing  to  indicate  that  Eulwer  Lytton  actually 
read  Comte,  however. 

It  was  through  John  Stuart  Mill  that  Alexander  Bain, 

Professor  of  Logic  and  English  Literature  at  Aberdeen  University, 

became  interested  in  Positivism.  John  Robertson,  who  assisted 

Mill  in  the  editorship  of  the  London  and  Westminster  Revi ew  for 

about  three  years,  encouraged  Bain  to  write  to  Mill  on  his  own 

account.  The  answer  was  received  September  El,  1841.  In  the 

second  letter.  Mill  spoke  of  his  Logic „ and  asked:  "Have  you  ever 

looked  into  Comte*s  Cour  de  Philosophie  Posit ive?  He  makes  some 

mistakes,  but  on  the  whole,  I think  it  very  nearly  the  grandest 

1 

work  of  this  age."  The  following  year  Bain,  in  order  to 

improve  his  knowledge  of  French,  decided  to  read  Comte fs  book 
for  himself,  having  derived  his  first  definite  impression  from 
a review  of  it  in  the  Blackwood.  Mill  wrote  to  him  in  this  year 
that  he  had  refrained  from  putting  the  finishing  touches  to 
his  Logic  until  he  had  read  the  sixth  volume  of  the  Philosophie 
Positive,  which  was  just  out.  In  1843  Bain  made  a visit  to 

London. 

"Arriving  in  London  on  the  30th  of  May,"  he  writes, 

"I  obtained  a lodging  in  Windmill  Street,  Tottenham  Court  Road 
.••••••..  I went  without  delay  to  the  India  House  to  Mill  and  got 

1 

Bain,  Autobiography,  pp.  111-112. 


r 


f 


f 


T 


‘ 


-44- 

the  first  volume  of  Comte,  which  1 "began  forthwith.” 

He  finished  five  volumes  in  London  and  got  the  sixth 

to  take  to  Aberdeen*  He  made  an  abstract  as  he  went  along,  and 

constantly  discussed  the  work  with  Mill,  learning  many  of  the 

latter's  ideas  of  the  importance  of  the  doctrines* 

At  Neil  Arnott's  weekly  dinners  there  in  London,  there 

was  some  discussion  of  Comte.  "Arnott  himself  knew  something 

of  Comte,  and,  moreover,  had  classified  the  sciences  upon  the  same 

general  plan;  while,  at  a future  time  (1860),  he  skotched  an 

exhaustive  and  detailed  classification,  very  much  on  Comte's  lines, 

for  the  science  degrees  of  the  University  of  London."  G.  H.  Lewes, 

who  came  to  these  dinners,  was  reading  Comte  also.  At  this  time 
so  far 

Bain  had /concurred  with  the  theories  in  the  Philosophic  Positive 

that  Mill,  in  writing  to  Comte,  mentioned  him  as  one  of  his 

1 

assiduous  students. 

Upon  his  return  to  Aberdeen,  Bain  communicated  his 
Positivist  theories  to  the  members  of  a small  society  there,  of 
which  he  was  a member.  They  obtained  Comte's  complete  work  and 
divided  it  up  among  them  for  study. 

"Such  studies  had,  no  doubt,  the  effect  of  marring  the 
orthodoxy  of  all  concerned,"  writes  Bain,  "although  it  was  im- 
possible to  avoid  giving  indications  that  in  those  days  were  cal- 
culated to  bring  the  individual  students  into  trouble.  Never- 
theless, the  society  allowed  itself  to  be  mentioned  by  Mill  to 
Comte  as  one  of  the  centres  of  Positivism." 

1 

Bain,  Autobiography,  pp.  145-154. 


In  December  of  that  year,  Bain  read  a paper  to  the 


Philosophical  Society  on  the  Classification  of  the  Sciences, 

based  upon  Comte.  The  society,  and  particularly  John  Stuart 

Elackie,  expressed  strong  disapproval,  Blackie's  words  being, 

"my  whole  soul  revolts  at  this  classification."1 

In  1847  Bain  went  to  London,  and  there  finished  his 

Astronomy,  following  the  plan  given  by  Auguste  Comte  in  his 

popular  tret is,  and  making  an  acknowledgement  to  that  effect 

in  the  preface.  In  1849  his  Psychology  and  Logic  were  composed 

and  in  the  latter,  for  the  section  on  Induction,  he  rested 

exclusively  upon  Mill,  except  that  he  substituted  for  his  Book 

VI  (the  logic  of  the  moral  and  political  sciences),  the  logic 

of  the  sciences  generally,  according  to  the  scheme  cf  Auguste 
£ 

Comte.  During  a visit  to  Paris  in  1851,  Bain  met  Comte  and 

Littre,  as  well  as  a pupil  of  the  former,  Alexander  Williamson, 

3 

afterwards  Professor  of  University  College. 

Mill's  influence  for  Positivism  was  by  no  means  con- 
fined to  these  few  men  whom  I have  mentioned.  It  extended  to 
a larger  circle  than  it  is  possible  to  estimate,  through  the 
medium  of  his  writings.  Mill  was  also  a great  advocate  of 
discussion,  and  was  usually  surrounded  by  a group  of  disciples. 
During  the  50' s a number  of  young  men  came  to  London  from  Oxford 

1 

Bain,  Autobiography,  pp.  156-158. 

2 

Ibid,  pp.  194-202. 

3 

Bain,  Op.  cit..  pp.  223-224. 


t 


-46 


and  joined  this  circle  of  those  who  sat  at  the  feet  of  the 
great  philosopher,  receiving  from  him  Positivism*  colored  hy 
his  own  views  on  the  subject,  so  that  his  estimate  of  the  system 
came  to  he  rather  generally  accepted  among  those  who  studied  it 
at  all. 


-47 


II 

THE  UNIVERSITIES 

The  members  of  the  younger  group  of  English  Positivists 
seem  to  have  obtained  their  first  contact  with  the  works  of  Comte 
at  the  universities,  especially  at  Oxford,  Betv/een  the  years 
1848  and  1859,  J,  Cotter  Morison,  Frederic  Harrison,  and  John 
Morley  were  students  there,  while  Leslie  Stephen  was  at  Cambridge, 
After  leaving  the  universities,  these  men  went  to  London,  where 
they  came  in  contact  with  those  groups  of  Positivists  centered 
about  George  Eliot  and  John  Stuart  Mill, 

A very  interesting  figure  in  connection  with  the  Oxford 
of  that  day  was  Richard  Congrove,  a pupil  of  Dr.  Arnold,  and 
tutor  at  the  University  from  1848  to  1854.  Just  as  John  Stuart 
Mill  is  representative  of  the  clear,  critical  type  of  mind,  which 
siezed  upon  the  best  of  the  philosophical  elements  in  Positivism, 
discarding  the  rest,  so  Richard  Congreve,  although  clear-thinking 
at  firet,  became  more  and  more  absorbed  in  the  mystical  side  of 
Comte,  until  he  reached  a kind  of  fanaticism,  Frederic  Harri- 
son telle  us  that  he  was  not  a scholar.  Tut  that  he  had  a wide, 
systematic  grasp  of  history,  and  that  "his  knowledge  of  the  world, 
of  general  culture,  of  politics,  was  masculine  and  broad,"  "His 
strong,  ambitious,  but  rather  arrogant  nature  could  not  but 
impress  younger  men,"  but  he  did  not  inspire  hero-worship.  At 
Oxford,  Harrison  says,  "he  worked  hard,  and  was  genial  and  good- 
natured.  What  a transformation  have  I witnessed  in  forty  years 
to  the  arrogant  egotist,  the  fierce  intriguer,  and  the  pitiless 


-48- 

misanthr  opist  that  ambition,  vanity,  and  fanaticism  have  made  the 
Dr.  Congreve  of  1892  — the  would-be  High  Priest  of  Humanity  — 
the  restless  dreamer  after  a sort  of  back-parlour  Popedom.  I 
could  not  believe  that  human  nature  could  undergo  such  a trans- 
formation in  the  same  man,  if  I had  not  been  a close  witness  of 
the  whole  process."^  In  1855  Congreve  resigned  his  fellowship 
at  Oxford,  in  order  to  devote  himself  to  the  spread  of  the  teach- 
ings of  Positivism.  In  the  work  carried  on  in  Chapel  Street,  he 
took  a leading  part.  Later  he  refused  to  accept  the  authority 
of  Pierre  Lafitte,  Comte’s  successor,  and  caused  a split  in  the 

ranks  of  the  Positivists.  Frederic  Harrison  and  his  party  formed 

2 

a separate  society  at  Newton  Hall,  Fetter  Lane. 

Frederic  Harrison  was  brought  up  in  the  Church  of 

England  by  parents  with  High  Church  leanings.  Itfhen  he  was  a 

youth,  he  had  great  faith  in  prayer  and  used  to  practise  it  for 

the  mosttrivial  and  personal  things.  Later  he  came  to  look 

back  at  this  as  relaxing  to  morality  and  degrading.  "The 

essentially  human  and  special  evil,”  he  says,  "caused  by  our 

bad  acts,  is  ignored  when  it  becomes  a personal  matter  between 

self  and  God."  Never,  however,  did  he  have  a very  lively  in- 

3 

terest  in  the  future  life. 

At  Oxford,  he  came  in  contact  with  Richard  Congreve, 

1 

Harrison,  Frederic,  Autobiography.  I,  pp.  82-85. 

2 

Encyclopedia  Britannica,  Article  on  Congreve , Vol.  VI, 

p.  938. 

3 

Harrison,  Op.  Cit..  I,  p.  39. 


> i 

ji. 


- V 


♦ 


1 


T 


f 


-49- 


who  must  have  been  studying  Comte  at  the  time,  although  Harrison 
says  that  in  1649  Comte  was  little  known  in  England  and  that  he 
does  not  believe  that  Congreve  knew  much  about  him  until  later, 
Harrison  tells  of  the  band  of  "Jumbo"  (which  was  composed  of 
Basely,  Bridges,  Thor ley,  and  himself)  reading  an  article  by 
Brewster  on  Comte  (Edinburgh  Review,  July,  1838),  and  then  an- 
nouncing to  their  colleagues  that  Congreve's  system  of  ideas  was 
derived  from  Comte,  However,  they  did  not  question  Congreve 
definitely  on  the  matter,  and  the  latter  never  once,  during  their 
whole  time  at  Oxford,  referred  to  Comte  in  conversation  with  them. 
Harrison  expressly  states  that  none  of  them  became  Congreve's 
disciples  at  that  time. 

He  first  heard  of  Comte  while  there  at  Oxford,  from 
Littre's  book,  given  to  him  by  Charles  Cookson,  and  from  Mill's 
Logic , In  an  essay  he  expressed  the  opinion  "that  the  future  of 
Philosophy  seems  destined  to  be  the  Positive  Philosophy." 
"Congreve,"  he  says,  "tried  to  get  from  me  what  I meant.  I 
had  not  meant  anything  very  definitely,  and  I declined  to  be 
more  specific.  I thought  I meant  the  philosophy  of  Bacon, 

Hume,  Mill,  and  Comte  in  a general  sense  — the  philosophy  of 
experience  and  logic."1 

In  1855,  at  the  age  of  twenty-four,  Harrison  decided 
not  to  take  Holy  Orders,  owing  to  a strong  feeling,  which  he  had 
developed,  of  antagonism  to  the  Established  Church  as  a political 

1 

Harrison,  Op.  cit . , I,  pp.  85-87. 


r 


t 


t 


I 


f 


T 


t 


-50- 

and  social  scandal.  He  was  closely  associated  with  Dr.  Congreve, 
Dr.  Bridges,  Beesly,  the  Lushingtons,  and  other  Oxford  friends, 
and  a frequent  hearer  of  F.  D.  Maurice,  and  the  men  connected 
with  the  Working  Men’s  College.  He  was  also  being  influenced 
by  the  opinions  of  "Carlyle,  Kingsley,  Goldwin  Smith,  Mill,  Bright, 
' and  the  disestablishment  orators  and  organs."  He  writes  to  his 
mother  at  this  time;1 * 3 

"Nor,  lastly,  do  I find  among  cur  olorgy  that  clear 
conviction,  that  true  wisdom,  which  is  needed  in  one  who  assumes 
to  settle  and  explain  religious  questions  — to  comfort  our  dis- 
tresses — to  clear  up  our  perplexities.  A church  must  teach  — 
bind  — regulate.  I mus t find  one  that  will  flier,  regler, 
rallier  (Auguste  Comte)J." 

It  was  at  this  period  that  he  passed  "from  ardent  and 

unhesitating  Christian  belief  to  the  liberal  lat i tud inarianism, 

and  ultimately  to  scientific  Positivism."  By  this  time  he  had 

read  "with  deepest  enthusiasm"  Harriet  Martineau’s  Pos i t ive 

Philosophy.  He  had  also  read  "Dante,  F.  D.  Maurice , John  Henry 

Newman,  Francis  Newman,  C.  Kingsley,  J.  S.  Mill,  Carlyle,  Comte, 

--  plato,  Aristotle,  and  +he  Biblo  — with  almost  equal  interest 

2 

and  profit."  And  Comte  seemed  to  explain  them  all. 

In  this  year  (1855)  he  had  an  interview  with  Comte 

3 

himself,  which  he  describes  as  follows: 

1 

Harrison,  0£.  cit . . I,  pp.  146-147. 

E 

Ibid.,  pp.  97-106. 

3 

Ibid.,  pp.  97-99. 


T 


t 


f * . 


I replied , 


51 


"He  asked  me  what  I knew  of  his  writings. 

Miss  Martineau's  translation,  of  which  I could  follow  only  the  second 
(historical  and  sociological  ) volume,  and  that  I still  called 
myself  a Christian.  He  asked  me  what  were  my  studies;  and 
finding  that  I had  done  almost  nothing  in  science  and  little  in 
mathematics,  he  said  ‘that  accounted  for  my  mental  condition! ’ 

.....  He  spoke  entirely  as  a philosopher  — much  as  J.  S.  Mill 

would  speak  — not  at  all  as  a priest.  He  repudiated  the  sug- 

gestion that  he  expected  his  followers  to  abandon  Theism  al- 
together. He  said  that  he  had  no  such  hankering  after  the  Un- 
known; hut  some  of  those  nearest  to  him,  especially  the  women, 
clung  to  the  idea  as  a consolation.  Nor  did  he  condemn  them; 
hut  he  thought  the  interest  in  the  problems  of  the  universe  would 
gradually  disappear  under  earthly  cares  and  duties  and  abiding 
aspirations  for  human  good."  He  spoke  of  G.  H.  Lewes  as  "use- 
ful but  inadequate  and  untrustworthy."  Harrison  does  not  seem 

to  have  looked  upon  Comte  as  infallible,  at  this  time,  for  he 

observes  that  he  made  the  untrue  statement  that  Mazzini  did  not 
believe  in  God. 

By  1861  Harrison  was  so  far  a Positivist  in  the  religious 
sense,  that,  on  the  death  of  Dr.  -Bridges'  wife,  he  wrote  to  one 
of  her  friends,  offering  the  Positivist  consolation  of  the  idea 
of  memory.  "What  her  life  was  before  death,  an  active  life  of 
work  in  that  quiet  village,  such  her  life  will  be  after  death. 

I mean  her  memory,  and  all  the  nameless  influence  of  her  doings, 
feelings,  and  thoughts,  working  still  around  her,  amongst  those 
who  have  known  her,  all  kept  alive  tenfold,  a hundredfold  more 


T 


-52- 


distinctly  and  beautifully,  and  really,  when  her  grave  is  under 

the  shadow  of  the  church  tower  beside  her  sisters.”1 

During  the  time  just  after  his  interview  with  Comte, 

Harrison  was  sometimes  a visitor  at  Mill's  (where  he  met  Grote, 

also),  and  was  busied  with  the  study  of  sciences  and  of  Comte's 

work.  He  became  entirely  in  sympathy  with  the  scheme  of 

historical  evolution  described  by  the  latter,  and  found  that  all 

that  he  read  in  "Gibbon,  Ha 11am,  Carlyle,  Dean  Milman,  Michelet, 

Henri  Martin,  Guizot,  Michaud,  Ranke,  Heeren,  or  Dr.  Arnold  gained 

new  significance  when  seen  in  the  light  of  the  Positivist 

2 

elucidation  of  progressive  civilization." 

In  1867  the  Positivist  Society  was  founded  with  Con- 
greve as  president.  In  1878  to  1879  Congreve  seceded  from 
Lafitte,  while  Harrison  remained,  and  in  1881  the  Newton  Hall 
group  of  Positivists  was  formed.  This  and  the  logit ivist 
Review,  which  was  founded  in  1893  were  still  in  action  as  late 
as  1911. 

Positivism  became  the  guiding  force  of  Harrison's 

life,  and  most  of  his  works  touch  upon  it.  Together  with 

3 

Bridges  and  Beesly,  he  translated  the  Politioue  Positive. 

He  also  wrote  a large  number  of  articles  on  the  subject,  which 
were  published  in  the  Rortn ight ly  Review,  the  Cont emporary 
Review,  the  Nineteenth  Century,  and  others,  and  gave  many 

1 

Harrison,  Ojd.  cit . . I,  p.  212-213. 

2 

Ibid . . pp.  251-255. 

3 

Ibid . , pp.  251  ff. 


T 


T 


K 


-53- 


lectures.  Of  the  latter,  he  writes: 

"If  the  list  of  subjects  treated  seems  to  be  extremely 

various,  it  must  be  remembered  that  it  was  invariably  based  on 

the  collective  synthesis  of  tho  Positive  Philosophy,  on  the 

Calendar  of  Great  Men,  and  on  the  general  doctrines  of  Comte  as 

contained  in  his  Polity  and  other  books For  the  twenty- 

five  years,  1880-1904  inclusive,  I generally  lectured  on  Sundays 

for  about  two  months  in  each  year,  as  well  as  on  the  special 

1 

meetings  of  the  Positivist  Society.” 

The  Religion  of  Humanity  was  an  expression  of  Harrison's 

deepest  and  sincerest  convictions*  "The  central  idea  of 

Positivism,”  he  writes  in  The  Philosophy  of  Common  Sense . "is 

simply  this:  that,  until  our  dominant  convictions  can  be  got  into 

one  plane  with  our  deepest  affections  and  also  our  practical 

energies  — until  our  most  sacred  emotions  have  been  correlated 

with  our  root  beliefs  and  also  our  noblest  ambition,— that  is, 

until  one  great  object  is  ever  present  to  intellect,  and  to 

heart,  and  to  energy  all  at  once  - — human  life  can  never 

2 

be  healthy  or  sound."  Positivism  is  a relative  synthesis. 

"A  relative  synthesis  admits  that  absolutely,  in  rerum  natura.  the 
Earth  is  an  infinitesimal  bubble,  and  Man  a very  feeble,  casual, 

and  faulty,  organism But  re latively this  Earth  is  to 

us  mites  the  true  centre  of  the  World,  and  Humanity  is  far  the 

1 

Harrison,  Ojd.  cit . . I,  pp.  282-283. 

2 

Harrison,  Philosophy  of  Common  Sense,  p.  44. 


t 


i 


t 


t 


I 


f 


-54 


noblest,  strongest,  most  humane,  most  permanent  organism  that 

we  can  prove  to  inhabit  it,”1 

In  his  acceptance  of  the  idea  of  the  Religion  of 

Humanity,  Harrison  was  like  Mill,  bu.t  he  went  far  beyond  the 

latter  in  his  acceptance  of  the  cultus  which  went  with  it,  as  is 

shown  by  his  activity  at  Newton  Hall, 

Newton  Hall  was  established  to  serve  the  purpose  of 

"school,  club,  and  chapel  — a place  for  education,  for  political 

activity,  and  for  religious  communion.”  Scientific  training 

was  emphasized,  for  it  was  recognized  that  this  was  the  basis  of 

2 

the  very  existence  of  Positivism,  Harrison  insists  that  there 

was  no  ritual  nor  sacerdotalism  connected  with  this  establishment, 

but  goes  on  to  describe  the  sacraments  which  were  celebrated  there. 

They  were  nine,  as  was  proposed  by  Comte,  some  of  them  being: 

"Presentation  of  infants.  Continuation  of  adolescents  (initiation 

into  systematic  education).  Destination  to  a profession.  Maturity," 

3 

Marriage,  and  Funeral.  Another  of  the  rites  was  that  of 
Commemoration,  which  consisted  of  a pilgrimage  to  the  home,  or 
tomb,  of  one  of  the  great  men  on  the  Positivist  Calendar,  The 
most  important  of  these  was  that  to  Westminster  Abbey,  which  took 
place  on  September  5th,  the  anniversary  of  the  death  of  Comte, 

The  tombs  of  all  the  great  men  of  the  Calendar  buried  there  were 
visited,  and  later  a historic  estimate  was  delivered  in  the 

1 

Harrison.  Philosophy  of  Common  Sense,  p.  60. 

2 

Harrison,  Autobiography,  it,  pp.  270-271. 

3 

Ibid.,  II,  286. 


t 


55 


Chapter  House,  the  Dining  Hall,  or  the  Jerusalem  Chamber.1 

Frederic  Harrison  was  possessed  of  the  true  missionary 

spirit,  and  was  eager  to  find  Positivists  wherever  there  was  the 

slightest  possibility  of  there  being  any.  He  records  the  fact 

that  Mr.  Wu,  a student  under  the  name  of  Ng  Choy,  secretary  to 

Li  Hung  Chang,  was  a Positivist,  and  that  the  Chinese  minister 

2 

came  to  some  of  the  addresses. 

He  calls  Huxley  a '’rudimentary  Positivist"  and  quotes 
his  own  words  to  prove  it:  "That  a man  should  determine  to  devote 

himself  to  the  service  of  humanity  ....  that  this  should  be, 
in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word  his  religion  ....  is  not  only  an 
intelligible,  but,  I think,  a laudable  resolution."  This  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  Huxley  has  been  making  violent  attacks 
upon  the  doctrines  of  Comte.  The  most  famous  of  these  attacks 
was  made  in  an  address,  delivered  in  Edinburgh,  November  8,  1868, 
printed  in  the  Fortnightly  Review  for  February  1,  1869,  entitled. 

On  the  Physical  Bas is  of  Life . The  Archbishop  of  York  had 
delivered  a paper  On  the  Limit s of  Philosophic  Inquiry  the  day  before 
that  on  which  Huxley  was  to  speak.  The  clergyman  had  attacked 
what  he  called  the  "New  Philosophy,"  i.  e.  the  philosophy  that 
estimates  that  the  limits  of  speculative  inquiry  should  be  those 
of  human  experience,  and  had  identified  it  with  the  philosophy 
of  Auguste  Comte.  Huxley  replied  that  he  and  many  other  men 
of  science  held  this  philosophy  to  be  just,  but  insisted  that  it 

1 

Harrison,  Autobiography.  II,  pp.  288-289. 

2 

Harrison,  Op.  Cit . . I,  p.  330. 


T 


. 


* ’ 


r t 


t 


1 


-56- 

should  he  attributed  to  Hume  and  not  to  Comte. 

"Now,  so  far  as  I am  concerned,"  went  on  Huxley,  "the 
most  reverend  prelate  might  dialectically  hew  M.  Comte  in  pieces, 
as  a modern  Agog,  and  I should  not  attempt  to  stay  his  hand. 

In  so  far  as  my  study  of  what  specially  characterizes  the  Positive 
Philosophy  has  led  me,  I find  therein  little  or  nothing  of  any 
scientific  value,  and  a great  deal  which  is  as  thoroughly  an- 
tagonistic to  the  very  essence  of  science  as  anything  in  ultra- 
montane Catholicism.  In  fact  M.  Comte*s  philosophy  in  practise 

might  he  compendiously  described  as  Catholicism  minus  Chris- 
£ 

t ianity. " 

In  another  place  in  the  same  article,  he  characterized 

Comte  as  "a  French  writer  of  fifty  years  later  date  (than  HumeJ 

in  whose  dreary  and  verbose  pages  we  miss  alike  the  vigour  of 

thought  and  exquisite  clearness  of  style  of  the  man  whom  I make 

hold  to  term  the  most  acute  thinker  of  the  eighteenth  century 

3 

— .even  though  that  century  produced  Kant.” 

In  the  April  1st  edition  of  the  Fortnight ly  Review  for 
the  same  year,  Congreve  replied  to  this  article,  and  was  in 
turn  answered  by  Huxley,  in  the  same  periodical.  This  last 
article  is  mentioned  by  Mill  in  a letter  to  Dr.  Gazelles,  dated 
from  Avignon,  October  £3,  1869: 

"La  repons e de  M.  Huxley  a M.  Congreve  a deja  psru, 
dans  le  meme  recueil  periodiaue  que  la  conference.  

1 

Fortnightly  Review,  1869,  Vol.  II,  pp.  141-142. 

£ 

Ibid . , p.  141. 

3 

Ibid  . 


X 


X 


X 


V * 


-57- 


C’est  une  critique  amere  de  Comte,  parfoie  juste,  plus  souvent 

in juste  ou  exageree,  et  qui  me  parait  dans  son  ensemble 

extremement  faible.  Pour  rend  re  justice  a Huxley  il  faut  se 

rappeler  que  le  volume  le  plus  imparfait  et  surtout  le  plus 

arriere  de  la  Philosophic  Positive  est  celui  oui  traite  do  la 

1 

chimie  et  de  la  biologie," 

One  of  Huxley*  s objections  to  Positivism  is  the  same  as 

one  which  Mill  sets  forth  in  Comte  and  P'oe it  i vism.  i.  e.  the 

£ 

fact  that  Comte  rejects  psychology  in  favor  of  phrenology. 

In  spite  of  his  many  words  against  them.  Dr.  Bridges 
finds  evidence  in  Huxley*s  biography  that  his  ideas  were  not  so 
widely  different  from  those  of  Comte  as  might  be  inferred  from 
the  passages  quoted  above* 

"Of  the  two  synthetic  philosophies  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  claiming  to  be  founded  on  science,"  says  Dr.  Bridges, 
"one,  that  which  is  identified  with  the  name  of  Herbert  Spencer, 
takes  Cosmic  Evolution  for  its  central  principle;  the  other, 
that  of  Auguste  Comte,  rests  on  the  conception  of  Humanity.  It 
will  be  seen  that  Huxley* s l&tor  teaching  lends  support  to 
Comte  rather  than  to  Spencer*  This  point  has  been  already 
touched  by  Mr.  Harrison,  but  it  will  well  bear  re-ins ict once." 

He  goes  on  to  quote  passages  to  demonstrate  that  Huxley  leaned 
towards  the  conception  that  the  ethical  progress  of  Humanity 

1 

Mill.  Letters.  II,  p.  £82. 

2 

Huxley  on  Hume . English  Men  of  Letters  Series,  Vol. 


VII,  p.  52 


T 


• r 


i t •'  ■ 


T 


1 


i. 


t 


— 58 


depends,  not  on  imitating  the  Cosmic  Process,  nor  in  running 
away  from  it,  but  in  c cm  batting  it,  which  is  the  spirit  of 

1 

Positivism,  summed  up  in  Comte's  classification  of  the  sciences. 

Another  writer  of  whom  Harrison  tried  very  hard  to  make 

a convert  was  John  Ruskin,  whose  acquaintance  he  had  made  while 

2 

both  were  teaching  in  the  Working  Men's  College  about  1860. 

Harrison  tried  to  get  Ruskin  to  study  Comte,  not  the  philosophy 

or  religion,  but  the  social  principles,  because  he  believed  that 

they  had  many  points  in  common  with  those  of  his  friend. 

"I  never  dreamed  of  Ruskin  reading  Comte  himself," 

3 

he  says,  "but  of  his  taking  his  ideas  from  me.  Little  did  I 
know  then  that  John  would  take  no  ideas  from  the  Angel  Gabriel 
himself.  The  father  asked  me  to  direct  John  to  some  standard 
authorities  on  Political  Economy.  I might  as  well  have  asked 
John  to  study  Hints  on  Deerstalking,  or  The  Art  of  Dancing. 

He  wanted  no  man's  books,  no  ideas,  no  principles  but  his  own. 

He  would  make  it  all  out  for  himself."  Harrison  maintained  that 
"the  basis  of  the  economics  of  Comte  and  of  Ruskin  were,  if  not 
identical,  distinctly  parallel.  Both  saw  that  organic  society 
rested  on  property  — but  property  as  created  by  the  social  co~ 
operation  of  Labour  and  Intellect,  and  also  as  being  rightly 
devoted  to  the  good  of  society  as  a whole,  and  not  to  the  enjoy- 
ment of  individuals." 


Bridges,  Illustrations  of  Positivism,  pp.  451-452. 

2 

Cook,  Biography  of  Ruskin,  I,  p.  482. 

3 

Harrison,  Autobiography,  I,  p.  231. 


T 


' 


I 


-59- 

La  tar,  in  1868,  Harrison,  still  persistent,  wrote  him 
a long  letter,  pointing  out  wherein  Comte’s  doctrines  formed 
a scientific  ground  for  the  economic  theories  of  Ruskin.  To 
this  Ruskin  replied: 

"I  cannot  now  read  through  a severe  philosophical 

treatise,  merely  to  ascertain  that  its  author  is,  or  was  before 

me,  of  one  mind  with  me  as  to  two  and  two’s  usually  making 

four,  nor  do  I care  at  present  to  ascertain  wherein  Comte  differs 

from  me,  which  he  certainly  does  (I  hear)  in  some  views  respecting 

the  spiritual  powers  affecting  animal  ones  I You  know  how 

happy  1 am  always  to  see  you  yourself;  if  you  care  to  come  so 

far  to  tell  me  more  about  Positivism,  I shall  delightedly  listen*"'*' 

the 

On  religion  and/theory  of  Subjective  Immortality  after 
death  he  was  indignant! 

"If  indeed  these  enthusiasms  give  you  any  consolation 

in  the  loss  of  any  person  whom  you  care  for,  or  the  decline  of 

any  faculty  of  your  own  (such  as  Turner’s  or  Scott's  bursting 

into  tears  as  their  hands  ceased  to  obey  them)  Heaven  forbid 

2 

any  one  should  interfere  with  them*" 

As  to  immortality,  Ruskin *s  Preface  to  The  C rown  of 
Wild  Olive  indicates  grave  doubt  in  his  mind  on  the  subject  of 
a future  life,  and  almost  a feeling  that  the  assurance  that  the 
soul  does  not  live  after  death  gives  greater  value  to  this  life, 
than  the  contrary  belief. 

1 

Harrison,  Autobiography.  I,  p.  233-4. 

2 

Ibid.,  I,  p.  233-234. 


-60- 

In  1875-1876,  some  articles  of  Harrison's  on  his 
creed  were  the  cause  of  a vehement  correspondence  between  the 
two  men.  "Ruskin  was  passionately  stirred  by  the  very  idea 
of  a religion  of  Humanity;  and,  as  may  be  read  in  his  Fore, 
he  used  the  most  abusive  language  about  men  of  science  and  of 
everyone  suspected  of  Evolution,  Democracy,  or  Modern  Progress." 

In  spite  of  this  violent  language,  the  friendship  of  the  men  con- 
tinued, and  there  was  a feeling  of  utmost  kindliness  between  them. 
In  letter  LXVI  of  Hors Rusk  in  prints  the  whole  of  one  of  his 
personal  letters  to  Harrison.  A great  deal  of  it  is  taken  up 
with  good  natured  raillery  on  the  subject  of  evolution,  in  which 
Ruskin  declares  that  he  can  see  no  improvement  in  roses,  apples, 
nor  women  since  antiquity.  In  fact,  as  to  the  latter,  he  rather 
prefers  the  "ductile  and  silent  gold  of  ancient  womanhood  to  the 
resonant  bronze  and  tinkling  — not  cymbal,  but  shall  we  say  — 
saucepan"  of  modern  emancipated  woman.  He  complains  that  he 
does  not  find  the  advocates  of  Evolution  much  given  to  studying 
either  men,  women,  or  roses,  but  perceives  them  mostly  occupied 
with  frogs  and  lice,  and  wonders  of  there  is  a "Worshipful 
Batrachianity  --  a Divine  Ped icularity. " "Your  Humanity,"  he 
goes  on,  "has  no  more  to  do  with  roses  than  with  Rose-chafers 
or  other  vermin;  but  I must  really  beg  you  not  to  muddle  your 
terms  as  well  as  yourhead.  'We,  who  have  thought  and  studied,1 
do  not  admit  that  'humanity  is  an  aggregate  of  men. ' An  aggre- 
gate of  men  is  & mob,  and  not  'Humanity';  and  an  aggregate  of  sheep 

1 

Ruskin,  Eors  01s vi gera.  Ill,  221  ff. 


T 


f 


-61- 


is  a flock,  and  not  Ovility;  and  an  aggregate  of  geese  is  — 
perhaps  you  had  "better  consult  Mr*  Herbert  Spencer  and  the  late 
Mr*  John  Stuart  Mill  for  the  best  modern  expression."  Whereupon 
he  asks  Harrison’s  advice  on  some  legal  ouestions,  assuring  him 
that  he  can  do  more  service  to  Humanity  by  answering  them  than 
"by  any  quantity  of  papers  on  its  Collective  Development  of  its 
Abstract  Being,"  and  adjuring  him,  "by  all  that’s  positive,  all 
that’s  progressive,  all  that’s  spiral,  all  that’s  conchoidal,  and 
all  that’s  evolute"  to  answer  him.  He  closes  by  quoting  some 
devotional  poetry  of  Sir  Philip  Sidney: 

"Yet  of  thee  the  thankful  story 
Pilled  my  mouth:  thy  gratious  glory 
Was  my  ditty  all  the  day. 

Do  not  then,  now  age  assaileth. 

Courage,  verdure,  vertue  faileth. 

Do  not  leave  me  cast  away," 

suggesting  that  Harrison  may,  perhaps,  apply  them  personally  to 

Mr*  Comte, 

But,  for  all  his  raillery,  Ruskin  was  very  near  the 
doctrines  of  Comte  in  some  respects.  Take  for  example  three 
points  with  regard  to  St.  George’s  Guild.  The  landowners  were 
to  be  men  of  independent  fortune,  and  they  were  to  give  property 
and  their  own  ingenuity  to  +ha  service*  Comte,  as  we  have 
seen,  would  make  capitalists  the  ruling  power.  Ruskin  divides 
the  members  of  his  guild  into  distinct  classes,  according  to  their 
capacities  and  occupations.  Comte  does  the  same.  And  finally 
Ruskin  makes  the  second  article  of  the  vow  of  the  guild  to  read 
as  follows:  "I  trust  in  the  nobleness  of  human  nature,  in  the 

majesty  of  its  faculties,  the  fulness  of  its  mercy,  and  the  joy 


r 


f 


t 


t 


t 


* 


-62' 


of  its  love,"  Of  this  last,  Harrison  writes:"^ 

"The  second  article  is  the  direct  negation  of  the 
orthodox  Christian  view  of  the  desperate  wickedness  of  the 
human  heart  and  the  miserable  feebleness  of  man.  Besides  this, 
the  nobleness  of  Humanity,  its  majesty,  mercy,  and  love,  is  in 
a religious  sense,  the  doctrine  only  of  Positivists,  and  is 
repudiated  by  most  skeptics  and  agnostics  as  well  as  by 
Christ ians • " 

Even  Ruskin  perceived  that  this  was  a kind  of  religion 

of  humanity,  for,  in  1877,  in  telling  how  he  was  confronted  with 

the  problem  of  the  possibility  of  perfection  in  art,  such  as  that 

2 

attained  by  Titian,  without  religion,  he  writes: 

"I  set  myself  to  work  out  that  problem  thoroughly 
in  1858,  and  arrived  at  the  conclusion  — which  i s an  entirely 
sound  one,  and  which  did  indeed  alter,  from  that  time  forward, 
the  tone  and  method  of  my  teaching  — that  human  work  must  be 
done  honourably  and  thoroughly,  because  we  are  now  Men;  — 
whether  we  ever  expect  to  be  angels,  or  ever  were  slugs,  being 
practically  no  matter,  We  are  now  Human  creatures,  and  must, 
at  our  peril,  do  Human  — that  is  to  say,  affectionate,  honest, 
and  earnest  work.”  and  adds  the  footnote:  "This  is  essentially 
what  my  friend  Mr,  Harrison  means  (if  he  knew  it)  by  his  Religion 
of  Humanity,  — one  which  he  will  find,  when  he  is  slightly  more 
advanced  in  the  know'l  od  ge 1 of  all  life  and  thought,1  was  known 

1 

Harrison,  Tennyson,  Ruskin,  and  Mill,  p.  174. 

2 

Ruskin,  Hors,  IV,  p.  8. 


r 


t 


t 


r 


t 


T 


1 


-63- 

and  acted  on  in  epochs  considerably  antecedent  to  that  of  modern 

Evolution. " 

Two  other  Oxford  friends  of  this  period  were  J.  Cotter 
Morison  and  John  Morley. 

The  former  was  the  son  of  the  inventor  of  "Morisonfs 
Pills"  referred  to  so  scathingly  hy  Carlyle  in  Past  and  Present . 
The  elder  Morison  made  a large  fortune  and  settled  in  Paris  where 

/i. 

Cotter  obtained  a knowledge  of  the  French  language  and  a deep 

sympathy  with  French  institutions.  He  v/ent  to  Oxford  in  1650. 

and  made  the  acquaintance  of  Mark  Pattison,  John  Morley,  and 

1 

probably  Beesly,  and  Bridges. 

Morley  paints  a very  engaging  picture  of  him  as  he 
knew  him  at  Oxford,  "at  home  in  the  saddle,  skillful  with  the 
foils,  and  an  excellent  boxer"  — brilliant,  quick,  versatile, 
and  kindly.  "He  had1  the  art  of  kindling  new  life  in  our 
spirits,  and  if  you  had  anything  of  your  own  to  say,  you  were 
sure  of  quick,  sincere,  and  brotherly  response."  Meredith 
referred  to  him  later  as  "a  fountain  of  cur  sweetest,  quick  to 
spring,  in  fellowship  abounding." 

He  wrote  a life  of  St.  Bernard,  which  he  was  preparing 
even  in  those  days  and  which  "had  the  good  fortune  to  gratify  so 
singular  a trinity  as  Carlyle,  Manning,  and  the  Positivists  of 
every  tinge."2 

1 

Encyc loped  ia  Br itannica  and  Diet  inn^ry  of  Hat i onal 
Biography,  Articles  on  Morrison. 

2 

Morley,  John,  Recollections . I,  pp.  9-11. 


-64- 

After  leaving  Oxford,  Morison  'became  one  of  the  leading 
Positivists  and  was  associated  with  Harrison  at  Wewton  Hall. 

Towards  the  end  of  his  career,  however,  ,he  wrote  "The  Service 
of  Man."  This  hook,  Morley  says,  "drew  hot  fire  from  orthodox 
quarters,  and,  in  other  ways,  particularly  scandalized  the 
Positivist  brotherhood  of  all  their  colours."1 2 

While  these  men  were  at  Oxford,  Leslie  Stephen  was  at 
Cambridge,  having  matriculated  there  in  1849.  Between  the 
years  1854  and  1864  he  was  a don  there  — a very  popular  don 
who  took  an  enthusiastic  interest  in  sports,  was  president  of 
the  Boa  Constrictor  Walking  Club,  and  did  not  always  try  to  avoid 
shocking  his  more  staid  fellow-dons.  These  latter  could  hardly 
be  persuaded  that  Stephen  had  any  serious  interests,  although 
he  did  do  some  reading  of  the  heavier  kind.  At  a later  date 
he  writes,  "at  Cambridge,  where  the  standard  was  very  low,  I was 
supposed  to  know  something  about  philosophy;"  and  added  that  he 
had  read  Mill,  Comte,  Kant,  Hamilton,  etc.  Extant  note-books, 
though  written  in  shorthand,  prove  that  he  studied  MauriceIs 
Theologi cal  Essays . Ricardo* s Principles  of  Politi cal  Economy. 
Butler’s  Analogy.  Comte’s  Po s i t i v e Philosophy  (finished  May  £8, 
1859),  and  others.^ 

In  1865  he  decided  to  do  more  serious  reading.  "He 
tackled  Spinoza,"  says  his  biographer,  "and  he  tackled  Hegel, 
though  some  'long-hand*  words,  rising  like  rocks  out  of  a sur- 
rounding mist,  suggest  that  Hegel  was  not  allowed  to  try  hie 

1 

Morley,  John,  Recollections , I,  p.  12. 

2 

Maitland,  Life  and  Letters  of  Leslie  Stephen,  pp.  64-73. 


I 


r 


t 


T 


-65- 


patience  long.  ('In  short,  Hegel  is  in  many  ways  little  better 
than  an  ass.')  Comte  and  Strauss  and  Renan  seem  more  attractive, 
and  the  annotator's  projects  become  less  distinctly  political. 

They  tend  towards  the  history  of  thought:  especially  toward  the 
history  of  religious  thought  in  modern  times.  To  Comte  in 
particular,  he  paid  close  attention.  Long  afterwards  he  said  that, 
had  he  been  at  Oxford,  he  might  have  been  a Positivist.  It  may 

be  so,  but  to  speculate  about  what  Leslie  Stephen  would  have  been 

had  he  not  been  at  Cambridge  would  be  like  speculating  about  a 

1 

Matthew  Arnold  who  had  not  been  at  Oxford." 

In  1866  in  a memorandum  written  on  his  38th  birthday,  he 
seems  to  be  suffering  from  lack  of  enthusiasm  and  an  aim  in 
life.  He  mentions  that  he  is  reading  Comte  and  attempting  to 
finish.  Comte,  however,  was  probably  not  responsible  for  this 
melancholy  mood,  for  a week  later  Stephen  became  engaged  to  one 
of  Thackeray's  daughters. 

For  the  next  seven  years  Stephen  was  a correspondent 
of  the  nation  in  New  York.  He  wrote  fortnightly  letters  "on 
religious  matters,  of  Maurice,  and  Stanley,  of  Ritualists  and 
Posit ivists . " 

He  counted  all  the  Positivist  group  among  his  friends: 

John  Morley,  Frederic  Harrison,  with  whom  he  climbed  the  Alps, 

2 

Morison,  G.  H.  Lewes,  and  George  Eliot,  whose  biography  he  wrote. 

1 

Maitland,  Life  and  Letters  of  Leslie  Stephen,  pp.  172-3. 

2 

Ibid., 


p.  185  ff 


T 


f 


j 


t 


-66- 

In  1882  he  wrote  to  Henry  Sidgwick,  expressing  his 

1 

indebtedness  to  Comte: 

"You  speak  of  me  as  exaggerating  the  novelty  of  the 
evolutionist  theory  and  specially  by  overlooking  Comte.  If 
I have  done  so  it  was  through  carelessness  of  expression.  The 
fact  is  that  I consider  myself  to  have  learnt  very  much  from 
Comte,  and  I take  a higher  estimate  of  him  than  most  people  do, 
especially  the  scientific  people  who  object  to  his  religion. 

I only  think  that  evolutionists  have  made  his  theory  workable  and 
brought  it  into  a quasi-sci ent ific  state  more  thoroughly  than  he 
could  do.  But  I agree  that  much  of  my  morality  is  contained 
in  his 

Stephen  was  an  agnostic,  but  not  a Positivist  in  the 

strict  sense  of  the  word,  although  he  was  influenced,  (according 

, 2 
to  Maitland) , by  Lewes  and  Comte  more  than  by  Spencer.  He 

points  out  that  "we  are  all  agnostics,  though  some  people  choose 

3 

to  call  their  ignorance  God  or  mystery " 

On  the  other  hand  Stephen  takes  even  his  liberalism 

lightly,  and  mocks  at  the  free-thinkers  a bit.  He  writes  to 

4 

a friend: 

"By  the  way,  I actually  preached  a sermon  the  other 
day— about  Materialism!  which  I showed  conclusively  to  mean 

1 

Maitland,  Life  and  Letters  of  Leslie  Stephen,  p.  352. 

2 

Ibid  . . p.  405-6. 

3 

Ibid.,  p.  287. 

4 

Ibid.,  p.  389. 


-67- 

something  quite  different  from  what  anybody  supposes  it  to  mean. 
Really  I plagiarized  a bit  of  Comte,  But  the  performance  was 
rather  comic.  It  was  in  Moncure  Conway’s  old  chapel.  They 
asked  me  for  a Sunday  lecture;  but  I found  that  they  aimed  at 
a kind  of  service,  singing  Emerson,  and  taking  the  first  lesson 
out  of  Mill  and  the  second  out  of  Wordsworth.  It  was  a oueer 
caricature;  but  I suppose  it  amuses  some  of  them.  I believe 
that  I succeeded  tolerably,  and  though  I assured  them  (politely 
I hope)  that  they  could  not  understand  a word  I was  saying,  they 
did  not  offer  to  object ” 

And  again: ^ "I  think  I wrote  you  about  that  wonderful 
meeting  of  ’liberal  thinkers,*  which  was  got  up  by  Conway  in 
the  summer.  It  seems  to  be  coming  to  life  again — rather  to  my 
disgust,  to  say  the  truth.  Huxley  and  Tyndall  are  going  to 
take  it  up,  and  I shall  have  to  join,  if  it  is  launched  — Oh, 
Lord,  what  bosh  will  be  poured  forth  if  we  get  the  free-thinkers 
together  for  a palaver!” 

In  strong  contrast  to  the  lighthearted  Leslie  Stephen, 
was  his  friend  John  Addington  Symonds,  a member,  like  Morison  and 
Morley,  of  the  Oxford  group,  although  he  went  there  several  years 
later  than  they.  Symonds  could  not  mock  at  rationalism;  it  cut 
too  deeply  at  the  roots  of  his  most  cherished  sentiments  and 
beliefs.  Like  Matthew  Arnold,  he  felt  the  full  sadness  of  the 
new  movement,  a poignant,  almost  desperate  nostalgia  for  the  old 
faith.  This  feeling  was  given  an  added  pathos  by  the  fact  that 

1 

Maitland,  Op.  cit . . p.  330. 


» 


t 


T 


f 


l 


'I 

I 


-68 


he  was  an  exile  in  "body,  as  well  as  spirit,  from  the  surroundings 
of  his  childhood.  At  the  age  of  twenty-three  his  health  broke 
down  and  he  was  never  well  afterwards.  He  had  to  spend  roost  of 
the  rest  of  his  life  in  Switzerland  and  Italy,  and  his  literary 
ambitions  could  never  be  realized.  He  died,  still  an  exile, 
in  Rome,  at  the  age  of  53. 

The  Positivist  influence  on  John  Addington  Symonds  was 
represented  by  Richard  Congreve,  more  than  any  other  person.  It 
began  at  Oxford.  During  his  first  year  there  he  wrote  to  his 

• 4.  1 

sister: 

"Do  you  think  you  could  find  out  from  Mrs.  B- 

where  and  when  Mr.  Congreve  preaches,  and  whether  he  does  preach 
regularly?  Puller  is  very  anxious  to  hear  him,  and  wants  me  to 
go  with  him  some  day  to  London  for  that  purpose.  As  the  risk 
of  my  conversion  to  Positivism  is  extremely  small,  I should 
not  mind  it." 

curing  his  first  year  of  absence  from  England  he  met 

2 

Congreve  in  Florence,  and  describes  at  length  in  letters  the 
impression  made  upon  him  by  that  meeting: 

"1  have  seen  much  of  Congreve  here.  Rut son  and  I 
take  long  walks  v/ith  him  and  make  him  discourse.  You  know, 
of  course,  whom  I mean  — the  Positivist  priest  in  London. 

This  is  an  inadequate  description  of  the  man,  but  it  denotes  him, 

1 

Brown,  John  Addington  Symonds,  I,  104. 

2 1 

Ibid.,  I,  296-298-299. 


-69- 

E0  is  divided  from  Littre  and  Mill  and  Lewes,  and  others  whom 
the  world  call  Comtists,  by  his  priesthood.  They  take  the 
scientific  side  of  Comte,  regarding  the  religions  as  a senile 
a ream.  He  hinges  his  theory  of  the  future  upon  the  new  faith, 
that  shall  reorganize  society.  I never  saw  a man  more  con- 
fident in  his  own  opinions  under  worse  auspices.  When  1 asked 
him  how  far  distant  he  thought  the  reign  of  Positive  principles 
might  be,  he  answered,  'To  the  unbelieving,  I should  place  it  at 
the  expiration  of  three  or  four  centuries;  for  myself,  I believe 
that  our  power  will  be  established  in  hardly  more  than  the  same 
number  of  generations.*  Everything  according  to  his  notions 
points  to  the  silent  adoption  of  Positive  principles  and  the 
irresistaole  march  of  its  unerring  truth.  So  far  he  agrees  with 
the  enemies  in  his  own  camp.  But  he  goes  beyond  and  says, 

’Men  need  religion;  the  health  of  Europe  is  decaying  because 
there  is  no  religion;  religion  is  necessary  to  Mnd  ?or»i*ty  to- 
gether. Why  are  our  nerves  weak,  our  bodies  feeble,  our 
writings  aimless,  our  whole  constitutions  brittle?  Because  the 
moral  organization  of  religious  faith  has  been  dissolved,  no 
discipline  exists,  each  man  thinks  as  he  chooses,  many  think 
nothing,  others  are  broken  by  a thousand  doubts,  literature 
expands  into  useless  but  exciting  channels,  stimulus  without  an 
aim  keeps  up  continual  irritation,  in  short,  there  is  no  centre 
or  circumference  to  our  society.  In  politics  the  State  is 
becoming  disintegrated  to  the  very  individual.'  .....  I ask, 
does  he  think  that  rositivism  can  supply  to  the  affective  parts 
of  man  an  interest  sufficient  to  make  each  individual  auiet  in 


-70- 


hie  sphere,  confident  of  the  future,  and  vigorous  for  labour? 
’Certainly,*  he  answers;  'men  will  relinouish  the  immoral  and 
degraded  yearning  after  personal  immortality;  science  will  teach 
them  not  to  seek  for  first  causes  like  God.'  Humanity  then 
will  reorganize  as  their  great  mother,  as  that  without  which  they 
are  nothing,  to  which  owing  everything  they  are  hound  to  render 
every  service,  as  the  source  of  strength,  the  seat  of  aspirations, 
and  the  object  of  prayer.  He  allows  that  humanity  can  have 
no  consciousness,  and  when  I define  prayer  as  implying  the 
communion  of  two  conscious  beings  he  glides  away  and  talks  of 
contemplation,  I have  asked  for  bread,  and  he  has  given  me 
a stone.  Why  not  deny  me  bread  and  say,  *1  have  none,  science 
has  petrified  my  store?1  I should  be  more  content.  But  to 
offer  me  religion,  prayer,  a Church,  a liturgy,  a stool  to  kneel 
on,  a pulpit  to  hear  sermons  from,  and  then  to  bid  me  fix  my 
hopes  upon  a summum  gems  which  i help  to  make  — it  is  too 
absurd.  If  I ever  become  a Positivist,  it  will  be  of  the  Mill 
kind 

Then,  after  a reverie  anent  the  Christmas  anthems  at 
the  Cathedral  at  Bristol,  comes  a paragraph  in  which  the 
poignancy  of  his  homesickness  for  the  old  spiritual  as  well  as 
physical  associations  is  manifest: 

”1  wish  I could  be  home  again  at  Christmas,  free  from 
Congreve,  and  the  Sistine  Chapel,  with  a child's  belief  in 
angels.  How  they  hurried  in  the  Gloria  in  Excelsis,  after 
the  low  symphony,  until  the  whole  church  rustled  with  their 
swift  descending  squadrons.” 


I 


! 


I 

I 


t 


; 


T 


T 


t 


r 


t 


I 


* 


T 


-71 


Throughout  the  life  of  Symonds  echoes  and  re-echoes  the 
agony  of  hie  scepticism  and  the  conflict  of  the  poet  with  the 
man  of  reason  within  him*  It  paralyzes  him. 

TTI  wish  and  cannot  will,"  he  wrote  in  his  diary.^ 

"To  emulate  things  nobler  than  myself  is  my  desire.  But  I cannot 
get  beyond  — create,  originate,  win  heaven  by  prayers  end  faith, 
have  trust  in  God,  and  concentrate  myself  upon  an  end  of  action. 
Sceptiem  is  my  spirit.  In  my  sorest  needs  I have  had  no  actual 
faith,  and  have  said  to  destruction,  ‘Thou  art  my  sister.1 
To  the  skirts  of  human  love  I have  clung,  and  I cling  blindly. 

But  all  else  is  chaos  — a mountain  chasm  filled  with  tumbling 
mists;  and  whether  there  be  Alps,  with  flowers  and  streams  below, 
and  snows  above,  with  stars  or  sunlight  in  the  sky,  1 do  not  see. 
The  mists  sway  hither  ani  thither,  showing  me  now  a crag  and  now 
a pine  — nothing  else. 

"Others  see,  and  rest,  and  do.  But  I am  broken,  boot- 
less, out  of  tune 

"I  want  faith.  'Je  suis  venu  trop  tard  dans  un  monde 
trop  vieux . ' " 

In  another  place,  he  declares  that  if  all  the  world 

felt  this  misery  of  doubt  and  consciousness  of  the  vanity  of  all 

things,  "a  simultaneous  suicide  might  be  expected,"  and  that  this 

E 

conclusion  is  implied  by  Schopenhauer. 

Again:  "But  it  oppresses  me  just  as  much  if  I try  to 

1 

Brown,  0£.  cit . . I,  320-321. 

£ 

Ibid..  I,  403. 


I 


! 


t 


* 


72- 


imagine  no  God,  as  if  I state  the  absurdity  of  a God  emerging 

from  somnolence  into  world -act ivity.  I wish  I could  embrace 

1 

Positivism  as  a creed.” 

Even  his  doubt,  however,  brings  him  an  occasional 

moment  of  spiritual  exaltation: 

"At  times  this  very  disbelief  appears  to  me  as  an 

illumination  and  a martyrdom,  because  I know  that  it  has  not  been 

brought  upon  me  by  the  desire  to  elude  the  law  of  God,  and 

2 

because  it  is  actually  painful." 

He  spoke  with  his  friend  Professor  Jowett  about 
Positivism,  asking  him: 

"Do  you  think  any  young  men  get  good  from  Comte?" 

"Yes,"  was  the  reply,  "in  a modified  way;  it  satisfies 

them  to  find  a system,  repudiating  dogma  and  basing  morality  on 

3 

an  independent  footing." 

Symonds*  biographer  diagnoses  his  case  as  a matter  of 

ill  health,  combined  with  a determination  to  obtain  absolute 

4 

knowledge — to  accept  nothing  relative.  One  might  conclude 
that  such  a disposition  must  in  the  ond  reject  the  Positive  rela- 
tive synthesis.  It  is  not  this,  however,  which  prevents  him 
from  embracing  the  Religion  of  Humanity,  for  he  is  finally  forced 


1 

Brown,  Ojo.  cit  . . II,  42. 

2 

Ibid.,  I,  403. 

3 

Ibid.,  I,  334. 

4 

Ibid.,  II,  57. 


r 


T 


f 


73' 


to  accept  a relative  view  of  things.  It  is  the  idea  of 
Humanity  itself. 

"The  only  sure  thing,"  he  says,  "is  that  we  have  to 
live  and  have  to  die  — why  either  we  do  not  now  know;  if  we  come 
to  know,  well  . ...  hut  meanwhile  we  ought  to  be  able  to  get  on 
without  it.  Least  of  all  ought  we  to  rely  upon  an  unproved 

bribe  and  unproved  deterrent  for  right  action This  is  not 

Comtism.  The  miserable  spectre  of  humanity  is  quite  d_e  trop. 

He  calls  this  the  Grand  Etre,  doesn't  he?" 

After  a certain  mystical  exp  er  ience^dur ing  an  illness, 
Symonets  found  peace  and  stability  in  a way  which  reminds  one 
of  Carlyle  and  Arnold.  He  closed  his  Schopenhauer  and  opened 
his  Goethe. 

"So  then, having  rejected  dogmatic  Christianity  in  all 
its  forms.  Broad  Church  Anglicanism,  the  gospel  of  Comte,  Hegel's 
superb  identification  of  human  thought  with  essential  Being,  and 
many  minor  nostrums  offered  in  our  times  to  sickening  faith— 
because  none  of  these,  forsooth,  were  adapted  to  my  nature — 

I came  to  fraternise  with  Goethe,  Cleanthes,  Whitman,  Bruno, 
Darwin,  finding  that  in  their  society  I could  spin  my  own  cocoon 
with  more  of  congruence  to  my  particular  temperament  than  I 
discerned  in  other  believers,  misbelievers,  non-believers, 
passionate  believers,  of  the  ancient  and  modern  schools. 

1 

Brown,  0£.  cit . . II,  107. 


! 


f 


t 


t 


-74- 

"Speaking  simply,  I chose  for  my  motto  'To  live 
resolvedly  in  the  Whale,  the  Good,  the  Beautiful.1  I sought 
out  friends  from  divers  centuries,  who  seemed  to  have  arrived, 
through  their  life-throes  and  ardent  speculations,  at  something 
like  the  same  intuition  into  the  sempiternally  inscrutable  as 
I had.  They  helped  me  by  their  richer  or  riper  experience,  by 
flights  beyond  my  reach,  by  knowledge  denied  to  my  poor  studies, 
by  audacities  vtfiich  thrilled  the  man  in  me.  I addicted  myself 
to  their  society  because  they  accepted  the  whole,  and  were  not 
trafficking  or  pettifogging  about  a portion.  They  threw  them- 
selves upon  the  world  and  God  with  simple  self-devotion,  seeking 
nothing  extraordinary  in  this  life  or  the  next,  accepting  things 
as  they  beheld  them,  attempting  to  mould  no  institutions,  leaving 
the  truths  they  had  discovered  to  work  like  leaven,  aiming  at 
justice  and  a perfect  clarity  of  vision,  discarding  economics 
and  accomodations  of  all  kinds,  casting  the  burden  of  results  upon 
that  of  Him  who  called  them  into  being,  standing  unterrified, 
at  ease,  before  time,  space,  circumstance,  and  any  number  of 
sidereal  systems. 

’’Because  these  men  were  so,  I elected  them  as  the 
friends  with  whom  my  spirit  chose  to  fraternise.  From  being 
in  their  company  I derived  solace,  and  their  wisdom,  like  in 
kind,  was  larger  than  my  own.  It  is  good  for  the  soul  to 
dwell  with  such  superiors;  just  as  it  is  also  good,  in  daily  life, 

to  live  with  so-called  inferiors,  to  learn  from  them,  and  love 

1 

them • " 

^Brown,  Op.  cit . , II,  132-133. 


1 


r 


s 


r 


f 


t 


t 


* 


* 


t 


Ill 


THE  PRIORY 

When  the  younger  Positivists  went  to  London  from  Oxford, 
they  came  into  personal  contact  with  Mill  and  with  George  Eliot, 
each  of  whom  seems  to  have  been  the  center  of  a group  of  thinkers, 

"Some  two  University  generations  before  my  own,"  writes 
1 

John  Morley,  "Oxford  had  sent  to  London  a remarkable  group  of 
disciples  of  Comte,  This  group  became  known  to  me  through 
Lewes  and  George  Eliot,  who  were  both  of  them,  in  a more  or  less 
informal  way,  adherents  of  Comtist  doctrines.  Indeed,  the 
latter  of  the  two,  with  much  gravity,  more  than  once  assured  me 
that  she  saw  no  reason  why  the  Religion  of  Humanity  should  not 
have  a good  chance  of  taking  root,  if  Congreve,  its  chief 
authority  and  expounder  in  our  island,  had  only  been  blessed  with 
a fuller  measure  of  apostolic  gifts.  They  were  recognised  as 
singularly  accomplished  and  high-minded  men;  they  were  devoted  and 
unselfish  workers  in  a wide  range  of  large  public  issues;  they 
proved  peculiarly  well  able  to  hold  their  own  in  controversy." 

The  home  of  George  Eliot  and  George  Henry  Lewes,  known 
as  the  Priory,  became  the  gathering  point  for  these  men. 

Marian  Evans,  later  known  as  George  Eliot,  was  one  of 
the  sincerest  and  most  influential  followers  of  Comte  in  England 
— influential  because  of  her  artistic  ability  to  interpret  and 

1 

Morley,  Recollections , I,  68-69. 


-76 


apply  in  her  writings  the  doctrines  to  which  her  intellect 
1 

assented.  She  was  always  an  earnest  and  independent  thinker, 

although  her  early  religions  training  was  orthodox.  In  1641, 

2 

at  the  age  of  twenty-two,  we  find  her  writing  in  this  strain: 

"This  is  not  our  rest,  if  we  are  among  those  for  whom 
there  remaineth  one,  and  to  pass  through  life  without  tribulation 
(or,  as  Jeremy  Taylor  beautifully  says,  with  only  such  a measure 
of  it  as  may  be  compared  to  an  artificial  discord  in  music,  which 
nurses  the  ear  for  the  returning  harmony)  would  leave  us  desti- 
tute of  one  of  the  marks  that  invariably  accompany  salvation, 
and  of  that  fellowship  in  the  sufferings  of  the  Redeemer  which 
can  alone  work  in  us  a resemblance  to  one  of  the  most  prominent 
parts  of  his  divinely  perfect  character,  and  enable  us  to  obey 
the  injunction,  ‘In  patience  possess  your  souls.'  I have  often 
observed  how,  in  secular  things,  active  occupation  in  procuring 
the  necessaries  of  life  renders  the  character  indifferent  to 
trials  not  affecting  that  one  object.  There  is  an  analogous 
influence  produced  in  the  Christian  by  a vigorous  pursuit  of 
duty,  a determination  to  work  while  it  is  day." 

The  last  sentence  is  expressive  of  her  character  through- 
out her  life,  while  she  was  a Christian,  and  after  she  became 
a Positivist. 

Shortly  after  this  expression  of  Christian  sentiment, 

1 

Cooke,  G.  W. , George  Eliot,  p.  167. 

2 

Cross,  J.  V/.,  George  Eliot's  Life . I,  63. 


-77- 

however,  the  liberalism  of  the  age  began  to  reach  her  through 

( 

her  friends,  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Charles  Bray,  whose  brother,  Charles 

Hennell  had  published  in  1838  "An  Inquiry  Concerning  the  Origin 

of  Christianity,"  a book  which  made  a great  impression  upon 
1 

Marian  Evans. 

In  1841  she  became  conscious  of  grave  doubts  in  her 
mind  concerning  the  old  Christian  beliefs,  and  lamented  the  fact 
that,  "while  mathematics  are  indubitable,  immutable,  and  no  one 
doubts  the  properties  of  a triangle  or  a circle,  doctrines  in- 
finitely more  important  to  man  are  buried  in  a charnel-heap  of 

bones  over  which  nothing  is  heard  tut  the  barks  and  growls  of 
2 

cont  ent ion. " 

With  the  courageous  desire  to  suit  her  actions  to  her 
beliefs,  which  characterized  her,  she  gave  up  going  to  church, 
thereby  suffering  a great  deal  of  social  persecution,  and  pro- 
claimed her  desire  to  become  a champion  of  Truth.  "For  my 
part,  I wish  to  be  among  the  ranks  of  that  glorious  crusade  that 
is  seeking  to  set  Truth’s  Holy  Sepulchre  free  from  a usurped 

3 

domination." 

A serious  break  with  her  family  was  threatened  as  a re- 
sult of  her  extreme  position,  and  she  was  thrown  more  and  more 
with  the  Brays.  Charles  Bray's  philosophy  was  a mixture  of 
transcendentalism  and  the  philosophy  of  experience.  He  was  an 

1 

Cross,  0£.  oit . . 1,  67. 

2 

Ibid.,  I,  75. 

3 

Ibid  . , I,  77. 


* 


p 


p 


t 


f 


r 


t 


T 


r 


- 


p p * 


-78- 


ad  heron  t to  the  doctrine  of  necessity  and  an  ardent  believer  in 
phrenology*  One  expr  ess  ion"*"  of  his  attitude  in  regard  to  hu- 
manity is  worth  quoting  as  possibly  bearing  upon  George  Eliot *8 
later  inclination  toward  the  Religion  of  Comte. 

’’The  great  body  of  humanity  (considered  as  an  indi- 
vidual). with  its  soul,  the  principle  of  sensation,  is  ever  fresh 
and  vigorous  and  increasing  in  enjoyment*  Death  and  birth,  the 
means  of  renewal  and  succession,  bear  the  same  relation  to  this 
body  of  socioty  as  the  system  of  waste  and  reproduction  do  to  the 
human  body;  the  old  and  useless  and  decayed  material  is  carried 
out,  and  fresh  substituted,  and  thus  the  frame  is  renovated 

and  rendered  capable  of  ever-increasing  happiness The 

minds,  that  is  to  say,  the  ideas  and  feelings  of  which  they  were 
composed,  of  Socrates,  Plato,  Epicurus,  Galileo,  Bacon,  Locke, 
Newton,  are  thus  forever  in  existence,  and  the  immortality  of  the 
soul  is  preserved,  not  in  individuals,  but  in  the  great  body  of 

humanity To  the  race,  though,  not  to  individuals,  all 

beautiful  things  are  preserved  forever;  all  that  is  really  good 
and  profitable  is  immortal*" 

Another  influence  upon  George  Eliot  at  this  time  was 
that  of  Feuerbach,  who  looked  upon  religion  as  a subjective 
experience,  as  something  identical  with  self-consciousness, 
the  expression  of  man's  sense  of  the  infinitude  of  his  own 
faculties.  While  living  at  the  Bray's,  after  her  father's  death, 
she  translated  Feuerbach's  Essence  of  Christianity,  De  Deo  of 

1 

Cooke  , Oj).  cit  . , 


Chapter  IX. 


J 


. X 


f 


X 


X 


X 


f 


T 


! 


-79- 


Spinoza,  and  Strauss's  Loben  Josu.  All  these  studies  were 

leading  her  toward  the  Posit ivie  Philosophy  which  was  later  to 

occupy  so  important  a place  in  her  life. 

In  1851  she  went  to  London  to  assist  John  Chapman  in 

the  editorship  of  the  Westminster  Review,  which  numbered  among 

its  contributors  such  writers  as  Mill,  Grote,  Spencer,  and 

Harriet  Martineau.  She  lived  in  the  Chapman  home,  and  here, 

at  the  fortnightly  gatherings  of  contributors  to  the  magazine, 

which  took  place  there,  she  came  to  know  the  scientific  and 

2 

Positivist  thinkers  of  England.  The  most  intimate  of  the 

friends  which  she  made  in  this  way  were  Herbert  Spencer  and 

George  Henry  Lewes.  Harriet  Martineau  also  became  her  friend. 

Miss  Evans  had  met  her  in  1845  on  a visit  with  the  Brays  to 

3 

Atherstone  Hall,  and  now  the  translator  of  Comte  made  very 

4 

cordial  advances. 

A woman  with  Marian  EvanTs  active  mind  and  strong 
philosophical  inclinations  could  not  remain  long  as  assistant 
editor  of  such  a magazine  as  the  Westminster  Review,  thrown 
socially  with  the  thinkers  which  made  up  its  contributors, 
without  becoming  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  new  Positivist 
philosophy.  Mill  had  been  writing  on  it;  Miss  Martineau  was, 
at  the  time,  at  work  on  a translation  of  it;  and  G.  H.  Lewes 


1 

Cooke,  Ojd.  Cit.,  177. 

2 

Ibid.,  28-29. 

3 

Cross,  Ojo.  cit.,  I,  94. 

4 

Ibid  . . I,  193. 


-80- 


1 

had  coma  forth  as  an  adherent. 

In  1853  she  identified  her  fortunes  with  those  of  the 

latter  and  began  living  with  him  as  his  wife,  a legal  marriage 

not  being  possible  under  English  law  at  that  time.  Leslie 

Stephen  comments  upon  this  step  and  its  relation  to  Positivism 

2 

in  the  following  manner; 

"Nothing  in  her  life,  she  declares,  has  been  more 
’profoundly  serious,1  which  means,  it  seems,  that  she  does  not 
approve  ‘light  and  easily  broken  ties.*  In  her  writings, 
indeed,  her  tendency  is  to  insist  upon  the  sanctity  of  the 
traditional  bonds,  which,  whatever  their  origin,  are  essential 
to  social  welfare,  and  so  far  she  agrees  on  this,  as  on  many 
points,  with  her  friends  the  Positivists.  Comte,  though  he 
admired  the  Catholic  doctrine  of  the  ind issolubility  of 
marriage,  discovered  the  necessity  for  making  an  exception  which 
happened  to  cover  his  own  case.  George  Eliot,  it  seems,  who 
had  never  accepted  the  strictest  doctrine,  was  more  consistent. 
No;  one  can  deny  that  the  relation  to  Lewes  was  ’serious*  enough 
in  her  sense.  It  lasted  through  their  common  lives,  and  their 
devotion  to  each  other  was  unlimited,  and  appears  only  to  have 
strengthened  with  time." 

George  Henry  Lewes  was  a singularly  lively  and  attrac- 
tive figure  among  men  of  letters  of  that  day.  He  was  early 

1 

Stephen,  George  Eliot.  42-43. 

2 

Ibid  . . 48. 


t 


t 


t 


T 


T 


t 


t 


f 


T 


t 


r 


r 


T 


-81- 


attracted  to  the  study  of  philosophy,  for  at  the  age  of 
nineteen  he  regularly  attended  the  meetings  of  a small  meta- 
physical society,  held  in  the  parlor  of  a tavern  in  Red  Lion 
Square,  Holhorn.  Here  he  developed  a great  interest  in 
Spinoza,  At  twenty  he  was  giving  a course  of  lectures  on 
philosophy.  He  became,  at  various  times, a clerk  in  a merchant's 
office,  a medical  student,  and  finally  a man  of  letters.  He 
spent  many  years  abroad,  and  was  interested  in  and  well-informed 
upon  a great  variety  of  topics.  From  his  grandfather,  a 
second-rate  actor,  he  inherited  some  dramatic  instinct  and  a 
love  for  the  stage,  which  may  have  been  responsible  for  his  pro- 
pensity for  doing  unexpected  things,  Thackeray  once  said  that 
it  "would  not  surprise  him  to  meet  Lewes  in  Piccadilly,  riding 
a white  elephant. 

Lewes  had  early  become  attracted  to  Positivism  through 

2 

John  Stuart  Mill,  Bain  says  that  he  met  him  in  London  in  1842 
and  that  "he  sat  at  the  feet  of  Mill,  read  the  Logic  with 

avidity,  and  took  up  Comte  with  equal  avidity In  an 

article  in  the  British  and  Foreign  Review  in  1843,  on  the  Modern 
Philosophy  of  France,  he  led  up  to  Comte,  and  gave  some  account 
of  him."  In  1845-1846  appeared  his  Biographical  History  of 
Philosophy,  in  the  preface  of  which  he  announced  that  "philosophy” 

1 

These  facts  from  the  life  of  Lewes  are  drawn  from 
Mathilde  Blind's  George  Eliot . pp.  105-6  and  112,  Cooke's  George 
Eliot,  p.  49,  and  Leslie  Stephen's  George  Eliot,  pp.  44-45. 

2 

Bain,  J.  S.  Mill . note  p.  76. 


-82 


1 

was  to  give  way  before  Comtek  Positivism.  Of  this  work 

Harrison  made  the  extravagant  statement  that  "it  had  simply 

2 

killed  metaphysic." 

Between  1849  and  1854  he  was  writing  for  the  Lead er . 

among  other  things  a series  of  eighteen  articles  on  Comte fs 

Positive  Philosophy,  by  means  of  which  he  raised  a considerable 

3 4 

sum  of  money  for  the  philosopher.  Harrison  says  of  him: 

"I  believe  that  his  services  to  the  thought  of  his  time  will 

one  day  be  more  valued  than  they  are  today*  And  amongst  these 

services  I can  never  forget  that  he  was  the  first  writer  in 

England  to  herald  the  new  era  which  dates  from  Auguste  Comte,  and 

he  was  the  first  in  England  who  sought  to  popularize  the 

Positivist  scheme  of  thought." 

Lewes,  like  Kill,  however,  was  no  blind  follower  of  the 

French  master.  He  founded  his  philosophy  upon  the  Philosophie 

Pos it ive . but  did  not  accept  the  social  theories  of  Comte,  and 

attached  considerable  importance  to  psychology,  which  the  French 

5 

writer  rejected.  Lewes,  it  will  be  seen,  was  at  this  time 
a Positivist  of  the  Mill  type. 

It  must  not  be  supposed  that  George  Eliot  took  over  her 
Positivism  ready-made  from  Lewes;  she  was  too  independent  in  her 


1 

Stephen,  Op.  c it  . , pp.  44-45. 

2 

Cooke,  £p.  Qit . . p.  59. 

3 

Ibid.,  pp.  52-53. 

4 

Harrison,  F..  Autobiography,  II,  p.  109. 

5 

Cooke , Op.  cit . , 


61 


-83- 


thinking  for  that*  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  more  probable  that 
a community  of  ideals  may  have  been  one  of  the  elements  which 
acted  to  draw  them  together.  The  general  direction  of  her  thought 
had  been  taken  before  she  met  him.  She  writes  of  Herbert 
Spencer:’*’  "Of  (Herbert  Spencer's)  friendship  I have  had  the 
honor  and  advantage  for  twenty  years,  but  I believe  that  every 
main  bias  of  my  mind  had  been  taken  before  I knew  him.  Like  the 
rest  of  his  readers,  I am,  of  course  indebted  to  him  for  much 
enlargement  and  clarifying  of  thought.”  It  must  be  remembered 
that  her  acquaintance  with  Spencer  antedates  that  with  Lewes.  In 
an  intellectual  relationship  of  this  character,  it  is  impossible 
to  determine  which  of  the  two  most  influenced  the  other,  but  on 
the  whole  it  seems  as  probable  that  George  Eliot  exerted  an 
influence  upon  the  opinions  of  Lewes  as  that  he  was  the  formative 
force  o f her  ideas.  She,  like  him,  accepted  the  general 
philosophy  of  the  Philosophie  Posit ive.  but  did  not  agree  en- 
tirely with  the  social  system  worked  out  in  Comtek  later  works. 

2 

"Lewes,”  relates  Mathilde  Blind,  "speaking  of  the  Politique 
Po  s it iv  e in  his  'History  of  Philosophy,'  admits  that  his  antago- 
nistic attitude  had  been  considerably  modified  on  learning  from 
the  remark  of  one  very  dear  to  him,  'to  regard  it  as  an  Utopia, 
presenting  hypotheses  rather  than  doctrines  — suggestions  for 
future  inquiries  rather  than  dogmas  for  adepts.' 

1 

Cooke,  Ojo.  Cit . , 172.  The  author  appends  the  follow- 
ing note:  "Elizabeth  Stuart  Phelps'  'Last  words  from  George  Eliot,' 
in  Harper's  Magazine  for  March,  1882.  The  names  of  Mill  and 
Spencer  are  not  given  in  this  article,  but  the  words  from  her 
letters  so  plainly  refer  to  them  that  they  have  been  quoted  here 
as  illustrating  her  relations  to  these  men." 

2 Blind,  Op.  cit.  p.  282. 


\ 


“84- 


"On  the  whole  * although  George  Eliot  did  not  agree  with 
ComteTs  later  theories  concerning  the  reconstruction  of  society* 
she  regarded  them  with  sympathy  *as  the  efforts  of  an  individual 
to  anticipate  the  work  of  future  generations.1" 

This  attitude  would  account  for  the  mention  of  the 
Politique  which  she  makes  in  1867  in  a letter  to  Mrs.  Congreve:^" 
"After  breakfast  we  both  read  the  'Politique*  — George 
one  volume  and  I another  — interrupting  each  other  continually 
with  questions  and  remarks.  That  morning  study  keeps  me  in  a 
state  of  enthusiasm  through  the  day  — a moral  glow  which  is  a 
sort  of  milieu  subject  if  for  the  sublime  sea  and  sky.  Mr. 

Lewes  is  converted  to  the  warmest  admiration  of  the  chapter  on 
language  in  the  third  volume,  which  about  three  years  ago  he 
thought  slightly  of.  I think  the  first  chapter  of  the  fourth 
volume  is  among  the  finest  of  all,  and  the  most  finely  written. 

My  gratitude  increases  continually  for  the  illumination  Comte 
has  contributed  to  my  life.  But  we  both  of  us  study  with  a 
sense  of  having  still  much  to  learn  and  to  understand." 

They  seem  to  have  acted  and  reacted  one  upon  the  other 
with  a delightfully  harmonious  result.  The  final  attitude 
arrived  at  is,  briefly,  this: 

They  agreed  with  Comte  in  his  rejection  of  metaphysics, 
in  his  idea  of  the  dominion  of  law,  and,  in  fact,  with  all  of 
the  doctrines  of  the  'Positive  Philosophy.' 

1 

Cross,  Ojd.  cit . . Ill,  2-3. 


They  rejected  his 


f 


-85- 

social  theories  as  absolute  rules , looking  upon  them  as 
hypothetical  solutions  of  the  problems  of  society.  They 
accepted  the  Religion  of  Humanity  considered  as  the  Grand  fit re, 
and  assented  to  Comte's  concept  of  the  importance  of  feeling  as 

the  highest  expression  of  human  life,  with  special  emphasis 

1 

upon  altruism. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  regard  to  religion,  George  Eliot 
in  particular  differed  from  Comte  in  her  attitude  toward  tradition 
The  new  religion  was  too  new  and  artificial.  It  involved  too 
abrupt  a break  with  the  traditions  of  the  past,  ’’the  poetic  ex- 
pression of  feeling  and  sentiment”  evolved  out  of  the  experiences 
2 

of  the  race.  She  preferred  to  keep  the  old  symbols,  reading 

into  them  the  new  philosophy. 

This  accounts,  to  some  extent,  for  her  refusal  to 
identify  herself  with  the  Positivist  Church  as  a member,  although 
she  aided  the  objects  of  that  organization  financially  and  other- 
wise as  far  as  she  was  able,  and  was  a close  friend  of  Mr,  and 
Mrs.  Congreve.  They  had  been  kind  to  her  during  that  time  after 
her  union  with  Lewes  when  some  of  her  old  friends  had  become 
alienated,  and  from  G@orge  Eliot  we  get  a different  picture  of 

Richard  Congreve  from  that  shown  us  by  Erederic  Harrison.  Of 

3 

their  first  meeting  she  says  in  1859: 

"We  have  met  a pleasant-faced,  bright -glancing  man,  whom 

1 

Cooke,  Ojd.  cit . . 189-194. 

2 

Ibid.,  250-251. 

3 

Cross,  0£.  cit . . II,  62. 


t 


1 


t 


f 


t 


t 


-86- 


we  set  down  to  be  worthy  of  the  name,  Richard  Congreve,  I am 

curious  to  see  if  our  ahnung  will  be  verified," 

1 

And  again: 

"We  are  so  happy  in  the  neighborhood  of  Mr,  and  Mrs, 
Richard  Congreve,  She  is  a sweet,  intelligent,  gentle  woman, 

I already  love  her:  and  his  fine,  beaming  face  does  me  good, 
like  a glimpse  of  an  Olympian," 

From  that  time  on  the  Congreves  and  the  Leweses  were  the 
most  intimate  of  friends. 

The  most  direct  expressions  of  George  Eliot's  Positivism 

in  her  writings  are  to  be  found  in  her  poems,  "The  Choir  In- 

visible"gives  utterance  to  the  Positivist  conception  of  subjective 

immortality,  and  "The  Spanish  Gypsy”  was  considered  at  that  time 

as  a Positivist  writing.  In  1868  she  wrote  to  Mrs,  Congreve 
2 

concerning  it : 

"Tell  Dr.  Congreve  that  the  'mass  of  positivism,'  in 
the  shape  of  'The  Spanish  Gypsy,*  is  so  rapidly  finding  acceptance 
with  the  public  that  the  second  edition,  being  all  sold,  the 
third,  just  published,  has  already  been  demanded  to  above  700, 

Do  not  think  that  I am  becoming  an  egotistical  author.  The 
news  concerns  the  doctrine,  not  the  writer." 

The  Priory,  as  a rendezvous  for  men  of  letters  of  the 
time,  has  already  been  referred  to. 

1 

Cross,  Op.  cit . , II,  73. 

2 

Ibid.,  Ill,  49. 


It  was  a comfortable  house 


, 


! 


? 


f 


-87- 


in  the  suburbs  of  London,  and  from  1865,  when  it  became  the 
home  of  the  Lewes es,  for  many  years,  it  was  the  scene  of 
regular  Sunday  afternoon  gatherings.  George  Eliot  presided 
over  this  salon  with  dignity  and  charm,  but  her  extreme 
seriousness  required  Lewes*  vivacity  and  sparkle  to  offset  it. 

"As  a companion  Lewes  was  extremely  attractive,"  says 

1 

Herbert  Spencer.  He  was  "full  of  various  anecdote;  and  an 

admirable  mimic;  it  was  impossible  to  be  dull  in  his  company." 

It  was  this  brilliance  and  flexibility  of  mind  which 

gave  the  gatherings  their  zest  and  which  made  them  so  attractive. 

2 

The  Positivists  all  came  — the  Congreves,  Dr.  Bridges,  Prof. 

Beesly,  Moncure  Conway,  and  many  others  besides,  among  them  Herbert 

Spencer,  Professor  Huxley,  Frederic  Harrison,  Madame  Bodichon, 

Lord  Houghton,  Tourguenief,  Justin  McCarthy,  Du  Maurier,  and 

Mr.  and  Mrs.  Mark  Patti  son,  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Burne  Jones,  John 

3 

Everett  Millais,  Robert  Browning,  and  Tennyson. 

Herbert  Spencer,  as  has  already  teen  noted,  was  an  old 
friend.  It  was  he,  in  fact,  who  had  introduced  Lewes  to  Marian 
Evans  in  1851,  and  he  was  a life-long  friend  of  them  both,  in 
spite  of  some  differences  of  opinion.  His  last  call  upon 

4 

George  Eliot  was  made  the  day  upon  which  her  last  illness  began. 


1 

Spencer,  Autobiography.  I,  437. 

2 

Among  the  friends  of  Lewes  was  Wm.  Smith,  the  author 
of  the  novel  "Thorndale."  He  had  reviewed  Comte  favorably  in 
"Blackwood’s"  in  1843,  an  article  which  attracted  Bain's  interest. 
(Benn,  History  of  English  Hat ionalism,  X,  427) . George  Eliot 
said  that  Lewes  "admired  and  esteemed  him  very  highly."  (Cross, 
Op.  cit . , II , 5. ) 

^Blind  , Ojd.  cit  . . 273. 

^Cross,  Op.  cit . . Ill,  315-316. 


j 


f 


-68- 

Lewes,  in  a journal  of  1859,  ’’speaks  of  a walk  with  Mr*  Herbert 
Spencer*  Mr.  Spencer’s  friendship  had  been  the  brightest  ray 
in  a very  dreary  ’wasted  period  of  my  life';  it  had  roused  him 
from  indifference  to  fresh  intellectual  interest;  but  he  adds, 

’I  owe  Spencer  another  and  a deeper  debt.  It  was  through  him 
that  I learned  to  know  Marian.’”^ 

Spencer  was  one  of  the  first  ac ouaintances  made  by 
Marian  Evans  on  her  first  coming  to  London,  and  the  friendship 
grew  into  one  of  considerable  intimacy*  In  fact  there  were 

reports  current  among  their  friends  that  he  was  in  love  with  her 

2 

and  that  they  were  about  to  be  married.  "But,"  Spencer  says, 

"neither  of  these  reports  was  true."  She  writes  of  this 

3 

intimacy,  in  1852: 

"My  brightest  spot,  next  to  my  love  of  old  friends, 

is  the  deliciously  calm,  new  friendship  that  Herbert  Spencer  gives 

me.  We  see  each  other  every  day,  and  have  a delightful 

camaraderie  in  everything.  But  for  him  my  life  would  be  deso- 

4 

late  enough."  And:  "I  went  to  the  opera  on  Saturday  — ’I 

Martiri,’  at  Co vent  Carden  — with  my  ’excellent  friend,  Herbert 
Spencer,*  as  Lewes  calls  him.  We  have  agreed  that  we  are  not 
in  love  with  each  other,  and  that  there  is  no  reason  why  we 
should  not  have  as  much  of  each  other’s  society  as  we  like.  He 

1 

Stephen,  Ojo.  cit.,  48. 

2 

Spencer,  Autobiography,  I,  462. 

3 

Cross,  Op.  cit.,  I,  203. 

4 

Ibid . . I,  200. 


« 


t 


r 


. T 


T 


w 


T 


T 


! 

' , 


r t 0 


-89- 


is  a good,  delightful  creature,  and  I always  feel  "better  for 
"being  with  him." 

The  works  of  Comte  were  first  introduced  to  Spencer  "by 
George  Eliot  during  this  time.  "In  the  course  of  the  spring," 
he  writes,^  "the  name  of  Comte  came  up  in  conversation.  She 
had  a copy  of  the  Philoeophie  Posit ive . and  at  her  instigation 
I read  the  introductory  chapters  of  ’Exposition'.  As  may  be 
inferred  from  what  has  been  said  in  past  chapters,  the  task  was 
not  an  easy  one.  Such  knowledge  of  French  as  I had  gained  by 
scrambling  through  half-a-dozen  easy  novels,  content  to  gather 
the  drift,  and  skipping  what  I failed  to  understand,  was  of  course 
very  inadequate.  What  I thought  about  the  doctrine  of  the  three 
stages  — theological,  metaphysical,  and  positive  — I do  not 
clearly  remember.  I never  considered  the  matter  and  was  not 
prepared  either  to  deny  or  to  admit.  I believe  I remained 
neutral.  But  concerning  Comte's  classification  of  the  sciences 
I at  once  expressed  a definite  opinion.  Here  I had  sufficient 
knowledge  of  the  facts;  and  this  prompted  a pronounced  dissent. 

She  was  greatly  surprised:  having,  as  she  said,  supposed  the 
classification  to  be  perfect.  She  was  but  little  given  to 
argument;  and  finding  my  attitude  thus  antagonistic,  she  forth- 
with dropped  the  subject  of  Comte's  philosophy,  and  I read  no 
further." 

In  1855  Spencer  had  an  interview  with  Comte.  Chapman, 

1 

Spencer,  Autobiography,  I,  461. 


t 


t 


a 


T 


T 


* 


. 


t 


r 


T 


c 


t 


f 


T 


-90— 

the  publisher  of  Harriet  Martineau's  translation,  wishing  to 

send  a share  of  the  profits  to  him  in  Paris,  had  asked  Spencer 

to  deliver  them.  He  does  not  seem  to  have  been  very  prepossessed 

by  the  personality  of  the  Frenchman.  "Certainly  his  appearance 

1 

was  not  in  the  least  impressive,"  he  reports,  "either  in  figure 

or  face.  One  could  say  of  his  face  only  that,  unattractive 

though  it  was,  it  was  strongly  marked;  and  in  this  way  distinguished 

from  the  multitudes  of  meaningless  faces  one  daily  sees.  Of  our 

conversation  I remember  only  that,  hearing  of  my  nervous  disorder, 

he  advised  me  to  marry;  saying  that  the  sympathetic  companionship 

of  a wife  would  have  a curative  influence." 

Herbert  Spencer  has  been  frequently  numbered  among  the 

2 

English  Positivists.,  wrongly  so,  according  to  Barzellotti,  and 

indeed  according  to  Spencer  himself.  His  attitude  was  one  of 

reaction  against  the  philosophy  of  Comte,  as  he  explains  in 

3 

his  Autobiography: 

He  had  been  reading  Miss  Martineau's  translation  of 
Comte.  "This  had  been  recently  issued;  and  as  two  of  my 
friends,  Mr.  Lewes  and  Miss  Evans,  were  in  large  measure  ad- 
herents of  Comte’s  views,  I was  curious  to  learn  more  definitely 
what  these  were.  Already,  as  said  in  a preceding  chapter,  I 
had  got  through  the  ’Exposition*  in  the  original;  and  while 
remaining  neutral  respecting  the  doctrine  of  the  three  stages, 

1 

Spencer,  Op.  cit.,  I,  577. 

2 

Barzellotti,  Op.  cit . . 80-81. 

3 

Spencer,  >0p.  C it . I,  517-518. 


T 


f 


f 


T 


f 


i 


T 


< 


T T 


* 


r • 


-91- 


ha  d forthwith  rejected  the  clasei f icat ion  of  the  sciences,  I 
had  also  read  Mr.  Lewes’s  outlines  of  the  Comtean  system*  serially 
published  in  The  Lead  er.  Whether*  when  I began  to  read  Miss 
Mart ine au's  abridged  translation,  I had  any  intention  of  reviewing 
it,  I cannot  remember;  but  evidently,  if  not  present  at  the 
outset,  the  intention  was  soon  formed. 

"The  disciples  of  M.  Comte  think  that  I arc  much  indebted 
to  him;  and  so  I arc,  but  in  a way  widely  unlike  that  which  they 
mean.  Save  in  the  adoption  of  his  word  'altruism,1  which  I 
have  defended,  and  in  the  adoption  of  his  word  'sociology,' 
because  there  was  no  other  available  word  (for  both  which 
adoptions  I have  been  blamed),  the  only  indebtedness  I recognize 
is  the  indebtedness  of  antagonism.  My  pronounced  opposition 
to  his  views  led  me  to  develop  some  of  my  own  views.  What  to 
think,  is  a question  in  part  answered  when  it  has  been  decided 
what  not  to  think.  Shutting  out  any  large  group  of  conclusions 
from  the  field  of  speculation,  narrows  the  field;  and  by  so  doing 
brings  one  nearer  to  the  conclusions  which  should  be  drawn.  In 
this  way  the  Positive  Philosophy  (or  rather  the  earlier  part  of 
it,  for  I did  not  read  the  biological  or  sociological  divisions, 
and  I think  not  the  chemical)  proved  of  service  to  me.  It  is 
probable  that  but  for  my  dissent  from  Comte's  classification  of 
the  sciences,  my  attention  would  never  have  been  drawn  to  the 
subject.  Had  not  the  subject  been  entertained,  I should  not 
have  entered  upon  that  inquiry  which  ended  in  writing  'The  Genesis 
of  Science.'  And  in  the  absence  of  ideas  reached  when  I was 
tracing  the  genesis  of  science,  one  large  division  of  the  Pr in- 


I 


I 


92- 


oi pies  of  Psychology  would  possibly  have  lacked  its  organizing 
principle,  or  indeed,  would  possibly  not  have  been  written  at  all. 
In  this  way,  then,  I trace  an  important  influence  on  my  thoughts 
exercised  by  the  thoughts  of  M.  Comte;  but  it  was  an  influence 
opposite  in  nature  to  that  which  the  Comtists  suppose." 

He  criticised  his  friends, the  Leweees.for  inconsistency 

in  their  views  of  humanity.  "Though  they  were  partial  adherents 

of  M.  Comte  my  friends  did  not  display  much  respect  for  the  object 

which  he  would  have  us  worship.  Reverence  for  humanity  in  the 

abstract  seemed,  in  them,  to  go  along  with  irreverence  for  it  in 

the  concrete.  Pew  of  these  occasions  I have  described,  passed 

without  comment  from  them  on  the  unintelligence  daily  displayed 

by  men  — now  in  maintaining  so  absurb  a curriculum  of  education 

(which  they  reprobated  just  as  much  as  I did),  now  in  the  follies 

of  legislation,  which  continually  repeat,  with  but  small 

differences,  the  follies  of  the  past,  now  in  the  irrationalities 

1 

of  social  habits." 

After  the  death  of  George  Eliot,  Spencer  wrote  to  a 
friend  to  correct  the  impression  that  she  had  been  a disciple 
of  his,  saying  that,  while  she  was  not  "a  Comtist  in  the  full 

sense  of  the  word she  had  strong  leanings  to  the  ’Religion 

of  Humanity1"  which  was  always  a point  of  difference  between  them. 
Indeed,  he  seemed  to  believe  that  she  was  becoming  more  in- 
fluenced by  his  (Spencer’s)  views  toward  the  last  and  "veering  a 

1 

Spencer,  Qjd.  Git..  II,  237-8. 


-93- 


good  deal  away  from  Comte."  "Positivism,”  he  said,  "has  always 
been  a tacitly  tabooed  topic  between  the  Lewesee  and  myself  — 

the  only  topic  on  which  we  differed,  and  which  we  refrained  from 

1 

d iscussing. " 

It  seems  to  have  been  the  habit  of  Spencer  to  refrain 

from  discussing  topics  on  which  he  differed  strongly  with  his 

friends,  for  John  Morley,  another  Positivist,  says  that  he  knew 

him  at  Mill's  and  visited  him  at  St,  John's  Wood,  but  that  Spencer 

2 

drew  off  from  talk  on  serious  things. 

Spencer  was  constantly  irritated  by  the  efforts  of  the 

Positivists  to  prove  his  indebtedness  to  Comte.  There  was  quite 

a little  irritation  over  such  a controversy  in  1884-5,  but  they 

were  later,  says  Harrison,  on  the  most  friendly  terms  and  Spencer 

3 

"became  a reader  of  the  Positivist  Review. " 

Dr.  Bridges,  one  of  the  most  thorough  Positivists  in 

England,  pointed  out  rather  clearly  the  resemblances  of  Spencer's 

4 

system  to  that  of  Comte,  and  the  differences  between  them. 

They  both  define  the  limits  of  knowledge  and  include  an  arrange- 
ment of  scientific  material.  Both  procede  from  the  outer  world 
to  man,  and  both  make  sociology  and  ethics  the  most  important  part 
of  their  systems.  Although  Spencer  will  have  nothing  to  do 
with  the  Religion  of  Humanity,  still,  as  Dr.  Bridges  points  out, 


1 

Spencer,  Op.  cit. , II,  430-431. 

2 

Morley,  Recollections.  I.  112-113. 

3 

Harrison,  Autobiography.  II,  113. 

4 

Bridges,  Illus trat ions  of  Positivism.  126-7. 


r r 


-94- 


his  goal  is  an  "evolved  Humanity"  and  such  a quotation  as  the 
following  from  Spencer’s  Beneficence  at  Large  indicates  that  the 
fundamental  aim  of  both  is  the  same. 

"Hereafter  the  highest  ambition  of  the  beneficent  will 
be  to  have  a share  — even  though  an  utterly  inappreciable  and 
unknown  share  — in  ’the  making  of  Man.*  Experience  occasionally 
shows  that  there  may  arise  extreme  interest  in  pursuing  entirely 
unselfish  ends;  and,  as  time  goes  on,  there  will  be  more  and  more 
of  those  whose  unselfish  ends  will  be  the  further  evolution  of 
Humanity." 

The  great  difference  between  the  religion  of  Spencer 
and  that  of  Comte  is  chiefly  one  of  direction.  Prom  the  point  at 
which  they  both  stand  in  accord  — the  principle  that  man’s 
knowledge  does  not  go  beyond  the  observation  of  phenomena  and  their 
laws Spencer’s  religion  turns  to  the  contemplation  of  the  Abso- 
lute or  Unknowable,  Comte’s  to  the  utilization  of  the  relative 
2 

or  known. 

George  Eliot’s  gentle  and  dignified  personal  character, 

and  her  keen  analytical  mind  attracted  the  younger  writers  and 

drew  about  her  a group  of  disciples  who  were  often  to  be  found 

3 

at  the  Priory.  Leslie  Stephens  expresses  their  attitude  towards 
her  with  his  characteristic  gaiety: 

"I  am  this  afternoon  to  sit  at  the  feet  of  the  immortal 

1 

Bridges.  Illustrations  of  Positivism,  131. 

2 

Ibid.,  263  ff. 

3 

Maitland,  Up.  cit . , 294. 


-95- 


George  Eliot.  Poor  woman!  The  critics  have  dealt  rather 
hardly  with  Daniel  Deronda,  and,  though  I agree  with  them,  I am 
rather  sorry  for  her,  for  she  seems  to  be  really  a very  noble 
sort  of  person,  and  as  little  spoilt  as  a prophetess  can  well  be 

in  these  days.  I always  like  to  talk  to  her."  And  in  another 

1 

place,  in  speaking  of  a studio  affair  at  which  he  felt  rather 
shy:  "I  was,  I say,  silly,  for  the  parties  were  really  far  less 

alarming  than  those  at  the  Leweses,  where  one  had  to  be  ready  to 
discuss  metaphysics  or  the  principles  of  aesthetic  philosophy, 
and  to  be  presented  to  George  Eliot,  and  offer  an  acceptable 
worship." 

Among  the  habitues  of  the  Priory  were  also  Robert 

Lytton  (son  of  Bulwer  Lytton)  and  Anthony  Trollope.  How  near 

the  Leweses  came  to  making  Positivists  of  them  it  is  hard  to  say. 

Lytton,  at  the  age  of  thirty-one,  expressed  to  his  father  his 

belief  in  "God,  soul,  hereafter,  prayer,  reverence  for,  and 

2 

acceptance  of,  the  hopes  and  ethics  of  Christianity."  He 

believed,  however , that  the  ethical  side  of  religion  and  the 

human  side  of  Christ's  character  should  be  emphasized.  He 

3 

expressed  interest  in  Renan's  Vie  d e J esu  and  Seeley's  Ecce 

Homo , from  this  point  of  view7.  The  former  rejected  the  miraculous 


1 

Maitland,  Ojo.  cit  . . 317. 

2 

Life  of  Bulwer  Lytton.  II,  400-401 
3 

Benn,  in  his  History  of  English  Rationalism,  sees  in 
Ecce  Homo  a temporary  compromise  between  positivism  and  Christianity 
He  does  not  know  whether  Seeley  ever  studied  Comte  at  first  hand, 
but  believes  the  book  to  be  an  attempt  to  construct  an  ideal 
Christian  church,  using  the  social  doctrines  (rejected  by  the  earlier 
English  Positivists)  without  withdrawing  from  adherence  to 
Christianity.  Benn  explains  this  attempt  by  surmising  that 


r f 


t 


r 


r 


t 


f 


T 


f 


-96- 


and  mystical,  the  latter  implied  acceptance  of  them  hut  put  the 

1 

ethical  aspect  first, 

2 

The  letter  which  Lytton  wrote  to  George  Eliot  on  the 
occasion  of  the  death  of  Lewes  will  show  that  it  is  her  view  of 
death  which  he  has  accepted  and  in  which  he  found  consolation: 

"Turn  which  way  I will,"  he  wrote,  "the  shadow  of  your 
sorrow  still  lies  darkly  on  me;  I measure  it  by  my  knowledge  of 
the  magnitude  of  your  own  great  nature  and  his  worth  — who  was 
the  last  of  the  few  friends  wiser  than  myself  to  whom  from  hoy- 
hood  I have  looked  up,  I shall  honour  his  memory,  and  mourn 
his  loss,  and  love  and  thank  him  as  long  as  I live.  But  I cannot 
offer  consolation  I have  never  found,  and  do  not  feel.  Your 
strength,  your  wisdom  and  insight,  are  immeasurably  greater  than 
mine;  1 am  comforted  by  the  consciousness  that  fine  souls  like 
yours  know  how  to  turn  great  griefs  to  best  account.  But 
I cannot  comfort  you.  If  there  be  any  personal  eompensat ion  for 
the  death  of  those  we  love  and  need,  it  is  unknown  to  me.  The 
only  mitigating  consequence  of  such  bereavement  that  I have  ever 
experienced  is  one  vfhich  you  yourself  once  predicted  to  me,  and 
which  I therefore  know  you  will  not  miss.  Certainly,  since  my 
dear  father  died  I have  been  in  closer  and  more  constant  inter- 

Comte’s  ideas  had  in  some  way  reached  Seeley's  mind,  and,  mingling 
with  older  traditions,  had  produced  this  result,  and  he  sees  in 
the  book  evidences  of, the  French  type  of  thought  and  feeling 
mingled  with  the  English  passion  for  compromise.  (Benn,  Hist o ry 
of  English  Rationalism.  J,  241-244). 

1 

Letters  of  Robert  Lytton,  I.  139. 

2 

Ibid.,  II,  138. 


r 


-<? 


T 


r 


-9  7- 


course  with  him,  and  have  seemed  to  understand  him  better,  than 

when  he  was  alive*  But  even  this  comes  slowly.  And  oh,  the 

difference!  All  intercourse  with  the  dead  is  so  shadowy,  so 

indistinct,  so  like  twilight  after  daylight." 

The  consolation  which  she  offered  him  must  have  been 

that  which  she  voices  in  "The  Choir  Invisible." 

"Oh  may  I join  the  choir  invisible 
Of  those  immortal  dead  who  live  again 
In  minds  made  better  by  their  presence:  live 
In  pulses  stirred  to  generosity. 

In  deeds  of  daring  rectitude,  in  scorn 
For  miserable  aims  that  end  with  self. 

In  thoughts  sublime  that  pierce  the  night  like  stars. 
And  'with  their  mild  persistence  urge  man’s  search 
To  vaster  issues. 


This  is  life  to  come. 

Which  martyred  men  have  made  more  glorious 
For  us  who  strive  to  follow.  May  I reach 
That  purest  heaven,  be  to  other  souls 
The  cup  of  strength  in  some  great  agony. 

Enkindle  generous  ardour,  feed  pure  love. 

Beget  the  smiles  that  have  no  cruelty  — 

Be  the  sweet  presence  of  a good  diffused. 

And  in  diffusion  ever  more  intense. 

So  shall  1 join  the  choir  invisible  ^ 

Whose  music  is  the  gladness  of  the  world." 

Anthony  Trollope  first  met  Lewes  in  1860  at  a dinner 

given  by  George  Chapman,  of  the  Cornhill  Magaz ine  and  the  Pall 

Mall  Gazett e , to  his  contributors.  Five  years  later  he  was 

associated  with  him  in  the  establishment  of  the  Fortnightly 

Review,  the  object  of  which  was  perfect  freedom  of  speech. 

2 

"The  matter  on  which  we  were  all  agreed,"  wrote  Trollope, 
"was  freedoiii  of  speech,  combined  with  personal  responsibility. 


1 

W o rk s of  George  Eliot . Vol.  IX,  p.  454-455. 

2 

Trollope,  Autobiography.  178-9. 


-98- 


We  would  be  neither  conservative  nor  liberal,  neither  religious 
nor  free-thinking,  neither  popular  nor  exclusive;  — but  we  would 
let  any  man  who  had  a thing  to  say,  and  knew  how  to  say  it,  speak 

freely In  the  very  beginning,  I militated  against  this 

impossible  negation  of  principles,  — and  did  so  most  irrationally, 
seeing  that  I had  agreed  to  the  negation  of  principles,  — by 
declaring  that  nothing  should  appear  denying  or  questioning  the 
divinity  of  Christ." 

Trollope  criticised  the  eclectic  policy  of  the  magazine 

1 

later  as  being  unpractical.  "It  was  as  though  a gentleman 

should  go  into  the  House  of  Commons  determined  to  support  no 

party,  but  to  serve  his  country  by  individual  utterances.  Such 

gentlemen  have  gone  into  the  House  of  Commons,  but  they  have  not 

served  their  country  much."  "Of  course  the  project  broke  down. 

Liberalism,  free-thinking,  and  open  inquiry  will  never  object  to 

appear  in  company  with  their  opposites,  because  they  have  the 

conceit  to  think  that  they  can  quell  those  opposites;  but  the 

oppocites  will  not  appear  in  conjunction  with  liberalism,  free- 

thinking  and  open  inouiry.  As  a natural  consequence,  our  new 

publication  became  an  organ  of  liberalism,  free-thinking  and  open 
2 

inquiry."  Indeed  the  magazine  was  criticised  as  being  a 
Positivist  organ. 

Besides  his  connection  with  the  Fortnightly  Review. 

1 

Trollope,  Autobiography , 180t 

2 

Ibid  . 


* 


* 


-99- 


Ant  hony  Trollope  was  associated  with  the-  Leweses  in  a personal 

way.  He  refers  to  them  as  among  his  dearest  and  most  intimate 

friends,  and  was  often  at  the  Priory.  "Of  all  this  company, 

none  more  frequently  than  Trollope  obtained  a seat  near  Mrs • 

Lewes'  armchair  on  the  left  of  the  fireplace.  The  two  novelists 

never  talked  publicly  about  themselves,  but  among  the  guests 

there  were  some  who  noticed  a kind  of  parallel  in  George  Eliot's 

and  Anthony  Trollope's  literary  courses.  The  earliest  successes 

of  both  with  the  general  public  won  the  favour  also  of  their 

1 

most  famous  fellow-authors."  Escott  asserts  that  George 

Eliot's  influence  upon  Trollope  was  very  great.  He  began  to 

deal  less  superficially  with  hie  characters  and  to  introduce 

questions  involving  graver  moral  issues.  "Among  the  most 

marked  of  Trollope's  mental  features  was  his  receptivity 

His  admiration  of  George  Eliot's  art  generally,  particularly 

of  those  qualities  in  her  work  that  secured  her  the  compliment 

of  comparison  with  Shakespeare,  did  without  affecting  his 

literary  style  and  method  to  some  degree  influence,  as  he  himself 

2 

felt,  his  views  of  character  and  life." 

Whether  this  influence  and  that  of  Congreve,  Bridges, 
Beesly,  and  Harrison,  whom  he-met  there,  gave  a Positivist 
tinge  to  his  views,  does  not  appear  in  his  Autobiography,  but 
they  must  at  least  have  made  him  very  familiar  with  Positivist 
teachings . 

1 

Escott,  Anthony  Trollope,  183. 

2 

Ibid.,  185. 


-100- 


Previous  mention  hae  been  made  of  the  fact  that  John 

Morley  was  one  of  the  Priory  group.  We  have  noted  his  connection 

with  the  Positivists  of  Oxford  and  his  introduction  to  the 

Positivists  of  London  upon  his  arrival  there,  through  George 

Eliot.  There  a double  Positivist  influence,  that  of  the  Priory 

1 

and  that  of  Mill,  was  at  work  upon  him.  He  tells  us  that  the 
system,  "supported  as  it  was  by  the  attraction  of  Comte’s  survey 
of  history,  laid  strong  hold  of  me;  and  at  one  time  I was  not 
far  off  from  a formal  union  with  this  new  church.  The  anti- 
sectarian instinct,  confirmed  by  the  influence  of  Mill,  held  me 
back.  Habitual  association  with  men  like  Spencer,  Tyndall, 

Huxley,  who  bitterly  condemned  official  Positivism  as  Catholicism 
minus  Christianity,  had  something  to  do  with  it.  Pierre 
Lafitte,  its  French  representative  — and  a most  brilliant, 
vivacious,  illuminating  representative  he  vras  — in  the  many 
conversations  we  had  together,  had  tact  enough  not  to  labour  the 
pontifical  side  of  Comte’s  system,  while  he  deepened  and 
strengthened  the  general  impression  of  the  soundness  and  value  of 
the  early  speculations,  and  he  did  more  than  anybody  else  to  fur- 
nish the  key  and  the  direction  to  my  French  studies,  whatever  for 
their  season  they  wero  worth.  He  elaborated  in  patient  detail 
and  with  scientific  method  Turgot'e  idea  of  progress,  and  made 
of  history  an  ordered  course,  not  a succession  of  vast  epidemic 
fevers.  Revolutions,  Reactions,  Reformations,  Counter-reformations. 
He  did  much  to  rescue  history  from  the  desperate  case  put  by 

1 

Morley,  Recollect  ions . I,  69-70. 


t 


t 


f 


t 


t 


i 


T 


t 


T 


T 


♦ 


T 


-101- 


Bishop  Butler  who,  one  night  walking  in  the  gardens  behind  his 
palace,  suddenly  turned  to  a chaplain  and  amazed  him  by  the 
question  whether  public  bodies  might  not  go  mad  like  individuals, 
for  in  truth  nothing  else  could  account  for  most  of  the  trans- 
actions in  history.  Frederic  Harrison,  in  those  days  incomparable 
as  controversialist,  powerful  in  historical  sense  and  knowledge, 
became  one  of  my  most  intimate  and  attached  friends  for  fifty 
years . 

"It  must  have  been  in  this  school  that,  besides  much 
else,  I began  to  absorb  the  lesson  that  I tried  to  apply  all 
through  — to  do  justice  to  truths  presented  and  services  rendered 
by  men  in  various  schools,  with  whom  in  important  and  even  in 
vital  respects  I could  not  in  the  least  bring  myself  to  agree. 

Comte  has  been  rightly  applauded  for  according  generous  recog- 
nition to  all  'who,  with  whatever  imperfections  of  doctrine  or 
even  of  conduct,  contributed  materially  to  the  work  of  human 
improvement.'  Far  less  elementary  in  those  days  than  it  seems 
now,  this  sank  deep  in  me,  and  in  spite  of  some  ephemeral 
severities  of  expression  that  might  perhaps  be  forgiven  to  one 
whose  pen  was  in  constant  employment,  most  of  it  controversial, 
it  became  a golden  rule  of  historic  and  literary  admeasurement." 

The  conversations  with  Lafitte,  Comte's  successor, 
which  Morley  speaks  of  here,  must  have  taken  place  during  the 
three  or  four  visits  which  Lafitte  made  to  England,  where  he  made 
a rather  favorable  impression.  "His  wit,  learning,  and  brilliant 
conversation  were  fully  recognised  by  judges  so  competent  as 
Morison,  John  Morley,  Sir  Grant  Duff,  Lord  Arthur  Russell,  Lord 


t 


T 


r 


* 


r 


l 


r 


f 


t 


t 


f 


-102- 


Houghton,  in  England;”  is  the  statement  made  by  Harrison,  ”and 
in  France  by  his  friends,  Sa inte-Beuve , Renan,  Madame  Adam,  and 
Anatole  Prance,  who  introduced  his  portrait  in  more  than  one  of 
hie  own  tales.”1 

A few  years  after  coming  to  London,  Morley  was  associated 

with  Lewes,  George  Eliot,  Trollope,  and  others  in  the  Fortnightly 
2 

project,  replacing  Lewes  as  editor  in  1866.  It  was  under  Morley, 

says  Harrison,  that  the  magazine  attained  its  real  success. 

About  this  time  he  first  made  the  acquaintance  of 

John  Stuart  Mill*  "Through  a French  friend  I was  presented  to 

3 

Mill  in  1865,"  he  says.  ”His  wife  had  died  in  1859,  and  he 

was  still  in  the  long  seclusion,  down  at  Blackheath,  that  fol- 
lowed his  loss.  He  had  sought  my  acquaintance  on  the  strength 
of  an  article  in  the  Saturday  Review  on  Hew  Ideas.”  Morley 
became  a regular  guest  at  the  Blackheath  Sunday  dinners  and 
maintained  the  attitude  of  an  admiring  disciple*  When  he 
went  to  America,  he  was  delighted  to  find  that  Mill,  in  letters 
of  introduction  given  him  to  Emerson  and  others,  described  him 
as  a personal  friend.  In  the  Blackheath  days,  "Grote,  Spencer, 
Fawcett,  Sir  Charles  Lyell,  Louis  Blanc .Thornton,  Cairnes,  were 


1 

Harrison,  Autobiography.  II,  38-39. 

2 

Morley  and  Robert  Lytton  were  good  friends  for  a long 
time  — until  a misunderstanding  put  an  end  to  their  intimacy. 
Among  Lytton' s letters  is  a rhymed  epistle  to  Morley: 

"Or  do  you  talk  treason 

With  the  Fortnightly  chiefs  of  the  Radical  garrison. 
Implacable  Beesly  and  high-minded  Harrison?" 

(Letters.  I.  325.) 

3 

Morley,  0£.  cit . . I,  52-53. 


r 


t 


r 


-103- 

among  the  few  others  at  these  ideal  symposia. " The  friendship 

and  personal  contact  with  Mill  continued  for  eight  years , until 
Mill  left  England  to  take  up  his  residence  in  France . Morley 

describes  himself  as  a young  disciple,  "but  adds  that  he  did  not 
lose  rudiments  of  a mind  of  his  own. 

He  was  a member  of  a small  club  called  the  Dominicans, 
formed  by  Mill  and  his  friends  in  order  to  enable  the  former 
to  expound  his  views  to  his  followers.  Harrison  was  sometimes 
there,  and  Leslie  Stephen. 

Although  the  influence  of  Mill  upon  the  thought  of 
Morley  was  considerable,  the  younger  man's  criticisms  of  Posi- 
tivism were  not  identical  with  those  of  his  master.  His  atti- 
tude toward  the  philosophy  is  pretty  well  expressed  in  his 
article  on  Comte  in  the  Encyclopedia  Britannica.  Comte* s 
statement  of  his  social  concepts  "in  relation  to  the  history  of 
civilization  of  the  most  advanced  portion  of  the  human  race,” 
as  developed  in  the  Philosophie  Positive , he  approves,  character* 
izing  it  as  a "masterpiece  of  rich,  luminous,  and  far-reaching 
suggestion.  7/hatever  additions  it  may  receive,  and  whatever 
corrections  it  may  require,  this  analysis  of  social  evolution 
will  continue  to  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  great  achievements 
of  human  intellect.'1 

Comte  had  suggested  that  Europe  would,  in  the  future, 
be  broken  up  into  many  small  states,  democratically  governed. 
Morley*s  view  of  this  matter  is  expressed  in  a letter  to  Sir 

f 


1 


T 


-104- 


1 

Arthur  Helps: 

"The  note  of  Harrison's  to  which  you  give  your  assent 
expresses  what  is,  I believe,  a central  conviction  of  Comte's  — 
that  all  Europe  will  eventually  form  itself  into  a large  number 
of  self-governing  but  closely  connected  communities.  The  state 
will  thus  ultimately  take  the  size  of  the  Platonic  or  Aristotelian 
TroAlS  . I confess  these  things  are  too  high  for  me.  I 

cannot  for  the  life  of  me  see  three  centuries  ahead.” 

The  Religion  of  Humanity  did  not  appeal  to  him  as 

2 

necessary.  He  quotes  from  Comte: 

"Society  can  only  be  regenerated  by  the  greater  subor- 
dination of  politics  to  morals,  by  the  moralizat ion  of  capital, 
by  the  renovation  of  the  family,  by  a higher  conception  of 
marriage  and  so  on.  These  ends  can  only  be  reached  by  a heartier 
development  of  the  sympathietic  instincts.  The  sympathetic 
instincts  can  only  be  developed  by  the  Religion  of  Humanity." 

Morley  objects  that  the  sympathetic  instincts  have  to  be  already 
developed  before  one  will  accept  Humanity  as  the  supreme  being. 

He  does  not  enter  into  the  controversy  over  the  fitness  of 
humanity  to  become  the  Grand  Etre,  but  observes:  "And  when  all 

is  said,  the  invention  does  not  help  us.  We  have  still  to  settle 
what  jis_  for  the  good  of  Humanity,  and  we  can  only  do  that  in  the 
old-fashioned  way.  There  is  no  guidance  in  the  conception.  No 
effective  unity  can  follow  from  it,  because  you  can  only  find  out 

1 

The  Go  rres  pond  ence  of  Sir  Arthur  Helps . 294. 

2 

Morley,  Article  on  C omt e , Encyclopedi a Br itannica. 


-105- 

the  right  and  wrong  of  a given  course  by  summing  up  the  advan- 
tages and  disadvantages,  and  striking  a balance,  and  there  is 
nothing  in  the  Religion  of  Humanity  to  force  two  men  to  find  the 
balance  on  the  same  side.  The  Oomtists  are  no  better  off  than 
the  Utilitarians  in  judging  policy,  events,  conduct.  The  various 
hypotheses,  dogmas,  proposals,  as  to  the  family,  to  capital, 
etc,,  are  merely  propositions  measurable  by  considerations  of 
utility  and  a balance  of  expediencies.  Many  of  these  proposals 
are  of  the  highest  interest,  and  many  of  them  are  actually  avail- 
able; but  there  does  not  seem  to  be  one  of  them  of  an  available 

kind,  which  could  not  equally  well  be  approached  from  other  sides, 

1 

and  even  incorporated  in  some  radically  antagonistic  system,” 

Another  of  Morley's  close  and  stimulating  friendships 

2 

was  that  with  George  Meredith,  of  whom  he  says: 

”It  would  be  hard  to  imagine  finer  personal  inspiration 
for  a beginner  with  a strong  feel  for  letters  in  their  broadest 
sense  — letters  in  terms  of  life,  and  in  relation  to  life  — 
than  was  George  Meredith  in  his  early  prime.  When  1 came  to 
London  at  five  or  six  and  twenty  to  try  my  fortunes  at  a hazardous 
vocation,  he,  being  ten  years  my  senior,  benevolently  took  to  me, 
and  extended  a cordial,  indulgent,  and  ever  faithful  hand.  I 
was  happy  enough  to  hold  it  until  the  very  end  of  his  life,  when 
he  left  me  as  one  of  his  three  trustees.  His  genius  in  his  early 

1 

Morley,  Article  on  Comte.  Bncyclopedia  Britannica, 

2 

Morley,  Recollections . I,  36-38. 


t 


t 


t 


-106- 


days  and  mine  had  met  little  encouragement,  and  his  name  was 
neither  widely  known  nor  at  all  valued  even  by  a few,  and  so  in 

truth  it  stood  for  long  years  after 

"He  came  to  the  morning  meal  after  a long  hour's  stride 
in  the  tonic  air  and  fresh  loveliness  of  cool  woods  and  green 
slopes,  w^ith  the  brightness  of  sunrise  upon  his  trow,  responsive 
penetration  in  his  glance,  the  turn  of  radiant  irony  in  his  lips 
and  peaked  beard,  his  fine  poetic  head  bright  with  crisp  brown 

hair,  Phoebus  Apollo  descending  upon  us  from  Olympus 

"His  personality  seemed  to  give  newr  life,  inner  mean- 
ing, vivacity,  surprise,  to  lessons  from  wholesome  books  and 
teachers,  and  to  shower  a sparkling  cataract  of  freshness  on  them 
all.  Even  the  sight  of  a devoted  worker  persevering  in  un- 
rewarded toil  against  clouds  of  difficulty,  was  in  itself  no 

ordinary  stimulus No  musical  note  from  a lute,  it  was 

the  call  of  the  trumpet  from  live  lips.  Live  writh  the  world. 

No  cloister.  No  languor.  Play  your  part.  Pill  the  day. 

Ponder  well  and  loiter  not.  Let  laughter  brace  you.  Exist 
in  everyday  communion  with  Nature.  Nature  bids  you  take  all, 
only  be  sure  you  learn  how  to  do  without." 

Meredith  had  teen  at  eel  ool  in  Germany  until  the  age 
of  sixteen,  but  his  thought  was  more  closely  allied  to  that  of  the 
Prench  philosophers.  He  came  to  England,  was  articled  to  a 
solicitor,  but  gave  that  up  for  letters  and  began  earning  his 
living  by  his  pen  at  the  age  of  twenty-one.  "In  London  he 
became  one  of  the  leading  spirits  in  the  group  of  young  philo- 
sophical and  positivistic  Radicals,  among  whom  were  John  (after- 


T 


t 


-107- 

wards  Lord)  Morley,  Frederic  Harrison,  Cotter  Morison  and 

Admiral  Maxse."  In  1867,  during  Morley*s  visit  to  America, 

1 

Meredith  edited  the  Fortnightly  Review  in  his  place* 

Morley  speaks  of  him  as  associated  with  the  Positivists 

2 

during  the  war  between  France  and  Germany: 

"When  the  war  between  France  and  Germany  came  to  a 
head  at  Sedan,  if  divided  our  small  Liberal  company.  The  Posi- 
tivist followers  of  Comte  were  some  of  them,  like  Harrison  and 
Beesly,  ardent  for  France,  Morison  an  ardent  German,  Maxse, 
who  was  not  a Positivist,  out  and  out  French.  'Morley  and  I,f 
wrote  Meredith  to  his  boy,  fdo  our  utmost  to  preserve  an  even 
balance.'  In  a notable  paragraph  next  year  he  says  to  Maxse: 
TWhat  I wish  is  that  you  and  I should  look  to  the  good  future  of 
men  with  some  faith  in  it,  and  capacity  to  regard  some  phases  of 
history  without  letting  our  sensations  blind  and  bewilder  us. 

I am  neither  German  nor  French,  nor  — unless  the  nation  is 
attacked  — English.  I am  European  and  Cosmopolitan  — for 
humanityi  The  nation  which  shows  most  worth  is  the  nation  I 
love  and  reverence.'" 

He  was  not  among  the  most  ardent  followers  of  Comte, 
however,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  his  views  had  a decided 
positivist  tendency,  for  he  s eld om  ment ions  the  philosophy  or 
the  philosopher  at  a time  when  such  people  as  Frederic  Harrison 

1 

Encyclopedia  Britannica,  Article  on  Meredith. 

E 

Morley,  Hecollect ions . 45-6. 


-108- 


had  the  names  Comte  and  Positivism  constantly  upon  their  lips. 

I have  been  able  to  find  Oomte's  name  only  once  in  Meredithls 

letters.  In  1865,  the  year  of  the  founding  of  the  Fortnightly 

1 

Review,  he  wrote  to  Captain  Maxse:  "You  should  read  Lewes* 

article  on  Comte  in  the  'Fortnightly'  before  this:-  also  Harrison's 
on  Cooperative  Labour." 

Meredith  criticised  the  Christian  church  chiefly  because 
of  its  clergy*  Such  paseages  as  the  following  from  his  letters 
indicate  a foreboding  distrust  of  the  priesthood: 

Philosophy  will  sap  its  (the  church  * s) structure . Most 
intelligent  young  men  will  not  seek  an  establishment  as  church- 
men, but  will  think  for  themselves  and  give  their  lives  to  other 
matters*  The  standard  of  churchmen  vail  be  lower*  "These  will 
find  themselves  at  variance  with  their  intellectual  superiors, 
and  in  self-defence  will  attempt  to  wield  the  Dogma  and  knock  us 

down  with  a club.  In  about  twenty  years'  time  we  may  expect 

2 

a conflict  to  come."  (Written  1865). 

(To  Maxse)  "We  differ  in  our  spirit  of  object  to  the 
dominant  creed:  but  I suppose  that  twenty  years  hence  we  shall 
not  differ.  When  the  Ministers  of  Religion  press  on  for  an 
open  rupture  by  attempts  at  persecution,  it  will  be  time  to  take 
rank  under  colours,  until  when  I hold  myself  in  reserve.  I 
don't  want  the  day  to  be  advanced.  I think  you  altogether  to 
impetuous:  500  years  too  fast  for  the  human  race:  I think  that 

1 

Meredith,  Letters . 174. 

2 

Ibid.,  173. 


' 

r 


< 

i 


- 


■ , 


t 


-109- 

where  th©  Christian  ministers  are  guilty  of  little  more  than 

boredom,  you  have  got  them  in  a state  of  perfection,  and  at  least 

owe  them  your  tolerance  for  theirs:-  And  so  I shall  continue  to 

think  until  next  I go  to  church . 

"The  man  of  the  country  that  fights  priestcraft  and 

priests  is  to  my  mind  striking  deeper  for  freedom  than  can  be 

struck  anywhere  at  present,  I foresee  a perilous  struggle  with 
2 

them," 

With  Christianity  itself,  however, .he  was  sympat hetic 

and  took  the  Positivist  attitude  of  viewing  it  as  a phase  of 

human  development.  In  remonstrating  with  Captain  Maxse  on  the 

3 

extreme  radicalism  of  the  latter,  ha  says: 

"Between  you  and  your  Philosophy  you  would  have  no  home 
on  our  planet.  You  presume  moreover  to  declare  yourself  as  if, 
perceiving  a system  to  be  faulty,  it  was  an  imperative  duty  to 
shred  it  to  the  winds.  You  must  bear  in  mind  that  Christianity 
will  always  be  one  of  the  great  chapters  in  the  History  of 

Humanity Prom  the  Pagan  divinity  to  the  Christian,  I 

see  an  advanced  conception  and  the  nearer  we  get  to  a general 
belief  in  the  abstract  Deity  — i.  e.  the  more  and  more  abstract, 
the  nearer  are  men  to  a comprehension  of  the  principles 
(morality,  virtue,  etc.)  than  which  we  require  nothing  further 
to  govern  us." 

The  Deity  mentioned  here  is  not  identified  with  the 

1 

Meredith,  Letters . 175. 

2 

Ibid.,  252. 

3 

Ibid. . 171. 


-110- 


Oomtist  Humanity.  In  fact  Meredith  clings  to  a more  mystical 
conception  of  the  Supreme  Being  — 

nTbe  Great  Unseen,  nowise  the  Dark  Unknown, 

To  whom  unv/ittingly  did  he  aspire 
In  wilderness,  where  bitter  was  his  need; 

To  whom  in  blindness,  as  an  earthly  seed  1 

For  light  and  air  he  struck  through  crimson  mire." 

2 

Perhaps  hie  letter  to  his  son,  written  in  187£,  is  as 
clear  a statement  of  his  religious  views  as  he  makes  anywhere. 

"The  Christian  teaching  is  sound  and  good:  the  eccles- 
iastical dogma  is  an  instance  of  the  poverty  of  humanity*s  mind 
hitherto,  and  has  often  in  its  hideous  fangs  and  claws  shown  whence 

we  draw  our  descent Belief  in  religion  has  done  and  does 

this  good  to  the  young;  it  floats  them  through  the  perilous  sensual 
period  when  the  animal  appetites  most  need  control  and  transmu- 
tation. If  you  have  not  the  belief,  set  yourself  to  love  virtue 
by  understanding  that  it  is  your  best  guide  both  as  to  what  is  due 
to  others  and  what  is  for  your  positive  personal  good.  If  your 
mind  honestly  rejects  it,  you  must  call  on  your  mind  to  supply 

its  place  from  your  own  resources Virtue  and  Truth  are 

one.  Look  for  the  truth  in  everything,  and  follow  it,  and  you 
will  be  living  justly  before  God.  Let  nothing  flout  your  sense 
of  a Supreme  Being,  and  be  certain  that  your  understanding  wavers 
whenever  you  chance  to  doubt  that  he  leads  tc  good.  We  grow 
to  good  as  surely  as  the  plant  grows  to  the  light.  The  school 


1 

Quoted  by  J.  A.  Hammerton  in  George  Mered ith  in 
Anecdote  and  Criticism,  p.  320. 

2 

Meredith,  Letters . 237-8. 


-111- 


haa  only  to  look  through  history  for  a scientific  assurance  of  it. 
And  do  not  lose  the  hah  it  of  praying  to  an  Unsoen  Divinity. 

Prayer  for  worldly  goods  is  worse  than  fruitless,  tut  prayer 
for  strength  of  soul  is  that  passion  of  the  soul  which  catches 
the  gift  it  seeks." 

The  idea  of  humanity  and  its  claim  upon  our  loyalty, 
its  importance  in  our  thoughts,  was  a prominent  one  to  him. 

Much  association  with  adherents  of  the  Religion  cf  Humanity 
must  have  emphasized  it.  The  spirit  which  moved  Robert  Lytton 
to  stress  the  ethical  and  human  side  of  Ohr i st ianity , which 
prompted  Ruskin,  and  Huxley,  to  give  a religious  significance 
to  the  service  of  humanity,  and  which  caused  Meredith  to  say  that 

Ruskin1 s work  would  he  found  good  hy  posterity  because  he 

1 

brought  humanity  into  it  — this  spirit  was  positivist  in 
character  and  in  accord  with  the  Religion  of  Humanity,  whether 
derived  from  Comte  or  not.  Meredith  was  religious  in  spirit, 
but  he  had  less  interest  in  personal  immortality  than  in  virtue, 
and  he  exhorted  the  soldiers  of  Humanity  to  its  defense  with 
ardor  and  passion. 

"They  number  hoary  heads  in  that  hard  flock. 

Trim  swordsmen  they  put  forth;  yet  try  thy  steel. 

Thou  fighting  for  poor  humankind,  wilt  feel 
The  strength  of  Roland  in  thy  wrist  to  hew 
A chasm  sheer  into  the  barren  rock,  g 

And  bring  the  army  of  the  faithful  through. 


1 

Meredith,  Letters,  199. 

2 

Ouoted  by  Morley,  Recollections , I,  38. 


-112- 


G OCCLUSIONS 

From  80  limited  a study  of  the  subject  as  this  has 
necessarily  been,  it  is  difficult  to  draw  definite  and  detailed 
conclusions  concerning  the  extent  of  Positivism  in  England.  Mill 
it  was  who  introduced  it,  and  through  his  writings  and  personal 
influence,  as  well  as  those  of  his  disciples,  among  them  George 
Henry  Lewes,  it  spread  among  a limited  number  of  liberal  thinkers. 
As  the  writings  of  the  earlier  Positivists  came  to  be  read  in 
the  universities,  they  drew  the  attention  of  a group  of  young  men 
to  the  works  of  Comte,  and  these  men,  on  leaving  the  universities 
and  going  to  London,  formed  rather  intimate  associations  with 
Lewes  and  George  Eliot  at  the  Priory,  and  with  Mill  at  Blackheath 
and  the  Dominicans  Club.  In  these  places  they  came  in  contact 
with  Positivists  of  all  shades  of  thought. 

Very  few,  if  any  of  them  (with  the  possible  exception 
of  Richard  Congreve)  accepted  the  doctrines  of  Comte  in  t ot o . 

The  greater  number  inclined  to  the  interpretation  of  Mill  — 
the  acceptance  of  the  philosophy  with  its  scientific  basis,  the 
law  of  three  states,  anc  the  evolutionary  conception  of  history; 
a belief  in  the  idea  of  a Religion  of  Humanity,  with  a refusal 
of  its  too  complicated  ritual  and  ceremony;  and  the  rejection  of 
Comtek  ideas  for  the  future  organization  of  society. 

The  greatest  differences  between  these  men  seem  to 
have  come  about  over  the  Religion  of  Humanity.  A small  group 
of  such  adherents  as  Congreve  and  Harrison  formed  a Positivist 


-1 15- 


church  and  carried  on  regular  worship.  Others,  as  for  instance 
the  Leweses,  felt  a truly  religious  sentiment  towards  humanity, 
hut  did  not  subscribe  to  the  touots  of  the  Positivist  church  to 
the  extent  of  uniting  with  it.  Mill  was  one  of  those  who 
approved  of  the  idea  of  this  religion,  but  did  not  seem  to  feel 
the  need  of  an  organized  worship.  Moreover,  there  v*ere  a number 
of  people, who,  while  entertaining  a feeling  towards  humanity 
essentially  religious,  scoffed  at,  or  violently  opposed  the 
theories  of  Comte.  To  this  group  belonged  Ruskin  and  Huxley* 

There  were  certain  elements  of  Positivism  which  seemed 
likely  to  make  a strong  appeal  to  Englishmen  at  this  time.  That 
it  was  founded  upon  science  was  one  of  the  chief  claims  made  for 
it  by  its  adherents.  This  was  a period  at  which  science  was 
becoming  more  prominent  than  ever  before,  but  we  find  that  those 
men  of  letters  usually  considered  the  apologists  for  new  scien- 
tific theories  — Huxley  and  Spencer  — adopted  an  antagonistic 
attitude  toward  Positivism. 

Another  element  of  appeal  was  the  religious  one,  and 
it  was  hardly  more  successful  than  the  scientific  one.  With 
their  old  faith  crumbling,  many  people  felt  an  imperative  need 
for  a new  one  to  take  its  place.  And  yet,  to  such  men  as 
Matthew  Arnold  and  John  Addington  Symonds  this  new  religion 
based  on  reason  had  no  attraction,  while  George  Meredith,  ac- 
cepting certain  Positivist  doctrines,  kept  his  more  or  less 
mystical  belief  in  a Deity. 

Wherein  was  the  Religion  of  Humanity  a failure?  Some 
natures,  such  as  that  of  John  Stuart  Mill,  are  so  constituted 


- 


> 


■ 


, 


- 

« 


-- 


-114- 


that  they  do  not  seem  to  feel  with  emotional  intensity  the 
necessity  of  a close  personal  communion  with  a Deity,  and  are  so 
radical  that  they  have  no  hesitation  in  "breaking  with  sentimental 
traditions  of  the  past.  For  such  men  the  new  religion  was 
adequate*  To  those,  however,  for  whom  a large  portion  of  the 
efficacy  of  religion  lay  in  a sense  of  personal  dependence  upon 
the  infinite  strength  of  a Superior  Being  which  does  not  partake 
of  the  evident  weakness  of  humanity,  Comte,s  religion  seemed  a 
mere  flimsy  make -shift.  Moreover,  it  lacked  the  appeal  of  old 
associations  and  of  hoary  traditions,  developed  slowly  through 
the  ages.  Men  who  were  accustomed  to  associate  the  word  worship 
with  the  conception  o f an  infinitely  grander  Being  than  that  of 
humanity,  whose  frailties  and  weaknesses  they  so  well  knew,  such 
men  found  something  grotesque  in  the  thought  of  worshipping 
their  own  species.  It  was  too  widely  removed  from  the  "God  of 
our  Fathers;”  and  so,  withheld  by  reason  from  worshipping  a God, 
they  preferred  to  worship  not  at  all,  or  to  wait  and  hope  for  a 


sublimer  faith. 


-115- 


PART  I AL  LIST  OP  WORKS  USED 


Arnold,  Matthew,  Poems , Oxford  edition,  Oxford  University  Press, 
1920. 

Bain,  Alexander,  Autobiography,  Longmans,  Green,  and  Go.,  1904. 

Bain,  Alexander,  John  Stuart  Mill.  A Criticism:  With  Personal 
Recollections*  Longmans,  Green,  and  Co,,  London, 

1882. 

Baring.  The  Hon.  Maurice,  Article  on  H.  Taine  in  the  Encyclopedia 
Britannioa.  Vol.  XXVI. 

Barsellotti,  Giacoma,  La  Philosophic  de  H.  Taine,  Felix  Alcan, 
Paris,  1900. 

Benn,  A.  W* , English  Rat ionalism  in  the  19th  Century,  London,  1906. 

Blind,  Mathilde.  George  Eliot.  Little.  Brown,  and  Co..  Boston. 

1904. 

Bridges,  John  Henry,  II lust  rat i ons  of  Posit ivism.  Edition  by  H. 
Gordon  Jones,  Watts  & Co.,  London,  1915. 

Brown,  Horatio  F.,  John  Ad d ington  Symond s . A Biography . John  C. 
Nimmo,  1895. 

Calkins,  Mary  Whiton,  The  Persistent  Problems  of  Philos ophy. 
Macmillan,  Sew  York,  1912. 

Carlyle,  Thomas,  Sartor  Resartus.  Everyman  Edition,  Button, 

New  York,  1918. 

Comte,  Auguste,  The  Positive  Philosophy*  Translated  by  Harriet 
Martineau,  3rd  edition,  Kegan  Paul,  Trench,  Trubner 
& Co*,  London,  1893. 

Cook,  E.  T.,  Life  of  John  Ruskin.  Macmillan,  New  York,  1911. 

Cooke,  George  Willis,  George  Eliot : A Crit ical  Study  of  her 

Life  Writings  and  Philosophy.  Houghton,  Mifflin  & Co., 
Boston  and  New  YorTFj  1884. 

Cross,  J.  W. , George  Eliot  's  Life  as  related  in  her  Letters  and 
Journals  * Harper  & Bros.,  New  York ' 1885. 

Dictionary  of  National  Biography.  Article  on  George  Grot e . 

Dictionary  of  National  Biography . Article  on  J.  Cotter  Mor is on. 


r 


-116- 


Eliot,  George,  Complete  Works.  St.  James  edition,  Postlethwaite , 
Taylor,  & Knowles , London,  1908. 

Encycloped ia  Br itannica . Article  on  Richard  Congreve . 

Encycloped ia  Britannica,  Article  on  George  Meredith. 

Encyclopedia  Britannica.  Article  on  J.  Cotter  Moris  on. 

Escott,  T.  E.  S.,  Anthony  Trollope . His  Works . Associates  and 
Literary  Originals.  John  Lane  Co.,  London,  1913. 

Grote,  Mrs.,  The  Personal  Life  of  George  Grot e . John  Murray, 
London,  1873. 

Hammerton,  J.  A. , George  Mo red ith  in  Anecdote  and  Criticism. 

Grant  Richards,  London,  1909. 

Harrison,  Frederic,  Autobiography,  Macmillan  & Co.,  London,  1911. 

Harrison,  Frederic,  The  Philosophy  of  Common  Sense,  The  Macmillan 
Co.,  Hew  York,  1907. 

Harrison,  Frederic,  Ruskin.  Macmillan  and  Co.,  London,  1907. 

Helps,  Sir  Arthur,  The  Correspond ence  of . Edition  by  E.  A.  Helps, 
John  Lane,  London,  1917, 

Huxley,  Thomas  Henry,  Hume , English  Men  of  Letters  Series. 

Huxley,  Thomas  Henry,  On  the  -Physical  Bas  is  of  Life . Fortnightly 
Review,  1869. 

Lanson,  Gustave,  Hist oire  de  la  Litt erature  Francaise . neuvieme 
Edition  Revue,  Hachette,  Paris,  1906. 

Lytton,  Robert,  First  Earl  of.  Personal  and  Literary  Letters . 
Longmans,  Green,  & Co.,  London,  1906. 

Lytton,  Y.  A.  G.  R.  Bulwer-Lytt on.  The  Life  of  Edward  Bulwer . 
London,  Macmillan,  1913. 

Maitland,  Frederic  William,  The  Life  and  Letters  o f Leslie 
Stephen.  Duckworth  & Co.,  London,  1907. 

Martineau,  narriet.  Autobiography,  Edition  by  Maria  Weston  Chap- 
man, Houghton,  Mifflin  and  Company,  Boston,  1877. 

Mill,  John  Stuart,  Auguste  Comte  and  Positivism,  5th  edition, 

Regan  Paul,  Trench,  Trubner  & Co.  Ttd . , .London,  1907. 

Mill,  John  Stuart,  Autobiography , Henry  nolt  & Co.,  Hew  York. 


-117- 


Mill,  John  Stuart,  Letters , Edition  "by  Hugh  S.  R.  Elliot, 
Longmans,  Green  & Co.,  London,  1910. 

Mill,  John  Stuart,  Ut ilitarianism.  Liberty,  and  Ropreeentat ive 
Government , Everyman  Edition,  1912. 

Morley,  John,  Article  on  C omt  e . Encycloped ia  Br itannica , Vol.  VI 

Morley,  John,  Viscount,  Recollect  ions . The  Macmillan  Co.,  New 
York,  1917. 

Renan,  Ernest,  Souvenirs  d TEnfance  et  de  Jeunesse . Nelson,  Paris 

Ruskin,  John,  Eors  Clavigera,  Lana  Eeter  & Co. 

Ruskin.  John.  The  Crown  of  Wild  Olive,  John  Wiley  & Sons,  New 
York,  1885. 

Spencer.  Herbert.  An  Autobiography,  L.  Appleton  & Co..  New  York, 
1904. 

Stephen,  Leslie,  George  Eliot . English  Men  of  Letters  Series, 
Macmillan  & Co.,  London,  1909. 

Trollope,  Anthony,  Works . Autobiography.  Copyright  edition, 
Bernhard  Tauchnitz,  Leipzig,  1883. 


